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This thesis consists of three self-contained essays on the economics of Labour Supply. 
 
Chapter 2 surveys the Labours Supply behaviour in the UK over the past four decades 
(LFS 1975 – 2016) on three different aspects: static labour supply, life cycle labour 
supply and labour supply in trade unions. Over static and life cycle labour supply, I 
explore both the intensive margin and the extensive margin across different 
demographic characteristics: gender, marital status, economic activity, industry, 
occupation, education, ethnicity and sector. In the context of trade unions, I only explore 
the intensive margin, since the union premiums are conditional on people having 
positive working hours/wage.  
Our results suggest that Education affects working hours, but only for women. Whereas, 
men`s working hours are hardly different on average across all education levels; Despite 
the fact that men are much more likely to work full time than women, the proportion of 
part-timers amongst men has increased dramatically over time; The historically 
persistent hours gap between single and married workers has been closed in the recent 
decade due to the steady increase in married women`s working hours; The best 
remunerated workers are most likely to work a standard full-time working week, those 
working longer or shorter hours than standard are significantly less well paid. 
Education`s effects on lifecycle labour supply again are obvious only amongst women, 
where the higher the educational attainment, the higher the lifecycle profile lies. The 
effect of marital status on the lifecycle profiles can be understood by the division of 
VII 
 
labour within a family: it pushes up the lifecycle hours profiles of married men and 
lowers that of married women.  
Both union membership and union coverage rates have been falling over time, though 
the fall in the rates of male workers are more pronounced. The patterns are consistent 
by education, sector, industry and occupation; The union premiums (wage and hours) 
are consistent in patterns, with membership premium decreases and coverage premium 
increases over time. 
Chapter 3 provides renewed evidence for married couples` labour supply 
responsiveness to the change in their wages and nonlabour income in the UK. Taking 
advantage of the time series of reforms, I apply the difference-in-differences techniques 
to elicit the causal effect of tax and benefit on couples` labour supply behaviour at both 
margins (intensive and extensive). I find that women are more responsive than men at 
all margins. and wage changes have larger effects on the decision to work, and smaller 
effect on hours of work. The fact that women have much larger intertemporal 
substitution effects than their spouse, implies that women, especially the lowly educated 
are more prone to smooth their consumption across lifecycle.  
Union coverage has been declining over the past four decades. However, collective 
bargaining and trade unions are still of crucial importance concerning the regulation of 
many issues in labour market, such as wage setting; hours` regulating, especially 
overtime hours; and fringe benefits. Chapter 4 “Estimating trade union effects on 
working hours: Evidence from the UK 1996-2016” examines the effects of trade unions 
on people`s working hours. I explore the effects in three hours` dimensions: total usual 
hours, standard hours and overtime hours, all in weekly terms. I also differentiate the 
membership effects from the coverage effects, which proves to be important. There are 
three primary findings from the analysis. First, there are consistent and significant union 
effects on working hours, the size of the effects ranges from -6 hours to 6 hours 
depending on characteristics, such as gender, types of effects, groups of people etc., 
Secondly, the size of the effects are falling overtime, this may reflect the declining 
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densities of unions. Lastly, our results also suggest that trade unions do use overtime as 
a means to stabilize working hours and expand membership. And trade unions do 
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“Those who work their land will have abundant food, but those who chase 
fantasies have no sense.” 
–––– Proverbs 12 : 11 
 
Our understanding of the economic determinants of labour supply behaviour has not 
changed substantially over the last few decades. The focus of recent work has continued 
to be on the effect of the nature of budget constraints on hours of work and participation. 
While earlier work was structural and exploited the nonlinearities in budget constraints 
to identify Maximum Likelihood estimates of wage and income elasticities, recent work 
has shifted to reduced form research that explores the effects of some reform to budget 
constraints using natural experimental variation in pooled cross-section or, in the case 
of lifecycle labour supply, panel data. Yet the overwhelming majority of the literature 
has continued to find that these effects are small, and often statistically insignificant. 
Indeed, the explanatory power of these models, both static and the lifecycle versions 
have not been encouraging. At best, they account for very little of the observed 
variations in work behaviour; at worst, the key implications of these models are refuted 
– for example, many instances are inconsistent with positive compensated differentials 
(Blundell et al., 2000).  
Moreover, there have been important institutional changes in the labour market over 
the last few decades that have not been explored at all in the labour supply context. Two 




rise in the education levels of individuals. It is surprising that these labour market 
phenomena have passed the literature by. In the case of unionization, one of the 
important features of the standard model of the behaviour of unions (Lewis, 1986) is 
that they raise wages through reducing labour supply. Yet, despite the central role of 
unions, there has been virtually no empirical literature that allows for a role for 
unionization in the determination of hours of work. In the case of unionization – only a 
few exceptions come to mind (Perloff and Sickles 1987; Earle and Pencavel, 1990; 
DiNardo, 1991; Trejo 1993). Indeed, it is very peculiar that part of the empirical 
literature of the effects of union status uses log earnings (usually weekly) as the 
dependent variable, while the other part of the literature uses the log wage (usually 
hourly) and no attention appears to be paid to how unionization affects hours despite 
the fact that log earnings are additive in log wage and log hours. In the case of education, 
it is very surprising that the literatures on short-run labour supply in terms of hours of 
work and participation at a point in time never appears to meet the literature on long-
run dimension of labour supply – in the form of education. Not only does education 
play no role at all in the determination of labour supply, where it does appear in 
empirical modelling, it is used as an exclusion restriction – that is, it is deliberately 
excluded from labour supply modelling so as to reserve its role as an instrument for 
wages. Yet, short-run labour supply is effectively the utilization rate of the stock of 
human capital that embodies education. This seems like an unsatisfactory state of affairs 
and it is the purpose of this thesis to try to redress these omissions from the existing 
literature. 
The analysis is motivated by the need to shine some light on these two neglected factors 
in the hope that they provide some improvement in our understanding of labour supply 
behaviour. Thus, our primary objective is to complement existing thinking about labour 
supply. Given our complete ignorance of the empirical relationships between labour 
supply, individual union status (membership and coverage), and education levels we 
first dedicate a chapter to simply describing the trends in the UK`s workhorse labour 
market dataset, the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a large cross-section survey 
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(with only a short panel element to it) that describes labour supply in great detail. This 
dataset is the UK equivalent of the US Current Population Survey (CPS), LFS has been 
in existence since the 1970s and contains information on unionization and education 
levels as well as hours, in great detail and wages.  
Chapter 2, “Survey on Labour Supply Behaviour in the UK: Evidence from LFS & 
QLFS1975-2016”, surveys trends in Labour Supply behaviour in the UK over the past 
four decades (LFS & QLFS 1975 – 2016) focusing on three different aspects: Static/ 
Life cycle labour supply; education; and labour supply in trade unions.  
The time seems right to shine some light on these two important gaps in our 
understanding – while we know that unions raise log earnings (Anderson et al., 1990) 
and they raise log wages (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003 etc.), no one appears to have 
explored the possibility that the two effects may be different – that would imply that 
unions directly affect hours, and we have experienced a pronounced drop in 
unionization and coverage over the period covered by LFS. We find that both the union 
membership rate and the union coverage rate have been falling over time in LFS, and 
the fall in the rates of union coverage is more pronounced. The patterns are consistent 
by education, sector, industry and occupation; Older cohorts are more likely to be a 
non-union member yet covered by a collective agreement. 
Similarly, with education. Some research uses earnings as a dependent variable 
(Blundell et al., 2001) and some uses an hourly “wage” (obtained mostly from dividing 
earnings by hours) (Harmon and Walker, 1995). On average, graduates work longer 
hours than non-graduates and this is reflected in the differences in the returns to 
education defined in terms of earnings, compared to the wage returns. Again, it is a 
good time to explore this – the UK has experienced a rapid growth in education levels 
over the last couple of decades. 
With respect to static and life cycle labour supply, we explore both the intensive margin 
and the extensive margin across different demographic characteristics: sex, marital 
status, economic activity, industry, occupation, education, ethnicity, sector and full-
time/part-time. In the context of trade unions, we only explore the intensive margin, 
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since the union premiums are conditional on people having positive working 
hours/wage.  
We offer this work in the spirit of “shining a light” on two neglected and important 
aspects of labour supply. Note that nothing here denies the validity of previous research 
providing that work is based on structural estimation or quasi-experimental methods. 
The work here complements the existing literature. 
Our results have uncovered some interesting, yet undocumented, trends. For example, 
despite the fact that men are much more likely to work full time than women, the 
proportion of part-timers amongst men has increased dramatically over time; The 
working hours of non-white workers have decreased, while that of white workers are 
fairly consistent in time, however, the composition have changed: a fall in white men`s 
working hours and a rise in white women`s hours; Overtime hours shows a similar 
pattern where the overtime hours series is consistent in time, while the composite has 
changed, with unpaid overtime increases, and paid overtime decreases both proportion 
and hours; Although the inactivity rate in the UK has roughly maintained at 25 to 20 
percent level over time, the make-up of the inactive has changed. Men have dropped 
out of the labour force in unprecedented numbers, whilst women have entered the 
labour force to such an extent that the two trends broadly offset each other; With respect 
to lifecycle education`s effects again are obvious only amongst women, where the 
higher the educational attainment, the higher the lifecycle profiles lie. Within the union 
context, the union premium (wage and hours) are consistent in patterns, with 
membership premium decreases and coverage premium increases over time. This may 
offer an incentive to free-ride the collective good trade unions produce, exacerbating 
the free-riding problem. 
The rest of the results confirm what has been known in the literature. In terms of static 
labour supply, working hours are cyclical, though the fall in working hours during the 
recent 2008 great recession has been unexpectedly small; Education affects workings, 
but only for women. The higher education a woman receives, the more she is going to 
work. The gap is particularly large between degree level and below. Whereas, men`s 
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working hours hardly vary on average across all education levels; The historically 
persistent hours gap between single and married workers has been closed in the recent 
decade due to steady increase in married women`s hours of work; The hours of non-
white workers have decreased, while that of white workers are fairly consistent in time, 
however, the composition have changed: a fall in white men`s hours of work and a rise 
in white women`s hours; The best remunerated workers are most likely to work a 
standard full-time working week, those working longer or shorter hours than standard 
are significantly less well paid. 
As for participation, the findings are that the inactivity rate in the UK has roughly 
maintained at 20 to 25 per cent level over time. Education works as a driver for labour 
market participation, the higher the level of educational attainment, the more likely an 
individual participates; White people are much more likely than ethnic minority to 
participate.  
The lifecycle labour supply profiles are found to be roughly an inverse “U” shape for 
both hours and participation. However, if decomposed by gender, men`s lifecycle 
profiles form an inverse U shape, peaking during the age of 35 to 50. While women`s 
lifecycle profiles form an M shape curve, where the dip in the middle happens at the 
late 20s to mid-30s, reasonably coinciding with the pregnancy and child-rearing period. 
Factors such as education and marital status can cause the lifecycle profiles to shits. 
Education`s effects again are obvious only amongst women, where the higher the 
educational attainment, the higher the lifecycle profiles lie. The effect of marital status 
on the lifecycle profiles can be understood by the division of labour within a family. 
Since it pushes up the lifecycle profiles of married men and lowers the lifecycle profiles 
of married women, indicating women on average still act as the main care provider 
within a family.  
We also find that both the union membership rate and the union coverage rate have been 
falling over time, though the fall in the rates of male union/covered workers are more 
pronounced. The patterns are consistent by education, sector, industry and occupation; 
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Older cohorts are more likely to be a non-union membership yet covered by a collective 
agreement.  
Although the primary contribution to the literature here is to document the relevance of 
the effects of education and union status on labour supply, we also look at the role of 
budget constraints. This is confined to chapter 3 where we explore and extend the 
seminal work by Blundell and others (1998). We intend to bring their evidence up-to-
date with LFS data (2002-2016). We seek to address this issue by exploiting the time 
series tax and benefit reforms in the UK during the data period. Their grouping method 
is applied to elicit the causal effect of wages at both margins (intensive and extensive). 
In line with previous empirical literature, we find that women are more responsive than 
men at all margins, and wage changes have larger effects on the decision to work, small 
effects on hours of work. The fact that women have much larger intertemporal 
substitution effects than their spouses, implies that women, especially the low educated, 
are more prone to smooth their consumption across lifecycle. 
Yet, understanding how policy affects work incentives, through budget constraints, 
remains a primary driver of research in labour economics. While, exploiting education 
as a source of exclusion restrictions has become passé, the literature has moved to 
difference in difference analysis of responses to policy changes that affect some groups 
differently than others, and interpreting the effects as if they were structural findings on 
labour supply elasticities that could be parachuted across the policy arena. We adopted 
the Blundell etc (1998) method, where rather than looking for the full solution to taxes 
and benefits, we simplify the problem by exploiting the discontinuity at tax kinks, then 
exploit the change in the UK wage structure and the numerous tax and benefit reforms 
that occurred to control for the endogeneity of wages and taxes. In the history of the 
LFS there have been important reforms of both kinds. There is little merit in exploiting 
only one side of the government budget constraint as Blundell et al., (1998), because 
tax and welfare reforms go hand in hand and may even be jointly determined.  
Another phenomenon that is missing from the traditional discourse of hours of work 
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are institutional constraints. One of the most important institutional phenomena of the 
past several decades has been the diminishing influence of trade unions. And strangely, 
trade unions in labour economics continues to be harnessed by labour demand and not 
supply. We have few reasons to believe that institutional phenomena would leave 
supply considerations unaffected. Unions are a case in point. There is a huge literature 
on the effects of unions on log earnings and we think of this relationship being driven 
through wage rates, indeed a significant minority of the literature is concerned with log 
wage rates. Yet log earning is the sum of log wage and log hours. There is very little 
literature that attempts to explore the hours and union relationship conditional on wage.  
Therefore, we attempt this in chapter 4 of this thesis as a prelude of exploring the 
unconditional relationship in more detail in future. Union coverage has been declining 
over the past four decades. However, collective bargaining and trade unions are still of 
crucial importance concerning the regulation of many issues in labour market, such as 
wage setting; hours` regulating, especially overtime hours; and fringe benefits. Chapter 
4 “Estimating trade union effects on working hours: Evidence from the UK 1996-2016” 
examines the effects of trade unions on people`s working hours. I explore the effects in 
three different hours` dimensions: total usual hours, standard hours and overtime hours, 
all in weekly terms. I also differentiate the membership effects from the coverage 
effects, which proves to be important. There are three primary findings from the 
analysis. First, I find that there are consistent and significant union effects on working 
hours, the size of the effects ranges from -6 hours to 6 hours depending on 
characteristics, such as gender, types of effects, groups of people etc., Secondly, the size 
of the effects are falling overtime, this may reflect the declining coverage of unions. 
Lastly, our results also suggest that trade unions do use overtime as a means to stabilize 
working hours and expand membership. And trade unions do alleviate firms` greed on 
workers in terms of unpaid overtime hours. 
All three essays are analysed in the context of UK data. Cautions must be exercised in 
extrapolating the conclusions reached in this thesis to other countries, as the analysis 
carried out in these essays are tied with the institutional backgrounds. This means that 
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the findings can provide input for labour market policies in developed countries which 















Survey of Labour Supply Behaviour in the UK 
             ---Evidence from LFS & QLFS 1975-2016 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The primary objective of this PhD thesis is to complement existing thinking about 
labour supply. However, given our relative ignorance1 of the empirical relationships 
between labour supply, individual union status, and education levels, we therefore 
decide to dedicate this first substantive chapter to simply describing the trends in the 
UK`s workhorse labour market dataset, the Labour Force Survey (LFS), and so lay the 
foundation for the chapters to come. We constrain our analysis to the UK data because 
the UK is an interesting laboratory for such work and the LFS is the only dataset that 
contains the requisite variables. 
Our analysis is done from three different perspectives: The static labour supply, the life 
cycle labour supply and the labour supply in the context of trade unions. We particularly 
choose the first two aspects because they are the crucial theoretical distinctions that 
have been made in the study of labour supply so far (Heckman, 1993). Unionization is 
highlighted because there has seen a large drop in trade union coverage, union increases 
hourly wages and earnings, and so seem likely to have effects on hours of work. We 
believe that incorporating unions into empirical labour supply analysis is novel.  
By the static and life cycle labour supply, both the intensive margin and the extensive 
margin are explored across different demographic characteristics, such as gender, 
 
1 The majority of the empirical trends documented in the literature are unemployment trends, very few looks at 
participation or hours of work. Even amongst these very few works, many studies the specific sub-groups of the 
population or period, such as youth, single parent, older men, participation and hours over recessions etc (Gregg 




education, marital status, full-time/part-time, sector, industry, occupation and ethnicity. 
In the context of trade unions, we only explored the intensive margin due to the fact 
that the premiums are conditional on people having a positive working hours or wage. 
We therefore describe the characteristics of the union densities in the UK, then go on to 
establish the time series trends of the densities, and finally estimate the union premiums: 
membership premium and coverage premium as well as wage premium and hours 
premium.  
Although in this chapter, we have focused on the working behaviour (participation and 
hours of work), we also show trends on inactivity stratified by reason, unemployment 
and self-employment in the appendix (Figure 2.34 – Figure 2.38) as further information. 
Amongst the four reasons stratified: student, housewife, retired and other; the 
proportion of the housewives has decreased dramatically, echoing our findings of the 
increase in married women`s labour market participation and attachment. The 
unemployment trends shown are in line with those already known in the literature 
(Gregg and Wadsworth, 1999 and 2011). Moreover, the self-employment rates rise 
steadily from 10 per cent to 15 per cent, and the percentage increase doubles amongst 
men.  
In terms of working behaviours, our results have uncovered some interesting yet 
undocumented trends. For example, despite the fact that men are much more likely than 
women to work full time, the proportion of part-timers amongst men has increased 
dramatically over time; The hours of work of non-white workers` have decreased, 
whilst hours of white workers are fairly consistent in time, though the composition has 
changed greatly: a fall in white men`s working hours and a rise in white women`s hours. 
The overtime hours show a similar pattern as in that the aggregate overtime hours` 
series being consistent in time, the unpaid overtime increases, and paid overtime 
decreases for both proportion and hours.  
As for participation, although the inactivity rate in the UK roughly maintains at 25 to 
20 percent level over time, the make-up of the inactivity has changed. Men have 
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dropped out of the labour force in unprecedented numbers, and women have entered 
the labour force to such an extent that the two trends broadly offset each other; With 
respect to lifecycle education`s effects, they are only obvious amongst women, where 
the higher the educational attainment, the higher the lifecycle profiles lie. Within the 
union context, the union premium (wage and hours) are consistent in pattens, with 
membership premium decreases and coverage premium increases over time. This may 
offer an incentive to free-ride the collective good trade unions produce, exacerbating 
the free-riding problem. 
2.2 Data 
The data used in this paper are drawn from three data sources: LFS (1975-1991), QLFS 
(1993-2016) and a combination of seasonal and quarterly data of QLFS2(1993 – 2016). 
The QLFS is the largest regular household survey in the UK. It is based on a country-
wide random sample of almost 53 thousand households for each quarter. Although it is 
not panel data, it provides consistent and accurate micro level information over a long 
period of time.  
In the hours of work analysis, we restrict our sample to include workers with age 
between 25 and 60 whose normally weekly hours are non-zero. Self-employed persons 
are excluded as well as those who did unpaid work for their family. In the participation 
analysis, we restrict our sample in similar principles but the age range extended to 
between 16 and 65 to reflect the working age population. The details of the data are 
described in table 2.1, we have collapsed the information for each decade for the ease 
of presentation. 
 
2 The reason for two data sources is that the UNION variables are only present in the QLFS public release data files 
from 2009 onwards. We therefore requested seasonal data from UK Data Service, which contains UNION variables 
as early as 1993, discontinues from 2005 onwards. Therefore, we consolidated both data sources and formed our 
data for trade union analysis which starts from 1996 to 2016, with 2006-2008 missing. 
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2.3 Static Labour Supply 
In this section, we will first lay out the theory at work on labour supply, then we go on to 
explore the time series trends of labour supply over different demographics in our datasets at 
both the intensive margin (Working Hours) and the extensive margin (Participation), with 
discussions of findings and implications thereof. 
2.3.1 Theory at work 
The framework that economists typically use to analyze labour supply behavior is called the 
neoclassical model of labour-leisure choice (Cahuc et al., 2004). The model isolates the factors 
that determine whether a particular person works and, if so, how many hours he/she chooses to 
work. By isolating these key factors, the model helps to understand and explain how labour 
supply decisions are made. 
The notion that an economic agent`s labour supply decision is based on the trade-offs between 
consumption and leisure can be summarized by the utility function: 
                                                             𝑈 = 𝑓(𝐶, 𝐿)                                                               (1) 
Where U represents the economic agent`s utility level, the higher the level of U, the happier 
the person. C is consumption, and L is leisure. Consumption and leisure are both assumed to 
be monotonic increasing in utility, which means the more the better. They are also constrained 
by the economic agent`s income and time respectively, known as the budget constraint. 
                                                              𝐶 = 𝑤ℎ + 𝑌                                                               (2) 
Where w is the hourly wage rate, h represents the hours worked, and Y is the non-labour 
income 3 . With the behavioral assumption that the economic agent wishes to choose the 
particular combination of goods and leisure that maximizes his/her utility. Therefore, the labour 
supply decision is thus a utility maximization problem against the budget constraint. Solving 
for this problem, we should find the first order condition which implies that  
                                                              
𝑀𝑈𝐿
𝑀𝑈𝐶
= 𝑤                                                                (3) 
This means that at the chosen level of consumption and leisure, the marginal rate of substitution 
equals the wage rate. That is to say that the rate at which a person is willing to give up leisure 
hours in exchange for additional consumption equals the rate at which the market allows the 
 
3 The specification of the budget constraint implies that the worker does not save in this model. The worker spends all the 
income in the period under analysis. 
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work to substitute one hour of leisure time for consumption. If we express equation (2) into a 
function of labour supply h. It is clear that there are two factors (w and Y) in play which affects 
labour supply. The impact of the change in nonlabour income (holding wage constant) on hours 
worked is thus an income effect. And the impact of the change in wages is the substitution 
effect, which illustrates what happens to the worker`s consumption bundle as the wage 
increases, holding utility constant. In below sections, we explore the empirical evidence in our 
dataset with the theory in mind. 
 
2.3.2 Participation 
we will explore the behavior of labour market participation in this section. First and foremost, 
as with participation, we use the definition from ILO/OECD, as measured by the proportion of 
people who are either working or actively seeking to work among the working age population4. 
As the left panel of figure 2.19 illustrates, the labour force participation rate in the UK over the 
past four decades has been fairly consistent at more or less an 80 percent level. However, if we 
look at men and women separately, the picture becomes interesting. Where the participation 
rate of men has been decreasing steadily over time, whilst that of women rises sharply from 
mid-1970s to early 1990s, after which still rising but at a milder rate. Another interesting feature 
is the sudden significant rise in participation for both men and women, from 2010 onwards. 
This reflects recovery from the 2008 crisis.  
Participation rate is an important indicator of the labour market performance. However, it is 
the opposite of participation, the inactivity which is often the focus of analysis and policy 
interest. Economic inactivity measures people without a job but who are not classified as 
unemployed because they have not been actively seeking work within the last four weeks 
and/or they are unable to start work within the next two weeks by ILO/OECD standards. 
The right panel of figure 18 depicts the time series trend of inactivity rate. We exclude students 
from the sample because of inconsistencies in classification of the LFS over time, and the fact 
that though inactive in the labour market, students are actively gaining skills. The figure shows 
that inactivity in the UK roughly maintains at 20 to 25 percent, though slightly decreased over 
time. The make-up of the inactive is radically different now because the composition has 
shifted dramatically toward men. Men have dropped out of the labour force in unprecedented 
numbers, while women have entered the labour force to such an extent that these two trends 
 
4 Working age is defined as males aged 16-64 and females aged 16-59. 
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broadly offset each other (see figure 18). 
In contrast, the inactivity rate for women has fallen sharply from 42 percent in 1975 to 35 
percent in 1990, then 30 percent in 2016. an almost equal and opposite swing compared with 
men. Indeed, most of the net rise in female employment over this period has been met by 
increased economic activity from those previously outside the labour force. The proportion of 
the inactive that are male has been more than doubled since 1975, from 8 percent to 18 percent. 
 
2.3.2.1 Participation and Age 
Who are the inactive? There has been wide speculation that the increase in male inactivity 
simply reflects the increase in early retirement. We therefore tabulated the inactive sample by 
age and gender as can be seen in table 7 below.  
Male inactivity has risen for all age groups to some extent (Table 7). The most dramatic increase 
has been amongst the 25 to 49 and 50 to 64 age groups. 24 percent of men over 50 are now 
economically inactive, some 1.3 million, compared with less than 15 percent in 1975. However, 
this is not only a problem for older workers. Around 7 percent of non-student men between age 
25 and 49 are now inactive. In 1975, the figure is less than 3 percent. For women, most of the 
rise in participation has been amongst women aged between 25 and 49. For this group, 
inactivity fell from 32.5 percent to 20 percent, i.e., 10 to 6.5 million. Significantly there is a 
smaller, but definite fall in inactivity amongst women over the age of 49, in complete contrast 
to the trend for men of a similar age. 
2.3.2.2 Participation and Education 
Labour force participation is also heavily dependent on educational attainment (Keane and 
Wasi, 2015). The lower the level of qualifications held, the more likely it is that an individual 
will be economically inactive. More than 38 percent of men with no formal qualifications are 
now inactive, on the contrary, less than 10 percent of men with degrees are outside the labour 
force. As can been seen from table 2.8 and figure 2.20a and 2.20b, for men, inactivity has risen 
amongst all education groups in roughly equal proportions, so that the share of different skill 
groups in the inactive stock is little different than in 1975. In contrast, the fall in inactivity rates 
amongst women has come entirely from within the more highly educated group. For less 
educated women (below NVQ3) inactivity rates have either remained constant or in the case 
of those with no qualifications have risen sharply. 
Therefore, the perception that male inactivity is simply a reflection of an increase in early 
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retirement is unfounded. Our data shows that several factors suggest that this is not the principal 
cause. First, inactivity is not exclusive to older men. Inactivity rises and fall for men under 50 
in much the same way as the pattern of inactivity amongst older men. Second, inactivity is 
greatest amongst the least educated. If inactivity were simply an early retirement effect, we 
would expect to see inactivity concentrated amongst the wealthier groups of the workforce, i.e., 
the more highly educated. However, this is not the picture we observe in our data.  
 
2.3.2.3 Participation and Ethnicity 
Ethnicity may also have a role to play in the variations in labour market participation. The 
empirical evidence in literature often suggest that people of ethnic minority background tend 
to have different labour market outcomes, such as wage, employment etc. for reasons of 
language deficiency (Miranda and zhu, 2013; Di Paolo and Raymond, 2012 etc.), cultural 
difference (CSI5 report 2016) and more. We therefore, are interested to see whether there are 
different patterns in labour market participation rate amongst people of different ethnic 
background. In figure 2.21, we firstly show the participation rate time series of white and non-
white (left panel), then we go on to detailed comparisons between different ethnic minorities 
and white (right panel).  
Overall, the participation rates of both white and non-white rise slightly over time, though, 
non-whites are (more than 10 percent) less likely to participate in the labour market than their 
white counterparts. Decomposing the trend by gender, we see that the pattern is consistent in a 
sense that the participation rate of non-whites, men and women, are lower than their white 
counterparts. However, what is worth noting is that the gap between white men and non-white 
men are a lot smaller than that between white women and non-white women. Also, the gap 
between white men and non-white men is narrowing significantly in time, while the gap 
between white women and non-white women is widened at the early 1990s, then kept 
consistent since then at a 15 percent level. 
The patterns between specific ethnic minority and white are generally in line with those found 
between non-white and white. We also find that men of Chinese background and men of other 
ethnic background are less likely to participate; amongst women, those of Indian, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh background are the least likely to participate, followed by women of Chinese 
background and women of other ethnic background. 
 
5 Centre for Social Investigation, University of Oxford 
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To sum up, while the numbers of economically inactive have not changed much in the last four 
decades, the composition of inactivity has changed radically. There are now some 6 million 
men of working age, excluding students, who are economically inactive according to LFS; 
Forty years ago, there were only around 2.6 million. The inactivity rate has risen for all men, 
but is concentrated amongst those aged 50 and over and amongst the least educated and ethnic 
minorities. At the same time, inactivity rates for women have fallen significantly. Most of this 
rising labour force participation is concentrated amongst more highly educated women aged 
between 25 and 49. When the economy expands the incidence of economic inactivity normally 
falls. However, this effect has been much more muted and confined to women.  
 
2.3.3 Hours of work 
Figure 1 shows the total usual hours series for the whole sample (left panel), and men and 
women separately (right panel) between 1975 and 2016. The shaded areas are the periods of 
recessions. It is typical in recessions for total hours to fall (Gregg and Wadsworth 2011), but 
the magnitude varies greatly in the data. Amongst the recent four recessions, the fall in working 
hours are much more pronounced in the first three, other than a very minor drop in the last one 
as shown clearly in the left panel of figure 1. The reasons suggested and documented are a 
combination of supportive monetary and fiscal policies of the government and BoE (Bank of 
England) during the recession and high profitability levels among firms going into the 
recessions (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2011). It is evident that from the end of the early 1990s 
recession till 2008, the British economy has experienced a continued expansion in output, 
alongside low and stable inflation and high and growing employment. The improved 
macroeconomic stability and increased market flexibility, combined with greater opportunities 
in a growing global economy, has prepared the companies more resilient when entering into 
the recession. Decomposing the trend by gender, we observe different patterns of working 
behaviors between men and women. First and foremost, the working hours of men is centered 
around a mean of 44 hours, whereas a mean of 30 hours for women.  
The most common reason for this is that women remain the major care provider within a family 
despite the increase in women`s participation in the labour market in the past decades. This 
leads to greater proportions of women working part-time compared with men, this is supported 
by figure 4 in section 3.1.2 below. There could also be a preference explanation behind, which 
suggest that women prefer less hours than men do, especially married women, when combined 
family incomes are high (Mitchell, 1984; Hakim, 1996 etc.).  
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Secondly, apart from the cyclical changes, the long-term hours patterns are very different 
between two genders as well. the working hours of men are falling down slightly (7%) before 
mid-1980s, then picking up (10%) until early 1990s and falling down again (6.5%) afterwards. 
In contrast, the working hours of women was almost level (recessions excluded) before mid-
1980s, and it rises steadily afterwards (13% increase in total). Complementary to the widely 
documented increasing trend of women`s participation in the labour market (Goldin, 1995; 
Blau and Kahn 2005; World Bank 2019; ILO, 2018 etc.), this series offer the evidence of 
women`s increasing effort in the labour market at the intensive margin (working hours), 
completes the picture.  
 
2.3.3.1  Hours of Work and Education 
The level of education affects working hours (Blundell et al 2016), particularly so for women. 
Plenty empirical evidence shows that the length of time women work in the labour market 
varies according to their level of education (Macran, Joshi and Dex, 1996 etc.). The channel 
known in literature between education and hours of work is mainly through wage rate, this is 
well researched and documented in human capital literature that education increases wage rate 
(Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974; Heckman 1974 etc.).  
The time series trend of educational attainment during the period of our data6 are shown in 
figure 2.2. There are more and more people demand higher education (NVQ57), more than 20 
percent increase throughout the whole period. Whilst, higher education below degree level 
(NVQ4), such as nursing8 and teaching certificate, see a mild decrease in the early 1980s and 
leveling off thereafter. Decomposing by gender, it is clearly noticed that both genders have 
increased their demand for higher education (NVQ5), but the increase amongst women are 
stronger, which catches up with and surpasses that of men in mid-2000s and still rises at a faster 
speed. 
Figure 2.3 confirms the empirical evidence by showing clearly that there is not much difference 
in men`s working hours across different educational levels. However, as for women, the 
 
6 1975 and 1977 are excluded from the data, based on the fact that the sample sizes are significantly smaller in these two years, 
causing the percentages deviating too far from the general trend, confuses the interpretation of the graph. 
7 NVQs (National Vocational Qualifications). In the paper, we follow the equivalences used by London School of Economics`s 
research lab, where there are five levels, NVQ5: degree level and above; NVQ4: higher education diploma below degree, 
teaching and nursing certificates; NVQ3: A levels or equivalent; NVQ2: O levels or GCSE equivalent: NVQ1: other 
qualifications. To simplify the analysis, we collapsed NVQ1 to 3 to form NVQ1-3. 
8 Nursing became an all-degree profession in 2009, and the degree path for an aspiring registered nurse is four years. This 
means that the first cohort graduate with a nursing degree is in 2013. Since our data is from 1975 to 2016. The impact of this 
change on our trend is minimal.   
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difference between different educational levels are far more significant. Those with NVQ5 
qualifications are on average working 36 hours, around 4 hours more per week than their NVQ4 
counterparts (32 hours), and around 6 hours more per week than their NVQ1-3 counterparts 
(30 hours), such gaps are more obvious and consistent from mid-1980s onwards. This may 
suggest that for men the income effect and substitution effect are of similar magnitude for all 
educational levels, they cancel each other. However, for women, the higher they are educated, 
the more dominant substitution effects are. The human capital literature has overwhelmingly 
relied on wage as the sole explanatory channel between education and labour supply. The 
underlying implication of our finding suggests that there is a greater commitment to the labour 
market associated with higher education, at least amongst women. That is, an increase in hour 
of work increases the utilization rate of human capital.  
 
2.3.3.2 Hours and Full time/Part time 
Full-time/Part-time working is an important dimension where people adjust their working 
hours. Comparative studies have demonstrated that the shift to part-time work is most dramatic 
in the UK compared to other countries (Bardasi and Gornick 2000) Our data does confirm such 
a trend in the UK. Figure 2.4 below shows the Full-time/Part-time working trend in our dataset. 
One of the most obvious highlights of the series is that the share of part-time working has risen 
significantly (10 percent) in recent decades. After decomposing by gender, it suggests that such 
increase in part-time working is mainly brought about by male workers, female workers also 
see an increase in percentage of part-time working, but much less pronounced (3.5%). 
There have been many known disadvantages attached to part-time working. The most crucial 
one of which, perhaps, is that such jobs tend to be in low paying, low status, feminized 
occupations (Blackburn et al, 2001). A shift from full-time to part-time work after childbearing 
often involves a downward shift to a lower status occupation (Blackwell, 2001). Why part-time 
then? Hakim (1996) argues that most part-time workers `voluntarily` choose part-time work 
despite the above-named disadvantages, because part-time work is a convenient way for people, 
mostly women to reconcile work and family. Moreover, she claims that female part-time 
workers have different tastes, commitments and preferences about work compared to female 
full-time workers, who are more like their male counterparts. The LFS variable FTPTW asks 
people why they work part-time. Although there are recognized problems with this question in 
that it provides too superficial an analysis of the possible reasons. With this caveat in mind, it 
shows that the majority of people say they work part-time because it is their preferred option; 
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they did not want a full-time job. 
It can be seen from figure 2.59 above that this statement is made by the vast majority of women 
working part-time. Whist for men, the percentage is a lot lower. And it is expected that the rate 
for “Could not Find FT job” is cyclical, and that the rate for “Did not want FT job” is counter-
cyclical for both genders. 
However, other researchers (Bardasi and Gornick, 2000) has questioned what ̀ voluntary` really 
means. Burchell, Dale, and Joshi (1997) observe that while LFS attempt to distinguish between 
voluntary and involuntary part-time work, they do not ask why respondents might state a 
preference for part-time work, that is whether this was a forced choice or their own preference. 
It is recognized that preferences are expressed from the vantage point of current circumstances, 
needs the range of perceived alternatives, and therefore would be expected to change in 
different circumstances (Fagan, 2001). Therefore, it could be argued that, rather than working 
part-time voluntarily, some women may choose to work part-time because there is no realistic 
alternative. 
In addition, researchers argue that work-time attitudes have to be interpreted in the context of 
society and at an individual level. For example, at the individual level both men and women`s 
employment commitments are influenced by occupational position and domestic 
circumstances (Fagan, 2001). It is therefore misleading to use employment status and gender 
as an explanation for their commitment to work. At then societal level, differences are observed 
in relation to preferences, part-time work patterns and child rearing across countries, which 
questions the homogeneity of part-time women`s working time preferences and suggests that 
social policies, gender norms and working time regimes are all influential (Fagan, 2001). In 
the UK, a lack of adequate and affordable childcare provision (Cohen, 1993) prevents feasible 
alternatives to women who work part-time. To illustrate this, Burchell, Dale and Joshi (1997) 
point to a UK survey that found that “14 percent of women part-timers would like full-time 
work but were prevented from seeking it by domestic commitments”. 
Moreover, family considerations also affect men`s evaluation of the conveniences of work 
schedules, although women are more likely to be influenced by childcare and domestic 
responsibilities (Fagan, 2001). Full-time working hours are very long in Britain and part-time 
hours are very short compared with other developed economies, as can be seen in figure 2.6. 
 
9 The variable FTPTW only starts in 1994. In our analysis, we excluded the reason for being in FT education, which contains 




Fagan (2001) also find that when questions about working hours are asked, both male and 
female part-timers, especially those in low paid manual jobs invariably want to work longer 
hours, whilst both male and female full-timers, especially those in well paid managerial and 
professional roles want their hours shortened. This not only questions the assumed gender 
differences in working patterns but also highlights that the choice for women, particularly 
mothers, is to undertake either very long or very short hours when neither alternative is actually 
the preferred option.  
Figures 2.6 shows the mean hours series by full-time/part-time. It confirms the fact that there 
is a huge gap (more than double) between full-time/part-time hours. Decomposing by gender, 
we can see that full-timers in both genders works a lot harder than their part-timer counterparts. 
Men full-timers on average works 5 hours more than women full-timers, men part-timers 
follow a similar pattern in the 1970s and early 1980s, but the gap narrows since, and closes up 
since mid-2000s. An interesting trend here, is the increase in men working part-time which is 
only noticed recently, the reasons documented so far are the “hollowing out”10 of mid-skilled 
jobs in the male labour market, as they move to other parts of the world, or disappearing 
altogether as a result of automation, such as manufacturing. This compositional change 
together with the increase in the intensity of female workers` labour market attachment has 
made the average part-time hours of both sexes converge.  
 
2.3.3.3  Hours and Marital Status 
Over the past several decades, there has been a major transformation undergoing in family 
structure in the western world, this change can be characterized by a large increase in the labour 
force participation of women, a sharp increase in the rate of divorce, a drop in the fertility rate 
and an increase in the number of female-headed households and never-married men and women 
(van de Klaauw, 1996; Eckstein and Lifshitz, 2015). These changes have led to growing 
awareness that both marital status and fertility decisions are strongly interrelated with labour 
supply decisions (van de Klaauw, 1996), again particularly with women. In our analysis, we 
explore the degree to which marital status (Single and married) accounts for differences in 
working hours in the labour market. Here we only look at the comparisons between single and 
married individuals, based on the fact that the widowed and the divorced are very small in 
number.  
 
10 Resolution Foundation Report 2018. 
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Figure 2.7 presents the hours series of the single and the married. On the aggregate level, people 
who are single on average works (3 hours) more than the married, though the difference is 
disappearing in time. This can be attributed to the increase in female participation and effort in 
the labour market (Goldin, 1995; Blau and Kahn 2004; World Bank 2009, 2011; ILO, 2018 
etc.). After the decomposition by gender, the disappearing difference as observed between the 
two marital groups is further confirmed by the significant increase in mean working hours (22%) 
amongst the married women across the period, though single women`s hours have not changed 
much. Amongst men, the married are working 2-4 hours more than their single counterpart, 
and the gap is fairly consistent throughout time. The findings are in line with the empirical 
evidence in literature (Ahituv & Lerman, 2005) that entry into marriage exerts positive and 
significant impact on men`s working hours. Fertility decisions are often seen as a main driver 
for the changes in labour supply decisions within households (van de Klaauw, 1996). We 
therefore explore further on how working times vary across different family types in terms of 
the existence of children and small children (aged under 2 years old). Table 1-2 shows the hours 
parents work with or without the presence of children in the past four decades, to make it easier 
to report, we group the hours into five groups: less than 20, 20-29, 30-40, 41-50 and above 50. 
Children under the age of two are believed to be heavily dependent on their parents which may 
reduce their parents` labour supply intensity further, we therefore report separately in table 3 
the hours of parents with children under the age of two as a comparison. 
Across Table 1 to 3, the general patterns are that parents` working hours are becoming more 
dispersed in time, with a big shift from the range of 30-39 hours to over 50 hours amongst men 
without children; and from 40-49 hours to over 50 hours amongst men with children. 
Meanwhile, there is a smaller proportion moves to lower hours brackets. As for women, the 
shift is from 40-49 bracket to 20-29 when they have children, which suggest that the presence 
of children affect mothers` working hours more than it does to that of fathers. Amongst women 
without children in their family, we see the proportions are moving from the 30-39 brackets to 
40-49 and over 50 hours significantly in time, this confirms what we see in figure 1 that women 
increase both their participation and their work intensity in the labour market.  
The UK government has working time regulations which stipulate that average weekly working 
hours should largely be within 48 hours. This suggest that the over 50 hours bracket should 
mostly be overtime hours, paid or unpaid. From tables 1-3, we see that more fathers are working 
over 50 hours with or without children. Fathers with children are 5 percent more likely to work 
over 50 hours than those without. And for mothers, they are much less likely to work over 50 
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hours than their male counterpart. However, in time, the number of women who work over 50 
hours has doubled. Where there are small children (less than the age of 2) present in a family, 
fathers are more likely to work overtime, but only within 50 hours, while the mothers are less 
likely to work overtime. This may suggest that though mothers in such circumstances are the 
main care provider, fathers may also help in home production in some less intensive way. 
 
2.3.3.4  Hours and Ethnicity 
For a variety of cultural and other reasons, as well as differences in characteristics such as 
education etc., average working hours vary between people of different ethnic groups in the 
UK. Figure 2.8 compares the average working hours of White and non-white. The average 
working hours for non-white decreases by 14% in our data period while for the White they 
largely level off at around 37 hours. Gender-wise, the average working hours vary for both 
genders at different times. Amongst men, the average hours of non-whites are decreasing more 
significantly than those of the whites forming a gap of 5 hours in recent decade. Amongst 
women, there has been a historical gap between that of white and non-white. However, the gap 
closes from 2010 onwards, with the average working hours of white women still on the rise.  
Further into ethnicity details, there is no significant correlation between race and working hours, 
but there is suggestive evidence that both men and women of the Chinese background were 
working more hours on average than people of other ethnic background. However, the general 
pattern remains consistent and clear across different ethnicities that men of ethnic minority 
background in the UK are working less intense than they used to be. With women, figure 2.9 
suggests that the average working hours of white women have been historically lower than that 
of their ethnic minority counterparts, however, they are catching up in the recent decade, and 
the gap is closed completely in recent five years. 
Figure 2.10 shows the full-time & part-time proportions by ethnicity, which is an important 
dimension where people adjust their working intensity. It is easy to find that women are much 
more likely than men to work part-time, and this is the case across all ethnic groups. The 
proportion of ethnic minority women working part-time is slightly lower than that of white 
women, so although their employment rate is lower overall, once in employment ethnic 
minority women are slightly more likely than white women to work full-time. And again, we 
see that percentage of part-time working white women are decreasing steadily, therefore the 
percentage of full-time increasing to roughly the same level as ethnic minority women. On the 
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other hand, ethnic minority men are more likely to work part-time than white men (less likely 
to be in full-time employment) and this is also consistent across ethnic groups. 
 
2.3.3.5 Hours and Occupation (White and Blue collar) 
If we believe that the changes in working hours happen mostly for those at the top and bottom 
of the wage distribution, as Bell and Freeman (1994) and Gregg and Manning (1997) suggest, 
then we would expect to see significant differences in the number of hours across occupations. 
In figure 2.11, we do see that this seems to be the case more and more so in recent decades than 
before 1980s. When gender difference is considered, working hours are fairly homogeneous 
across occupations11 amongst men, though the gap is widening somehow since late 2000s. 
Amongst women, the distribution of hours across occupations varies considerably, a gap of 
roughly eight hours has been very consistent between white-collar and blue-collar workers.  
Those in blue-collar occupations much more likely to work short hours, and they are more 
likely to work part-time as well. On the contrary, those in white-collar occupations such as 
managerial occupations and clerical workers are predominantly full-time. Also, it is important 
to account for full and part-time working status in gender difference as well, since women has 
been known for high concentration in the part-time work (Blackburn et al., 2001).  
 
2.3.3.6 Hours and Industry12 
Due to possible reasons of industry specific characteristics, such as requirement of frequent 
overtime and presence/lack of presence of trade unions etc, we do observe that there have been 
wide differences in average working hours across industries. 
Men working in Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing/Hunting are the most intensively working group, 
with an average of 55 weekly working hours, and men in the rest of the industries have more 
or less the same average hours (45 hours). Amongst women, the average hours are between 27 
and 37 hours across different industries. Women in energy & mining and Engineering & 
Manufacturing mostly work longer hours. to a lesser extent, those working in services and 
construction work fewer than average hours.  
 
11 Due to inconsistency in occupation specifications in our data, in order to be consistent and to simplify the analysis, we 
group the nice categories into two groups: white collar and blue collar. 
12 The industry variable originally contains 11 different classifications, to simplify the analysis, we re-classified the variable 
into five different industry groups: Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing/Hunting, Energy & Mining, Engineering and 




2.3.3.7  Overtime Hours 
In addition to the above patterns of usual working hours, we look at overtime hours separately 
in this section. to be precise, how overtime varies across different demographics in the past 
decades. Our analysis focus on the dimensions of percentage who are working overtime and 
mean overtime hours worked. Figure 12 below offers the bird view of overall time series of 
unpaid and paid overtime in our sample. It is worth noting that the overtime sample starts from 
1984, when the overtime variable POTHR and UOTHR was first introduced in LFS.  
The top two panels of figure 2.13 are the series of mean overtime hours worked, unpaid and 
paid. it suggests that unpaid overtime hours have been rising in recent decades, and the 
difference between two genders has been persistently narrowing. whilst mean paid overtime 
hours are roughly levelling off in past decades. However, different genders behave differently. 
Male workers` mean overtime hours are falling slightly, and female workers` mean overtime 
hours are rising contrarily. The lower panels picture the time series of the percentage of working 
people in the sample, it is not difficult to find the rapid increase in the percentage of people 
working unpaid overtime, and the sharp fall in the percentage working paid overtime. To 
explore the possible reasons behind this trend, we decompose the trend further by 
demographics, such as education levels, marital status, family types and occupation. 
We outline the overtime trends by education levels, measured by NVQs in figures 2.14 & 2.15. 
Figure 2.14 present the percentage of male and female workers in each education level working 
paid or unpaid overtime. The most prominent features of the figure are that people with NVQ5 
& NVQ4 education levels are more likely to work unpaid overtime rather than paid overtime. 
Yet people with NVQ1-3 levels are more likely to work paid overtime, especially so for male 
workers in this category. One interpretation for this could be that unpaid overtime proportion 
is high among the highly educated, because workers see this as increasingly important to their 
career prospects in the face of increasing labour market competition, particularly for female 
workers. while paid overtime has been more common among lowly educated workers as they 
need to work extra hours in order to make ends meet (Harkness 1999), it could also be that the 
wider presence of trade unions among blue collar occupations which alleviate the greed of 
corporations. 
Figure 2.15 depicts the mean overtime hours series (paid & unpaid) by education levels. 
Comparing this with figure 2.14, we can see that, though the percentage of people who work 
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overtime varies much across different education levels, the difference in mean overtime hours 
worked is small (1-3 hours per week). And there is a pattern revealed consistent between paid 
and unpaid overtime hours series, being that the overtime hours gap is narrower for highly 
educated, and wider for lowly educated between two genders. This is somehow expected, 
amongst female workers, the higher educational attainment they have, the similar their working 
behaviors are compared with those of their male counterparts. 
Figure 2.16 presents the overtime series by marital status (single or married). The left panel 
shows the trend of percentage of overtime workers, and the right panel the mean overtime hours 
worked.  
The patterns are in line with previous findings (figure 12) of increasing percentages of unpaid 
overtimers and decreasing percentages of paid overtimers. Amongst the workers who are single, 
there are roughly 20 percent work unpaid overtime, rarely any difference between genders; 
though the percentage is on a mild rise in time. When it comes to paid overtime, the percentage 
is flat at 20 percent for female single workers, but for male single workers, it is way higher, but 
trending downwards from 50 percent to 30 percent. Amongst the workers who are married, we 
see that the increase percentage in unpaid overtimers are mainly female workers, and the 
decrease in paid overtimers are mainly male workers.  
Regarding the average overtime hours, both male and female workers, single or married are 
working harder in the past decades. Tough the increase in unpaid overtime hours is more 
significant than that in paid overtime hours. Gender-wise, amongst the overtimers who are 
single, there is a small gender gap (1 hour roughly), which is closed in unpaid overtimes after 
2010 and closing in paid overtimes. The gender gaps are greater amongst the married than they 
are amongst the single. This may suggest the traditional family structure where women are the 
main care provider, in terms of childcare and home production, still plays an important role in 
many families.  
Another important factor that affects labour supply within a family is the presence of children. 
Therefore, we further explore the overtime hours based on family types in terms of whether 
children/small children present in the family in tables 4 to 6. “Small children” here is defined 
as children under the age of two. They are analysed separately, because they require more 
intensive care which normally translates into more hours and energy dedicated by their parents. 
Table 2.5 looks at the overtime in families without children; table 2.6 overtime in families with 
children; and table 2.7 overtime in families with small children. Generally, the presence of 
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children in a family affects women`s overtime more than it does to men in both the dimensions 
of percentage and mean overtime hours. However, men who have children, particularly small 
children, are (2% - 3%) more likely to work overtime than those without. Whilst, women who 
are with children are (4% - 6%) less likely to work overtime. This is expected with the 
traditional family structure in mind. It is not a surprise to find that men are more likely than 
women to do overtime, and that men`s mean overtime hours are higher than that of women in 
all cases. However, when the paid and unpaid overtime are looked separately, men are more 
likely to work paid overtime, and women unpaid overtime. And the increase in the percentage 
of women working overtime are only reflected in the unpaid overtime trend.  
The fact that different occupations behave differently has long been documented in literature 
as occupational segregation in terms of pay (Crompton, 1997) and total hours as evidenced in 
figure 2.11 in previous section. Although the changes in occupational segregation are sensitive 
to methods of measurement (e.g. Blackburn et al., 1993), the overall segregation has remained 
largely stable (Hakim, 1996; Blackburn et al., 1993; Blackburn et al., 2001). In this section, we 
explore the overtime trend by occupations – White collar and Blue collar, paid and unpaid. 
The time series of percentage working overtime (left panel) and mean overtime hours (right 
panel) by occupation: white collar (WC) and blue collar (BC) are shown in figure 2.17. 
Amongst those in white-collar occupations, the percentage of working unpaid overtime has 
been almost constant in time at around 40 percent, however the composition has changed, with 
the percentage of male unpaid overtimers decreasing and female unpaid overtimers increasing, 
thus closing the gap from the year 2000 onwards. And the trend for white-collar paid overtimers 
has been falling slightly in time from 20 percent to 17 percent, with no gender difference noted. 
Contrary to white-collar overtimers, the blue-collar overtimers are a lot more likely to work 
paid overtime, especially male workers (50% to 70%), though the series is trending down 
significantly.  
 
2.3.3.8  Hours of Work and Earnings 
We have seen that hours of work have become increasingly dispersed over the past decades. 
An interesting and related question arises, what does the relationship between hours of work 
and earnings look like. Unfortunately, LFS wage data only goes back to 1993. Figure 2.18 plots 
the mean hourly earnings for men and women across hours. 
For both men and women, earnings rise steadily with hours up to around forty-eight hours a 
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week before starting to fall. This indicates that those who are best remunerated are most likely 
to work a standard full-time working week. Those working longer or shorter hours than this 
are significantly less well paid. This fits well with earlier work of Harkness (1996) which has 
shown a growing gap between the earnings of full-time and part-time employees. It should, 
however, be noted that the chart does not control for any differences in the characteristics of 
workers and therefore does not tell us anything about any causal relationship between hours of 
work and earnings.  
This relationship between hours and earnings holds even after account is taken for occupational 
differences. The only exception is amongst professionals, whose earnings are inversely related 
to hours of work. These professionals who work relatively short paid hours, may include those 
who hold more than one job or who are paid high consultancy rates for a relatively short number 
of working hours.  
 
2.4 Life-cycle Labour Supply 
In the previous section, the patterns we show on labour supply have been static, i.e., the 
decisions of whether to work and how many hours to work from the viewpoint of a worker 
who allocates his time in a single time period (Year, in this case) and ignores the fact that he 
will have to make similar choices continuously over many years. In fact, because consumption 
and leisure decisions are made over the entire working life, workers can trade some leisure 
time today in return for additional consumption tomorrow as the basic lifecycle discussions 
(see Heckman, 1974) suggest.  
For instance, a person who devotes a great deal of his/her time to working today can save up 
some of the earnings and use these savings to increase his/her consumption tomorrow. Or in 
another case, an individual makes a decision to delay entering into the labour market by getting 
more years of education, with the expectation of a higher wage which improves his/her lifetime 
consumption profile. The latter example is the case that economists regard as the driver of 
demand for education and training which is widely recognized today.  
Empirically, in the following sections, we will explore the lifecycle hours profile, lifecycle 
participation profile, as well as how they variable by characteristics such as education and 
marital status. 
2.4.1 Lifecycle participation 
The life cycle approach suggests a link not only between wages and hours of work, but also 
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between wages and labour force participation rates. The literature (see Borjas 1996) describes 
such relationship as the labour force participation decision depends on a comparison of the 
reservation wage to the market wage. In each year of the life cycle, therefore, the worker will 
compare the reservation wage to the market wage. Suppose initially that the reservation wage 
is roughly constant over time. The person is then more likely to enter the labour market in 
periods when the wage is high. As a result, participation rates are likely to be low for young 
workers, high for workers in their prime working years, and low again for older workers. Our 
data does support this prediction, as can be seen in figure 2.27. 
The reservation wage measures the cost required to enter the labour market. Therefore, the 
participation decision also depends on how reservation wages vary over the life cycle. For 
instance, the presence of small children in the household increases the value of time in the 
household production for the person most responsible for child care (mainly mothers) and, 
hence, also would increase the reservation wage for mothers. Therefore, it is not surprising to 
find the dip in the middle of women`s life cycle participation profile. Many married women 
choose to participate in the labour force intermittently. They work prior to the arrival of the 
first child, withdraw from the labour market if not entirely when the children are small and 
need intensive care, and return once the children enrol in school.  
2.4.1.1  Lifecycle participation by education & marital status 
The dominance of substitution effect over income effect due to education is also observed in 
lifecycle participation decisions, as can be seen in figure 2.28 a & b, again, particularly in 
women. And by marital status, we can see a surge in participation rate of the married, which 
even exceeds the participation rate of the single after the age of 30. Decomposing by gender, it 
shows that the main contribution to such surge in the participation rate of the married is from 
married women. This should be attributed to the rise in female labour market participation in 
recent decades as well as the recent family friendly labour market policies in the UK, such as 
child benefit, child tax credit etc. 
Overall, the trends illustrated in the figure are consistent with the theoretical prediction that 
participation rates should be highest when the wage is high (that is, when workers are in their 
thirties and forties). The decline in labour force participation rates observed after age 55, 
however, is much too steep to be explained by the wage decline that is typically observed as 
workers near retirement age. The rapid decline is participation rates at older ages may be health 
related, may also be attributable to the work disincentive effects of various retirement and 




2.4.2 Lifecycle Hours 
Figure 2.22 illustrates the actual relationship between mean hours of work and age. Hours of 
work rise rapidly at early 20s, peak at 25, then fall slightly before peak again at around age 45 
to 50. After decomposed by gender, the lifecycle hours profiles are very different between men 
and women. For men, it is an inverse “U” shape profile, hours rise rapidly at early 20s, then 
slow down but still rising, until peak at age 45 to 50, decline as retirement age approaches. In 
contrast, hours of work amongst working women form a “M” shape profile, hours rise at the 
same rate as that of men at early 20s, peak at 25, rise again at late 30s, peak again at 50s, though 
at a lower level than the previous one, then decline as retirement approaches. One possible 
explanation for this would be that women work as hard at the beginning of their career, as soon 
as they start a family and child rearing, their hours drop significant (some young women work 
in part-time jobs if not totally out of the labour market while they have small children in the 
household). Their work intensity recovers only after their children are old enough to go to 
school.  
2.4.2.1  Lifecycle hours by education and marital status 
Education has an important role in labour supply, we therefore illustrate and elaborate this role 
in figure 2.23 and 2.24 before go on to the data. Where there are four axes: C1, C2, L1, L2 
represents consumption and leisure respectively in period 1 and 2. And therefore four quadrants 
are formed in each period. Quadrant C1, L1 represents the labour supply decision in period one. 
And Quadrant C2, L2 represents the labour supply decision in period two. Quadrants C1, C2, 
and L1, L2 offer the budget constraints for consumption and leisure.  
Figure 2.23 repsents the two period labour supply decision of an economic agent with low level 
education. In period 1, he/she has a wage 𝑤1, time endowment T. In period 2, a wage 𝑤2 and 
time endowment T, where 𝑤2 >𝑤1 . With the original budget constraint in period 1, the 
economic agent must work for H` hours, and achieve a life-time utility at point 𝐷3. Since at 
𝐷3, the marginal utility of wage for period 1 is higher than that for period 2, he has the incentive 
to smooth consumption from period 2 to period 1 by borrowing B. By so doing, he achieves a 
higher utility at 𝐷4, where the marginal utility of period 1 equals the marginal utility of period 
2. It has been well researched and documented in human capital literature that education 
increases wage rate, if we take education into consideration, building on top of this analysis, 
we shall find that labour supply decision of an economic agent with high level education looks 
like figure 2.24 below. 
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Both 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 are higher than the previous case, we can see the effect after smoothing out 
consumption. The lifetime budget constraint has been shifted out, showing a wealth effect. If 
education only changes wage and not preference, we should expect that the number of working 
hours for the highly educated to be lower than the lowly educated in every age period. However, 
this analysis only reflects the income effect of education, however, a wage increase could also 
generate a substitution effect in the consumption-leisure trade-off decisions. If income effect 
dominates, then the inference above should be observed, if substitution effect dominates, then 
we should expect that highly educated work more than their lowly educated counterparts, since 
their leisure is much more expensive than that of the lowly educated. Our data (Figure 2.25) 
does reflect that the substitution effect domination is the case; particularly for women, the more 
they are educated, the more they work across the whole lifecycle. If we link the “high 
substitution effect” to hard-working, this suggests either that education change people`s 
preference for hard work, or that hard-working people self-select into higher education.  
Marital status is also an important factor which influences labour supply decisions (see 
Killingsworth and Heckman 1986). Figure 2.26 confirms such claim. People who are single on 
average works more than their married counterparts throughout the lifecycle. However, if we 
look at men and women separately, the patterns are different. Across the lifecycle, men who 
are married work more than those who are single. But married women work significantly less 
than those who are single. This shows us a picture where traditional family division of labour 
still applies to the labour supply of men and women who are married.  
2.4.2.2  Life-cycle Hours and Earnings 
The age-wage profile (figure 2.29) of a typical worker rises rapidly when the worker is young, 
reaches a peak at around age 45, for women, the peak is earlier at around 35. And then wages 
either stop growing or decline slightly. The changing price of leisure over the life cycle implies 
that the worker will devote relatively more hours to the labour market when the wage is high 
and fewer hours when the wage is low13. 
This approach to life cycle labour supply decisions implies that hours of work and the wage 
rate should move together over time for a particular worker, as illustrated in the figure. This 
implication differs strikingly from our earlier conclusion that a wage increase generates both 
income and substitution effects, and that there could be a negative relationship between wage 
 
13 A detailed explanation of the model is given by James J. Heckman, “Life cycle consumption and Labour Supply: An 




and hours of work if income effects dominates. This important difference between the models 
arises because the two models mean very different things by a change in the wage. In the static 
model, an increase in the wage expands the worker`s opportunity set and hence creates an 
income effect that increases the demand for leisure. In the life cycle model, an evolutionary 
wage change- the wage change that workers expect as they age, does not change the total 
lifetime income available to a particular worker, and leaves the lifetime opportunity set 
unchanged. 
Empirically, many studies have attempted to estimate the interactions between hours of work 
and wage in a lifecycle frame. i.e. how hours of work change to the wage change over the life 
cycle14. These studies typically use a longitudinal sample of workers to estimate how a given 
worker adjusts his/her hours of work to the evolutionary wage changes that occur as the worker 
ages. The intertemporal substitution hypothesis implies that the correlation between changes in 
hours of work and changes in the wage should be positive: As a worker ages, an increase in the 
wage rate should increase hours of work. Figure 2.29, however, also reveal the stickiness of 
hours of work over a long stretch of working life. For example, mean hours of work barely 
changed between the ages of 35 and 50, despite the fact that the wage rises substantially during 
this period. Because hours of work tend to be sticky, many studies (MarCurdy, 1981; Blundell 
et al, 2002 etc) conclude that the response of hours of work to evolutionary wage changes is 
small: a 10 percent increase in the wage leads to less than a 1 percent increase in hours of work. 
Therefore, labour supply over the life cycle may not be very responsive to changes in the 
wage15. 
2.5 Labour Supply in Trade Unions 
The industrial relations literature on unionism usually ascribes an important role to trade unions 
(Pencavel, 1990) in the setting of labour supply, and certainly most unions have identified 
control over the hours worked by their members as a primary goal of their activities. At one 
time, unions focused their activities on the length of the workday and workweek. More recently, 
issues concerning the length of vacations, the number of holidays and leaves of absence have 
been emphasized. Yet research in labour economics on unionism tends to neglect this 
 
14 Thomas E. MaCurdy (1981) “An Empirical Model of Labour Supply in a Life-cycle setting”, Journal of Political Economy 
89:1059-1085. See also Joseph G. Altonji (1986) “Intertemporal Substitution in Labour Supply: Evidence from Micro Data”, 
Journal of Political Economy, 94:S176-S215; Casey Mulligan (1998) “Substitution over Time: Another Look at Life Cycle 
Labour Supply”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 13:75-134. 
15 There is a lot of debate over the validity of this conclusion. The magnitude of the labour supply response to life cycle 
changes in the wage (the intertemporal elasticity of substitution) has important implications in macroeconomics. Some 
macroeconomic models require sizable intertemporal elasticities to explain the behaviour of employment over the business 
cycle. As a result, there is heated disagreement over the evidence suggesting that the intertemporal elasticity is small. 
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dimension of influence on labour supply. 
In this section, we set to explore labour supply behavior in the context of trade unions in the 
UK over the past four decades. We start by describing the union density and union coverage 
characteristics, then we explore the union density and coverage time series by demographic 
characteristics, such as gender, sector, education, industry, occupation and cohort. Finally, we 
explore the hours and wage differentials between union and non-union workers, and finish with 
concluding remarks. 
2.5.1 Characteristics of union membership and coverage densities in the UK 
As shown in table 9, union density varies by demographic, job and workplace related 
characteristics. It varies little by gender or ethnic origin but rises with age, falling off slightly 
past age 50, then sharply at 65. Those with higher education have density levels substantially 
above those with lower or no educational attainments. However, people with NVQ level 4 are 
the most likely to be union members, since these are mostly teachers, nurses and other 
professional workers. Density rises sharply by tenure; this confirms the general knowledge that 
labour turnover is lower in workplaces with union presence. 
Public sector aggregate membership is more than three times that of the private sector. People 
who work in transport, communications, public administration, education and health services 
are far more likely to be members than those employed in business services, distributive 
services and hotels, construction, agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting. Manufacturing has 
a union density more and more down below that for the whole economy. Smaller workplaces 
(under 50 employees) have density levels less than half those of larger establishments. And an 
individual is much more likely to belong to a union if she or he lives in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland than in England. 
Union coverage measures the percentage of those whose wage or working conditions are 
affected by union collective agreement no matter what union status they are, members or non-
members. In other countries where industrial relations are simpler such as the US, union 
membership and union coverage mostly measure the same thing, however, in the UK, this is 
not necessarily the case. Many non-members work in workplaces that are covered by union 
agreements and conversely, more union members are employed in workplaces where unions 
are not engaged in bargaining (Bryson 2002). The fact that union coverage densities reported 
in table 10 are higher than the union membership densities in table 9, does prove that this, 
normally referred to as the free riding problem, is true. 
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The union coverage density pattern is comparable to that of membership density, apart from 
the fact that they are larger mostly. The only exception noted in table 10 is the coverage density 
in agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting from 2009 to 2016. It is 2 percentage point lower 
than the membership density during the same period. This suggests that the number of union 
worker whose wage or working conditions are not affected by union collective agreement is on 
the rise in recent years.  
2.5.2 Union membership and coverage densities trends 
After having a description of the characteristics concerning the union membership and 
coverage densities, it would be interesting to know how the densities have changed in time. We 
therefore explore the time series trends of these densities 16  below across demographic 
characteristics, such as gender, education, sector, industry, occupation and cohort. Figure 2.30 
presents the trends for the densities at aggregate level and at decomposed level by gender. 
Membership and coverage densities have both fallen throughout the decades by around 6 
percent, equivalent to 4m people. The coverage density is 8 to 9 percent higher than the 
membership density, such gap estimates the lower bound of the free riding problem, owing to 
the fact that the pay and working conditions of some union members are not covered by union 
collective agreements. The findings are twofold: The magnitude of the free-riding problem 
seems to be greater in male workers. And the density gaps between genders are widening in 
time due to much sharper falls in male densities. 
What`s more, by sector, as presented in figure 2.31 (left panel) reflects the general real-life 
experience where public sector is far (three times) more unionized than private sector. In private 
sector, a higher percentage of male worker are union members, though the difference between 
genders is diminishing in time. The same patterns are found in the coverage density as well. In 
public sector, the membership density amongst female workers are fairly stable across time at 
a level of around 60 percent, while the membership density for men is on a fall from 65 percent 
to 50 percent. 
Historically, unions have been known for its representation of workers with lower levels of 
education, a more working-class population. However, unions increasingly represented 
workers with more education (Farber et al., 2018). It is probably because of the combination 
of several reasons, such as the structural change of industries in the UK, where you see a shift 
 
16 Details on union membership and coverage status have been collected by LFS since 1989 and 1996 respectively. We have 
excluded the first few years of data for due to a mis-classification problem which classified some not-covered individuals as 
dna, causing the proportion trend very misleading to interpret. 
34 
 
from manufacturing to services, and the exerted attacks on unions` ability to organize with the 
overall restricting of the labour market, outsourcing and subcontracting isolated low-skill 
workers. Unions were not able to maintain their representation of the workers who would 
benefit the most from collective bargaining.  
the densities series by education (right panel in figure 2.31) suggest that membership and 
coverage densities are higher at NVQ4 and NVQ5 levels than those at NVQ1-3 levels. The 
densities at NVQ1-3 are similar across gender, whereas the densities at NVQ4 and NVQ5 levels 
differ greatly: the densities for female workers are (15 to 18 percent) higher than those for their 
male counterparts. 
Variations in union densities by industry and occupation are widely acknowledged. The 
evidence in our data are plotted in figure 2.32. It is interesting to find that the gap between 
coverage and membership densities are higher in industries where the union presence is bigger, 
such as Transport and communications, other services that comprises education, healthcare and 
public admin. In terms of occupation, we simplified the analysis by collapsing the occupations 
into two categories: white collar and blue collar, and the findings are that white-collar workers 
enjoy a higher membership and coverage densities; the gap between two collars is enlarging 
slightly in time due to sharper falls in blue collar workers densities. Decomposing by gender, 
we find that the fall in blue collar workers density is largely caused by male workers; the female 
white-collar workers are much more likely than their female blue-collar counterparts to be 
either a union member or collective agreement covered. Such gap is not clear amongst male 
workers. 
There has long been speculation that older cohorts are more likely to be unionized than younger 
cohorts. We therefore decomposed the union membership and coverage time series according 
to birth cohort as presented in figure 2.33 a & b. Since our sample are restricted from 25 to 60 
years old. Therefore, there are gaps shown for some cohort in some years.  
Although the membership densities are fairly similar across all cohorts at around 20 percent 
level. The pattern does show that older cohorts are more likely to be union members than 
younger cohorts, only at margins (2 to 3 percent). Nevertheless, when it comes to coverage 
density, the older cohorts17 are far more (10 to 15 percent) likely to be collective agreement 
covered than the younger cohorts. This suggest that the free riding problem is much more 
serious amongst older cohorts. After decomposing by gender, the patterns of membership and 
 
17 The cohorts are constructed through the age range 25-60. 
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coverage persists. Though women have a slightly higher density than men across all cohorts in 
both membership and coverage.  
2.5.3 Union wage premium  
One of the principle benefits for union members has been the delivery of a wage premium over 
similar non-members through unions` collective bargaining activities (Bryson and Forth, 2011). 
The widely documented decline in union membership and collective bargaining coverage over 
the past several decades has often been assumed as the reason for a lower union wage premium. 
However, it is not necessarily so, as the level of union wage premium depends upon the balance 
of the bargaining power of the remaining trade unions in the market. Whereas, the increase in 
free-riding is one problem that points towards a weakening of union power in organizations 
where unions remain present, and our results do suggest an increase in coverage wage premium. 
In the section, we update the picture of the union wage premium in the UK using the QLFS 
data (1993-2016). We have tabled the coverage wage premium separately from the membership 
wage premium to offer a more detailed insight into the patterns. Table 11 below shows that the 
membership wage premium has been declining in recent decades, while the coverage wage 
premium has been on a rise steadily. Having stood at around 10 percent across the 90s. the 
wage premium enjoyed by union members (after controlling for other characteristics) dropped 
to single digit at around 6 to 7 percent from 2000 to 2016. 
Female union members have typically enjoyed a larger wage premium (more than double) over 
their male counterparts. Female union members enjoy a wage premium over female non-
members of around 7.5 percent (down from 11.2 percent in the 90s), whereas among male 
employees the premium has fallen from around 6 percent to just 3 percent over the past decades.  
The coverage premiums are smaller in size compared with membership premiums; however, 
the differences are diminishing. The coverage premium itself does not reflect the seriousness 
of the free-riding problem, though the increase in the size of the coverage premium does pose 
as an incentive to free-riders of taking advantage of such collective goods trade unions produce. 
2.5.4 Union hours premium 
The bargaining between management and trade unions in practice, do not only focus on the 
level of wages, working hours is another important dimension where unions exert their 
influence in workplaces. This may happen in different forms though, such as the length of a 
working week, the length of paid holidays, the number of sick leaves and so on (Booth 1995). 
The focus of this research in on labour supply, we therefore, are more interested to know 
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whether such a premium exists in working hours between union worker and non-union workers.  
There are very few empirical evidences on union hours premium, yet majority of these work 
are based on US data (Perloff and Sickles 1987; Earle and Pencavel 1990; DiNardo 1991). In 
this section, we explore the union hours premium with our data, in an attempt to shed some 
light on this topic. 
Table 12 suggest that the hours premium indeed exists, and the patterns are similar to the wage 
premium; in that membership premium declines over time, while the coverage premium rises 
steadily. Again, female union members enjoy a significantly larger premium (3 to 4 times) over 
their male counterparts. Female union members enjoy an hours` premium over female non-
members of around 11 to 17 percent, if valued at a mean of 30 hours, this amounts to 3.3 to 5.1 
hours per week. Amongst male employees the premium has fallen slightly from around 4.2 
percent to 3.7 percent over the decades. The coverage premiums are a lot smaller in size, 
especially for male covered workers; for whom the coverage premium was negative up until 
2008, turned positive after 2009 but very small in size (0.6 percent). That means that in the 
years up to 2008, male union workers work (1.9 to 2.6 percent) less on average each week. If 
valued at a mean of 40 hours, it is 0.76 to 1.04 hours per week.  
 
2.6  Conclusion 
In this paper, we set out to explore the labour supply behavior in the UK over the past four 
decades with our LFS and QLFS data. We have done so through three different perspectives: 
static labour supply, life cycle labour supply and labour supply in the context of trade unions.  
In terms of the static labour supply, we have explored the behavior of working hours (total 
hours and overtime) and participation. The findings show that working hours are cyclical, 
though the fall in working hours during the recent 2008 great recession has been unexpected 
low; Education affects working hours, but only for women. The effect is particularly large 
between NVQ5 and NVQ4. Whereas, men`s working hours are hardly different on average 
across all education levels; Despite the fact that men are much more likely to work full time 
than women, the proportion of part-timers amongst men has increased dramatically over time; 
The historically persistent hours gap between single and married workers has been closed in 
the recent decade due to the steady increase in married women`s working hours; The working 
hours of non-white workers have decreased, while that of white workers are fairly consistent 
in time, however, the composition have changed: a fall in white men`s working hours and a 
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rise in white women`s hours; The overtime hours shows a similar pattern where the overtime 
hours series is consistent in time, while the composite has changed, with unpaid overtime 
increases, and paid overtime decreases both proportion and hours; The best remunerated 
workers are most likely to work a standard full-time working week, those working longer or 
shorter hours than standard are significantly less well paid. 
As for participation, the findings are that the inactivity rate in the UK roughly maintains at 25 
to 20 percent level over time. The make-up of the inactivity has changed, where men have 
dropped out of the labour force in unprecedented numbers, while women have entered the 
labour force to such an extent that the two trends broadly offset each other; The lower the level 
of educational attainment, the more likely an individual will be economically inactive; White 
people are much more likely than ethnic minority to participate. 
The lifecycle labour supply, again we have approached the analysis from margins of hours and 
participation both. We find that the lifecycle working hours profile is roughly an inverse “U” 
shape with a small dip in the middle, if decomposed by gender, men`s lifecycle hours profile 
form an inverse U shape, peaks at around the age of 35 to 50. While women`s lifecycle hours 
profile is more of an M shape curve, where the dip in the middle happens at the late 20s to mid-
30s, reasonably coincide with the pregnancy and child-rearing period. This pattern also applies 
to the lifecycle participation profile. Factors such as education and marital status can cause the 
lifecycle profiles to shift. Education`s effects again are obvious only amongst women, where 
the higher the educational attainment, the higher the lifecycle profile lies (working hours and 
participation). The effect of marital status on the lifecycle profiles can be understood by the 
division of labour within a family. Since it pushes up the lifecycle profiles (working hours and 
participation) of married men and lowers the lifecycle profiles of married women.  
Labour supply in the context of trade unions, i.e. hours determination with bargaining have not 
been given much attention in labour supply research. With limitation and constant failing of 
the traditional models, such perspective has become of great value. In our analysis, we describe 
and estimate the membership premium and coverage premium separately. We find that both 
membership rate and coverage rate have been falling over time, though the fall in the rates of 
male union/covered workers are more pronounced. The patterns are consistent by education, 
sector, industry and occupation; Older cohorts are more likely to be a non-union membership 
yet covered by a collective agreement. The union premium (wage and hours) is consistent in 
patterns, with membership premium decreases and coverage premium increases over time. This 
may offer an incentive to free-ride the collective good trade unions produce, exacerbating the 
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free-riding problem.  
Our findings suggest potential developments in the current theoretical framework of the role 
of human capital on the determination of hours of work. The transfer mechanism between 
education and labour supply has been solely attributed to wage, as majority of the labour supply 
literature suggests18; our findings show a taste-shifting story through the increase in human 
capital utilization rate. This is particularly the case amongst female workers between degree 
level and those below. Our findings also confirm the role of trade unions in regulating hours of 
work through overtime hours and premium. However, the effects have been eroding away by 
the decreasing influence of trade unions and the increasing problems of free-riding. 
In this chapter, we have offered a comprehensive survey of the trends across different 
demographic characteristics which on one hand shows the impact relevant to each variable and 
on the other, the time series fluctuations in time. Different from the existing descriptive trends 
(as seen from Dickens et al., (1999); Gregg and Wadsworth (1999, 2011); Blundell et al.,(2011) 
among others) we focus on showing the extensive and the intensive margins across the 
characteristics used in existing labour supply models, and describe the long-term trends to 























18 Imai and Keane (2004); Pencavel (2015); Blundell, Costa-Dias and Meghir (2015); Blundell, French and Tetlow (2016); 









Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics      
Men Women 
Year 1975-1985 1986-1995 1996-2005 2006-2016   1975-1985 1986-1995 1996-2005 2006-2016 
Hours 42.501 44.032 44.436 42.707  29.393 29.986 31.596 32.509 
Wage n/a 8.826 11.096 15.486  n/a 6.443 8.226 12.089 
Age 38.821 39.923 41.169 42.428  38.421 39.607 41.2 42.571 
NVQ5 17.50% 18.70% 21.65% 30.59%  10.51% 12.02% 17.21% 30.65% 
NVQ4 15.20% 10.00% 9.95% 10.22%  14.43% 14.71% 12.90% 12.50% 
NVQ1-3 67.10% 63.50% 59.23% 53.34%  64.80% 60.15% 56.55% 50.81% 
No qual. 0.20% 7.80% 9.17% 5.84%  10.25% 13.12% 13.35% 6.04% 
Obs. 92,595 316,999 303,845 251785   54,610 258,760 323,576 283,045 






Table 2.2: Hours worked by parents without children 
Men 
Without children 
1975/1985 1986/1995 1996/2005 2006/2016 
% working < 20 hrs 1.03 1.98 2.90 3.80 
% working 20-29 hrs 1.51 2.08 3.00 4.16 
% working 30-39 hrs 37.32 29.55 24.45 28.45 
% working 40-49 hrs 44.16 43.02 44.36 43.25 
% working >50 hrs 15.98 23.31 25.29 20.34 
Mean total hours 42.49 43.75 43.63 41.85 
Women 
Without children 
1975/1985 1986/1995 1996/2005 2006/2016 
% working < 20 hrs 13.75 13.91 12.60 11.29 
% working 20-29 hrs 13.67 13.29 13.09 13.05 
% working 30-40 hrs 48.19 43.50 38.18 39.64 
% working 41-50 hrs 20.69 23.12 27.41 27.23 
% working >50 hrs 3.70 6.18 8.72 8.79 
Mean total hours 33.13 33.95 34.98 35.15 

























Table 2.3: Hours worked by parents with children 
Men 
With children 
1975/1985 1986/1995 1996/2005 2006/2016 
% working < 20 hrs 1.07 1.13 1.73 2.70 
% working 20-29 hrs 1.41 1.19 2.09 3.71 
% working 30-40 hrs 22.19 24.46 19.94 24.63 
% working 41-50 hrs 54.9 42.85 44.72 44.63 
% working >50 hrs 20.21 30.17 31.52 24.33 
Mean total hours 43.41 45.67 45.49 43.21 
Women 
With children 
1975/1985 1986/1995 1996/2005 2006/2016 
% working < 20 hrs 23.73 34.24 28.40 24.36 
% working 20-29 hrs 21.04 22.94 25.21 25.38 
% working 30-40 hrs 31.45 26.57 27.55 30.42 
% working 41-50 hrs 21.30 12.34 14.21 14.98 
% working >50 hrs 2.48 3.91 4.63 4.86 
Mean total hours 28.82 26.19 27.69 28.83 






Table 2.4: Hours worked by parents with <2 years old children 
Men 
With children aged less than 2 years old 
1975/1985 1986/1995 1996/2005 2006/2016 
% working < 20 hrs 1.14 0.99 1.55 2.41 
% working 20-29 hrs 1.71 1.30 2.06 3.75 
% working 30-39 hrs 20.90 24.40 19.73 25.66 
% working 40-49 hrs 56.25 43.75 46.16 46.15 
% working >50 hrs 20.00 29.52 30.50 22.03 
Mean total hours 43.32 45.60 45.37 42.71 
Women 
With children aged less than 2 years old 
1975/1985 1986/1995 1996/2005 2006/2016 
% working < 20 hrs 21.69 36.86 31.55 23.84 
% working 20-29 hrs 20.65 20.82 25.29 25.60 
% working 30-39 hrs 32.22 27.02 26.30 30.34 
% working 40-49 hrs 22.98 12.20 13.45 16.05 
% working >50 hrs 2.46 3.1 3.41 4.17 
Mean total hours 29.42 25.57 26.67 28.94 












Table 2.5: Overtime in family without children   
 1975/1985 1986/1995 1996/2005 2006/2016 
Mean overtime hours:    
Mean paid overtime hrs 6.85 7.8 7.83 7.3 
Mean unpaid overtime hrs 7.02 7.6 7.78 7.83 
Overtime percentage:     
% work paid overtime 32.37 31.58 25.99 18.77 
% work unpaid overtime 18.65 21.61 20.27 19.06 
 1975/1985 1986/1995 1996/2005 2006/2016 
Mean overtime hours:    
Mean paid overtime hrs 4.56 5.13 5.48 5.75 
Mean unpaid overtime hrs 5.38 5.99 6.66 7.07 
Overtime percentage:     
% work paid overtime 15.83 18.97 16.99 12.89 
% work unpaid overtime 17.36 22.33 22.89 22.69 






Table 2.6: Overtime in family with children. 
  
Men 1975/1985 1986/1995 1996/2005 2006/2016 
Mean hours:     
Mean paid overtime hrs 7.67 8.63 8.53 7.44 
Mean unpaid overtime hrs 7.28 8.34 8.39 8.42 
Overtime percentage:     
% work paid overtime 33.32 31.29 25.45 16.76 
% work unpaid overtime 23.04 25.08 22.69 21.63 
Women 1975/1985 1986/1995 1996/2005 2006/2016 
Mean hours:     
Mean paid overtime hrs 4.37 4.93 5.13 5.14 
Mean unpaid overtime hrs 4.94 5.57 5.86 6.19 
Overtime percentage:     
% work paid overtime 14.37 16.85 15.93 11.1 
% work unpaid overtime 13.65 18.02 18.08 19.24 

















Table 2.7: Overtime in family with children aged <2 years old. 
Men 1975/1985 1986/1995 1996/2005 2006/2016 
Mean hours:    
Mean paid overtime hrs 7.85 8.76 8.41 7.22 
Mean unpaid overtime hrs 6.97 7.96 7.94 8.08 
Overtime percentage:    
% work paid overtime 36.11 34.18 26.98 18.21 
% work unpaid overtime 23.89 24.81 23.3 20.9 
Women 1975/1985 1986/1995 1996/2005 2006/2016 
Mean hours:    
Mean paid overtime hrs 4.17 4.85 4.73 5.05 
Mean unpaid overtime hrs 4.91 5.05 5.33 6.19 
Overtime percentage:    
% work paid overtime 11.28 14.69 13.39 8.61 
% work unpaid overtime 14.87 17.82 16.91 17.6 
Note: the numbers shown are percentages, source: LFS & QLFS 
 





1975-1985 1986-1995 1996-2005 2006-2016 
Male 
16-24 5.41 4.21 5.32 5.8 
25-49 2.68 5.26 6.85 6.73 
50-64 14.33 27.18 26.98 23.94 
 65+ 89.13 92.4 92.42 87.1 
      
Female 
16-24 18.41 14.81 13.23 11.62 
25-49 32.49 25.83 22.62 19.84 
50-64 46.83 50.79 45.46 38.28 
 65+ 96.12 96.85 96.57 92.83 



















Table 2.9: Inactivity by gender and education   
Gender Education 
Decades 
1975-1985 1986-1995 1996-2005 2006-2016 
Male 
NVQ5 3.32 5.08 6.13 9.95 
NVQ4 4.28 6.04 8.3 14.5 
NVQ1-3 4.15 8.59 10.12 14.64 
No qual. 23.14 22.66 28.58 38.14 
      
Female 
NVQ5 18.29 10.84 9.91 14.39 
NVQ4 22.69 15.04 13.01 23.33 
NVQ1-3 23.51 22.21 20.04 25.2 
No qual. 38.47 39.98 44.02 59.86 









1989-1998 1999-2008 2009-2016 1989-1998 1999-2008 2009-2016 
All 33.8 27.69 22.01        
Gender    Sector    
Male  32.84 26.17 20.37 Private  19.17 16.86 13.25 
Female 29.45 27.95 26.91 Public 60.92 58.79 55.39 
        
Age    Firm size    
<20 9.16 4.8 3.17 <50 employees  18.9 16.62 
20-29 26.56 18.36 14.99 50-249 employees 34.68 31.98 
30-39 33.58 27.69 22.51 >250 employees 44.05 39 
40-49 36.69 33.57 27.16     
50-64 35.26 31.65 29.39 Occupation   
65+ 9.77 10.6 12.79 White collar 32.33 30.52 27.29 
    Blue collar 28.51 23.06 18.93 
Ethnicity        
White 31.11 27.2 23.89 Selected industries   
Non-white 29.53 23.9 20.22 Agr/For/Fis/hunting 14.62 10.38 10.17 
    Energy & water 48.83 34.8 31.71 
Highest qualification   Manufacturing 31.95 24.57 17.85 
NVQ5 38.23 35.85 30.52 Construction 17.03 13.27 9.82 
NVQ4 48.72 41.29 31.53 Transport & comm. 47.83 38.11 24.39 
NVQ1-3 28.15 23.23 19.21 Other services  45.72 43.32 32.79 
None 25.87 20.52 14.89     
    Country    
Tenure (Length of service) England 29.83 25.73 22.18 
<2 years 13.2 13.22 11.4 Scotland 36.83 32.11 29.12 
2-10 years 28.24 24.74 20.92 Wales 39.99 34.93 31.97 
10+ years 54.9 42.49 34.94 Northern Ireland 41.34 34.39 30.97 












Table 2.11: Characteristics of union Coverage density UK (1989-2016) 
Characteristics 1996-2008 2009-2016 Characteristics 1996-2008 2009-2016 
All 36.14 30.12      
Gender   Sector   
Male  34.71 27.87 Private  22.2 16.73 
Female 37.56 32.28 Public 71.83 63.28 
      
Age   Firm size   
<20 16.96 10.49 <50 employees 22.43 17.23 
20-29 26.64 20.95 50-249 employees 41.31 34.76 
30-39 35.84 29.11 >250 employees 56.09 49.6 
40-49 42.87 33.7    
50-64 41.59 36.13 Occupation  
65+ 16.77 19.72 White collar 30.98 25 
   Blue collar 56.09 49.6 
Ethnicity      
White 36.34 30.57 Selected industries  
Non-white 32.47 25.47 Agr/For/Fis/hunting 13.19 7.98 
   Energy & water 40.88 39.64 
Highest qualification  Manufacturing 29.46 23 
NVQ5 43.69 36.81 Construction 22.43 16.85 
NVQ4 46.79 36.21 Transport & comm. 47.98 32.79 
NVQ1-3 33.21 26.06 Other services  54.95 39.78 
None 29.07 21.27    
   Country   
Tenure (Length of service) England 34.41 28.23 
<2 years 22.65 17.07 Scotland 42.27 36.51 
2-10 years 36.89 31.45 Wales 43.03 38.83 
10+ years 59.58 49.94 Northern Ireland 51.59 44.72 



















Table 2.12: Union wage premium. 
Year 














1993-1999 0.281 0.096 0.179 0.060 0.363 0.112 
2000-2008 0.237 0.071 0.145 0.040 0.321 0.097 
2009-2016 0.212 0.057 0.143 0.030 0.292 0.075 
Coverage premium: 
1993-1999 0.075 -0.025 -0.009 (ns) -0.068 0.169 0.014 
2000-2008 0.154 0.030 0.092 0.016 0.227 0.044 
2009-2016 0.170 0.048 0.121 0.041 0.232 0.052 
Notes: 1. Raw wage premium is the premium results without any controls. 2. Regression adjusted premium are based on 
models with following controls: gender, age, age squared, qualifications (5 NVQ levels), white/non-white, white collar/blue 
collar, temporary/permanent, tenure (6 categories), full-time/part-time, firm size (5 categories), private/public, industry (9 





Table 2.13: Union hours premium 
Year 














1993-1999 0.158 0.123 0.048 0.042 0.271 0.170 
2000-2008 0.136 0.097 0.062 0.040 0.234 0.139 
2009-2016 0.117 0.086 0.073 0.037 0.211 0.114 
Coverage premium: 
1993-1999 0.054 0.015 0.011 -0.026 0.113 0.041 
2000-2008 0.061 0.027 0.017 -0.019 0.127 0.057 
2009-2016 0.076 0.049 0.036 0.006 0.140 0.076 
Notes: 1. Raw wage premium is the premium results without any controls. 2. Regression adjusted premium are based on 
models with following controls: gender, age, age squared, qualifications (5 NVQ levels), white/non-white, white collar/blue 
collar, temporary/permanent, tenure (6 categories), full-time/part-time, firm size (5 categories), private/public, industry (9 
























































































































Figure 2.16b: Unpaid overtime series by marital status (Percentage & Mean Hours) 
 
 




Figure 2.17b: Unpaid overtime series by occupation (Percentage & Mean Hours) 
 
 


































Figure 2.22: Life-cycle hours profile 
 
 












































Figure 2.31a: Union trend by sector 
 
 





Figure 2.32a: Union trend by industry 
 
 





Figure 2.33a: Union trend by Cohort 
 
 

































































Estimating married couples` labour supply responses in the UK using tax and 
benefit reforms: Evidence from Quarterly Labour Force Survey 2002-2016 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Understanding how individuals vary their labour supply to changes in economic incentives is 
of critical importance. Wage effects are crucial to long run issues such as the design of the tax 
and welfare systems in models of static labour supply. (Graafland et al., 2001); and it 
contributes to our understanding of the efficiency cost of taxation in general equilibrium 
models (Ballard et al., 1985; Browning, 1987). The larger the supply response to a change in 
the tax rate, the higher the excess burden of taxation will be. In a lifecycle model the wage 
effects speak to intertemporal substitution – a parameter that both lies behind our understanding 
of savings behaviour and of unemployment, but also to our understanding of the timing of 
labour supply across the lifecycle. 
Given such importance, there has seen a development of an extensive theoretical and empirical 
literature on this topic since 1970s19. After the reviewing, it appears to me that, on the one hand, 
there exist great variations in the size of the results as well as the approaches to the estimation; 
and early estimates are afflicted by the inadequate treatment20 of the selection bias. On the 
other hand, there seems to be very little work done in the recent decades, especially with UK 
data21. Therefore, we attempt in this paper to use recent developments in estimation techniques 
to recalibrate this effect and take the empirical evidence to date with QLFS data (2002-2016)22, 
the largest survey in the UK, yet used for such purpose.  
The theoretical developments on labour supply research through all these years have gained 
much insights in our understanding of workers` labour supply behavior. The critical 
developments are the distinction between labour supply choices at the intensive margin and 
choices at the extensive margin (Heckman, 1993); and the distinction between within period 
 
19 Heckman (1974), Burtless and Hausman (1978), Hausman (1985), Mroz (1987), MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990), 
Blundell and Walker (1986), Blundell, Meghir, Symons and Walker (1988), Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) to mention 
just a few. 
20 Mostly OLS with cross-section data, or using instruments which is probably correlated labour supply decisions, such as 
education. 
21 The most recent study is Blundell et al., (2016) which used BHPS (1993-2008) and simulation data. 
22 QLFS data dates back to 1992, however, the id variables pid and sppid which are crucial to our derivation of our non-labour 




labour supply responses and intertemporal labour supply responses (Blundell et al., 1999). Such 
distinctions have gained important empirical payoffs since. 
The distinction between the intensive and extensive margin are the distinctions of the labour 
supply effects between hours of work and participation. Concerning hours of work, it is a good 
proxy for effort in the case of most on-the-clock workers. However, for those with high levels 
of autonomy on the job and who already work long hours, such as the self-employed and senior 
executives, they can either adjust their effort or work even when they appear to be at leisure. 
For this very reason, we have decided to exclude self-employed and people at the top 1% of 
the income distribution in our analysis.  
Furthermore, on the second distinction, much of the empirical work done so far on labour 
supply and taxes has been placed in a static (within period) framework, however, the labour 
supply decision could be understood better in a lifecycle context, where variations in real wages, 
health status and family composition provide incentives for people to smooth their income and 
to insure the unforeseeable shocks (Blundell et al., 1999). Moreover, recent labour supply 
works have been dominated by quasi-experimental methods23, which focus on the effect of a 
surprise on affected cohort from a policy reform. But the reform is permanent, the associated 
effects on future cohorts may be quite different from the affected one. Therefore, these 
estimates do not offer much insight into the structural behavioral conclusions. Life-cycle labour 
supply models have the potential to deal with this problem and to gain some meaningful 
insights into the anticipated effects as well as surprises from a given reform.  
In this paper, I provide renewed estimates of the labour supply responses to wages and 
nonlabour income from married men and women, within period as well as intertemporally.  
In practice, labour supply responses have been notoriously difficult to estimate in a robust and 
generally acceptable way (Mroz, 1987). That is probably why the variation in magnitude of 
labour supply elasticities in literature is huge and there is little agreement among economists 
on the size of the effects reached. One of the difficulties researchers face relate to the fact that 
marginal tax rates from the income taxes are a function of work effort, as are transfer program 
eligibility and benefit levels, in estimation it is necessary to treat the wage, nonlabour income 
and transfer program participation decisions as endogenous to labour supply choices. To 
identify model parameters, I exploit the exogenous discontinuities in the tax and benefit 
schedule, and the differential growth in marginal wages and nonlabour income induced by tax 
 
23 Leigh (2007); Gregg & Harkness (2003); Francesconi & van der Klaauw (2007); Blundell, Brewer & Shephard (2009); 
Meghir & Phillips (2010); Blundell, Bozio & Laroque (2011); etc. 
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and benefit reforms (Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998)).  
Another difficulty is that individuals` observed decisions represent intertemporal allocations as 
well as within period allocations. This leads to simultaneity problems with wage rate and 
nonlabour income. For example, hard workers will be facing higher marginal tax rates and 
hence lower hourly wages. This causes a downward bias in the wage effects. Instrumental 
variables based on arbitrary exclusion restrictions, such as education (Altonji, 1986) may not 
work, since these variables are probably correlated with tastes for work (Blundell et al., (1998)). 
To solve for the problems mentioned above, we adopt the grouping method developed by 
Blundell et al. (1998), labour supply effects can be estimated by comparing the responses over 
time of different groups of individuals (groups defined by cohort, time and education levels) 
who are affected differently by the reforms. The repeated cross-section nature of our data 
conveniently allows us to do so by constructing grouping instruments and thereby address these 
endogeneity issues.  
Our results support some of the empirical evidence in the previous literature, such as that 
female labour supply effects are generally positive whereas male ones are sometimes negative. 
In particular we find that men`s labour supply effects are consistently negative in our results; 
this well reflects the falling trend in men`s labour supply in recent decades. However, unlike 
previous evidence which shows women unilaterally sacrifices labour market commitment for 
home production and childcare, our results show a picture where men and women shares family 
responsibilities when small children present, this may be attributed to the family friendly social 
policies, such as paternity leave. What is more, we find that the effects on participation are 
much larger than the effects on hours. And in terms of the intertemporal substitution, the effects 
are again much larger amongst women, rather men, the explanations could be that women`s 
lifecycle labour supply are much more susceptible to interruptions (childcare and home 
production) than men do. There may also be reasons from men`s side, for example, they may 
discount the future too heavily to smooth out consumption. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the empirical literature; followed 
by section three where we discuss the empirical models we use for the analysis; and in section 
four, we introduce the dataset we use and the institutional background of UK tax and benefit 
systems as well as reforms during the data period. Then we go on to discuss the empirical 
results in section five. Lastly, we conclude in section six. 
3.2 Related Literature 
In this section, we survey the empirical literature on labour supply in the context of UK, 
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focusing on the effects of wages, taxes and benefits. This review contains a few seminal articles, 
but is certainly not meant to be exhaustive. For more complete surveys on the topic, please see 
Pencavel (1986), Killingworth and Heckman (1986), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and 
Meghir and Phillips (2010). 
Much of the empirical analysis on labour supply concentrates on estimating wage elasticities, 
which reflect the sensitivity of labour supply to small changes in incentives. These measures 
are not necessarily sufficient for understanding the impact of reforms24, but they do offer a way 
of providing coherent comparisons across models. 
We present in table 1 the existing evidence on labour supply elasticities in the UK. It includes 
evidence on married men and women as well as lone mothers (which is the focus of many tax 
and welfare programs). And both the static and intertemporal evidence are included. We 
classified them into four groups: 1. Studies on married women; 2. Studies on lone mothers; 3. 
Studies on married men; and 4. Studies on intertemporal labour supply.  
3.2.1 Married Women. 
The first group in table 1 presents estimates for married women. It is obvious that the range of 
estimates is very wide, from 0.11 to 0.71 at the intensive margin. Compared with some of the 
US studies (Ashenfelter et al., (1974) Hausman (1981) Triest (1990)) at around the same time, 
these estimates tend to be much smaller, however, the difference should be expected, since 
these US studies are based on annual hours of work instead of weekly hours that is used in all 
the UK studies. Annual labour supply can be viewed as combining the effect of adjustment 
across many different margins: hours per week, weeks per year and participation. Therefore, 
with similar methods the annual hours adjustments should be more sensitive to wages than 
weekly hours.  
Another important feature is whether the study has allowed for fixed costs of work. In the 
presence of fixed costs of work, the individual needs to decide whether to work or not. If he/she 
decides to work, he/she works at least enough hours to make it worthwhile. This is the so called 
“Reservation hours” (Cogan (1981)). Thus, wage fluctuations can lead to large jumps from 
zero hour to some large positive numbers, eg: 25 for women, 35 for men in my data. Ignoring 
such fixed costs will force the model to explain hours and participation changes at the same 
 
24 Since these approaches are sensitive to several sources of bias, such as “mean reversion”, “differential growth at different 
parts of the income distribution due to inequality” and “possible effect of tax reforms on skill price and hence on earnings.” 
These sources of bias do not all go in the same direction, thus creating some ambiguity on the credibility of the results. 
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time, this bias the effect of wages on hours upwards, therefore amplifying the labour supply 
effect. Arellano and Meghir (1992), after allowing for endogeneity of taxes and wages as well 
as non-labour income, find their elasticities in the range of 0.29 to 0.71 depending on 
demographic groups. However, their identification strategy is based on the assumption that 
education is not having an independent effect on hours of work. Blundell, Duncan and Meghir 
(1998) use long time series variation and allowed for the endogeneity of pre- and post-tax 
wages as well as fixed cost of work. It is being considered the most reliable estimates (Meghir 
& Phillips (2010), Blau & Kahn (2006)). Rather than looking for the full solution to taxes, it 
simplifies the problem by exploiting the fact that most working women are paying a single 
basic tax rate, after conditioning on having a working husband. They then exploit the change 
in the UK wage structure and the numerous tax reforms that occurred to control for the 
endogeneity of wages and taxes. They use the differential time series variation in after tax 
wages for different cohorts and different education groups. Their identifying assumption is that 
while preferences for work may be different between different education groups and cohorts, 
the differences are constant in time. Hence differential changes in the labour supply of these 
groups can be attributed to differential changes in the price of human capital that they face. 
However, the cost of their approach is that the sample they use is selected. The elasticities they 
find are in the range 0.13 to 0.37 depending on the age of children present in the family. They 
find that women with young children have higher elasticities, women with children aged 0-2 
the uncompensated wage elasticity is 0.205, and women with children aged 3-4 the 
uncompensated wage elasticity is 0.371, and for all other married women, the wage elasticity 
is around 0.13. 
Apart from the wage elasticity, income elasticity is also very important for reasons of 
measuring welfare effects. A large income effect will translate a modest Marshallian wage 
elasticity into a large Hicksian wage elasticity, which is the source of deadweight loss. The 
range of estimates we find in the literature is from -0.4 to -0.06 across all the studies listed, 
implying small behavioural effects.  
Putting all these results together, the picture we have for married women`s labour supply 
response is that the wage elasticity for hours worked per week is small for most married women, 
apart from those with pre-school children (under age 4). If a woman works the mean 25 hours 
per week, it would take a 10% increase in the wage rate to induce an increase of 1.3 hour in the 
work week. With a mean income elasticity of 0.2, this implies a compensated elasticity 
(Hicksian) of 0.3. With non-convex budget sets, such as those induced by tax-credits or other 
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welfare benefits, some individuals may respond to small tax changes by a large change in their 
hours of work decision. Mean elasticities like these may well imply that the number of such 
individuals is small, the outcome depends very much on the overall shape of the budget 
constraint and the distribution of hours of work. 
The fact that women has a lower participation rate suggest that the participation margin is more 
important to women than men. The range of the elasticities in the studies we have on married 
women is from 0.04 to 1.41. Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) use the 1974 GHS cross section data 
and find a participation elasticity of 1.41 for married women after allowing for taxes and their 
endogeneity. Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1987) draw a sample of 2011 married women from 
the 1981 FES cross section data, after fitting it with a Tobit as well as a double hurdle model, 
they find participation elasticity in the range from 0.04 to 0.08, which is fairly different from 
the findings in Arrufat and Zabalza (1986). However, both studies are based on a single cross 
section, the external validity is to be questioned. However, after comparing these results with 
the findings from other countries, we find Arrufat and Zabalza`s results are close to other 
findings. Such as Pencavel (1998) in the US and Aaberge et al., (1999) in Italy. Pencavel (1998) 
is the most comprehensive study amongst the ones listed here. It covers a long period of time 
1975-1994, using the CPS data and estimating the participation effects of wages with various 
approaches and instruments. The participation elasticities he finds range from 0.7 to 1.8. The 
drawback is that he does not allow for the tax system and used pre-tax wage rates in his paper. 
As with Aaberge et al., (1999), he finds evidence that participation is more elastic among 
women from poorer families. This is line with the studies which look at the labour supply 
response of the lone mothers, the results are listed as the second group in table 1. There are 
indeed many studies devoted on the labour supply of lone mothers, since lone mothers has been 
the focus of many welfare programs, and their labour supply response have been very large 
especially at the participation margin. However, as far as this study is concerned, we focus on 
the labour supply responses of married men and women with a working spouse. Therefore, we 
are not going into depths on these studies. 
3.2.2 Married Men 
There is a long history of estimating male labour supply. The majority of the empirical evidence 
are from US data (see surveys of Hausman, (1985) and Pencavel, (1986)). One key 
characteristic of male labour supply in many countries is that men work primarily full time. 
This is because of the traditional gender roles among many cultures around the world – men 
being the main “bread earner” in a family. Although there is some variability in hours worked, 
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it is small for much of man. And there is a clear lack of individuals working below a certain 
level of hours, roughly 35 hours in my datasets. See figure one. 
Estimates of wage elasticities on hours worked for married men are usually very small, often 
not significant and sometimes negative. The results of many studies25 from different countries 
confirmed these stylized facts for married men. In the UK, Blundell and Walker (1986) use a 
subset of 1980 FES cross-section on married men and women, it adopted two-stage budgeting 
method, to obtain a life-cycle consistent within period preference estimates of 0.024 for men. 
but this study is only based on one cross section. Apart from a small wage elasticity on hours, 
the income elasticities reported are lower than that of women as well and even close to zero. 
In all, it would be a fair description to say that male hours adjustment to changes in marginal 
wages is very low and can be ignored for welfare purposes.  
However, the intensive margin is only half of the picture, we still need to look at the extensive 
margin. Due to a long history of very high participation rates for men, most of the empirical 
literature has overlooked the participation decision, and there are very few estimates of 
participation elasticity for men. In the UK, Meghir and Phillips (2010) used discrete choice 
model on several most frequent hours across the hour’s distribution, allow for tax and benefits 
and the endogeneity of wages, find that the total income elasticity at participation margin are 
high, especially for lower educated men (0.36).  
3.2.3 Intertemporal Estimates 
Among the models that recognize intertemporal linkages, many of them are due to savings. 
The intertemporal substitution effect in such context is measured by the Frisch elasticity, which 
represents the willingness of individuals to postpone leisure in favor of work during periods of 
anticipated high wages. The Frisch elasticity itself does not have a direct policy implication, 
but it is an upper bound for the standard within period uncompensated elasticity. Besides, it is 
also a component of the full life-cycle specification elasticity.  
Across the empirical evidence, Pistaferri (2003) has attracted much attention, because of the 
unique data he uses. He uses the subjective expectations data of the Italian survey of household 
income and wealth to decompose actual wage changes into anticipated as well as unanticipated 
changes. He finds an intertemporal substitution effect for men of 0.7, and an effect on the shift 
 
25
 Macurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990) reports an elasticity of -0.24 to 0.032 for the US married men; Pencavel (2002) reports 
a number of negative elasticities; Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974) reports a mean elasticity of 0.06; Blomquist and Newey 
(2002) using Swedish data with results ranges from 0.06-0.08. Kaiser et al. (1992) with German data, having results evaluated 
at means: -0.04. etc. 
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of the wage profile of 0.5. Given the quality of the expectations data, the estimates he obtained 
should be quite robust. However, he does not allow for taxes as other studies did. In the UK, 
Blundell, Meghir and Neves (1993) investigates the intertemporal response of married women. 
They use 1970-1984 FES data, their approach is under a two-stage budgeting setup, by first 
estimating the parameters of the within-period hours of work/consumption substitution effect, 
followed by estimating an Euler equation for the marginal utility of consumption, then identify 
the intertemporal estimates. The Frisch elasticities they find ranges from 0.58-1.22 depending 
on household characteristics. However, these findings are based on repeated cross-sections (a 
built pseudo-panel), instead of a real panel.  
Beyond the intertemporal issues relating to savings, there is growing literature that introduces 
other important dimensions into the discussion. These models include human capital 
accumulation on the job, education choices and non-separability over time. They highlight 
several important points, such as the possible propagation effects of taxation through its impact 
on experience and wages, and habits etc. However, there is still heated discussions26 on the 
interpretations of the findings related to these abovementioned dimensions in the literature. In 
this study, we decide not to include these further dimensions in our analysis. 
Our study extends the empirical literature of labour supply elasticities estimation. Most of the 
UK evidence are either old (before 2000) or have focused on the quasi-experimental effects of 
specific groups, such as working tax credit on single mothers27. To the best of our knowledge 
a systematic study of the labour supply responsiveness of the couples is overdue. 
3.3 Theoretical and Empirical Framework 
In this section we elaborate on the theoretical and empirical frameworks for our analysis. In 
terms of the theoretical framework,three aspects are detailed below: the intensive margin, the 
extensive margin and the intertemporal model. And as for the empirical framework, we discuss 
the problems and the estimation techniques we chose to circumvent them. 
3.3.1.1 Intensive margin theoretical framework 
Our intensive model is based on the classic static labour supply model, where individuals 
maximize the utility function U = U(c,h) with respect to consumption c, and labour supply in 
 
26 For example, as far as the human capital accumulation story is concerned, it is observed that people who work a lot in one 
period, also tend to work a lot in the next. Furthermore, people who work a lot now tend to have higher wages in the future. It 
could be a story of human capital accumulation, where people work a lot because they realize that this will increase their skill 
and hence the future wages. However, it could also be a unobserved heterogenous preference story that people who are 




terms of weekly usual hours worked h, subject to the linearized budget constraint c = wh + Y, 
where w is the gross hourly wage rate and Y is the non-labour income (eg: income of the spouse 
and capital income).  
Due to data limitations on consumption information, we are not able to construct non-labour 
income from the widely used expenditure approach in many empirical studies Y= C – wh. 
(Blundell and Walker (1986) and Arellano and Meghir (1992)). Instead, we use the spouse 
weekly income as a measure for own weekly nonlabour income. Given the fact that in the UK, 
capital income and other sources of income account only a very small fraction of most 
individuals` total income.28 Therefore, spouse income can be a good approximation for own 
nonlabour income in our analysis. Inspired by Blundell et al. (1998), we specify the following 
hours of work equation: 
  ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽lnw𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                (1) 
Where i is an individual index and t is a time index. Within the static framework, the 
uncompensated labour supply elasticity evaluated at mean hours can be obtained by β/ℎ̅, where 
ℎ̅ is the mean weekly hours worked. Then the income elasticity is 𝛾?̅?, ?̅? is the mean hourly 
wage.  
3.3.1.2 Intensive margin empirical framework 
The main conceptual difficulty in estimating equation (1) is the fact that wages and nonlabour 
income are endogenous and observed only for workers. Estimating equation (1) by OLS 
directly will lead to biased estimates for both right-hand side parameters, since they are 
probably correlated with the error term . The most obvious reason recorded is that unobserved 
variables such as tastes for work and savings etc, might affect hours worked h, the gross wage 
rate w and the level of nonlabour income Y at the same time29 (Jantti et al., 2015), causing 
downward bias of the parameter estimates. 
The repeated cross-sectional nature of our dataset allows us to use the grouping method to 
compare groups of individuals over time and deal with these endogeneity issues by constructing 
instruments. Following Blundell et al. (1998) we partition our data into groups based on cohort, 
time and education levels. The key idea behind the grouping procedure is the Difference in 
 
28 Based on the Family Resources Survey, Department for Work and Pension, documented annual reports on the source of 
income in the UK. Investment income and Other sources of income only take up 3%-5% of the total income on average.  
29
 Hardworking people prefer longer hours, and they accumulate more human capital during work, the accumulated human 
capital will boost up future wage rates. And the possible assortative mating behaviour on education, may cause tastes for work 
to covary with spouse education, therefore income (own non-labour income). 
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Difference setting, which aims to compare similar groups of individuals who have been 
affected differently by tax and benefit reforms, retaining the ambition to estimate structurally 
meaningful parameters.  
We group our data based on cohort, time and education, to make sure that the number of 
observations in each group is large, we take four cohorts, consisting of individuals aged 25-34, 
35-44, 45-54, 55-59. And three education groups: NVQ1-3, NVQ4 and NVQ530. This gives us 
twelve groups in total. Our data runs from 2002 to 2016, with 2010 missing, due to the lack of 
ID variable, 14 financial years in total. Therefore, there are substantially more groups than 
parameters to estimate. 
Let g denote group cell. Suppose that 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑔 +𝑚𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡, where E [ηit|hit > 0, g, t] = 0. 
Based on this assumption, unobserved heterogeneity, conditional on g and t, can be captured 
by a permanent group effect 𝛼𝑔 and a time fixed effect 𝑚𝑡. This is the exclusion restriction 
for identification. Moreover, four reduced forms error terms are included in the equation to 
evaluate the relevance of the instruments.  





𝐾 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡    (2)                                             
Where 𝑣 are the residuals from reduced forms to control for the endogeneity of wages (𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑤), 
nonlabour income (𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑌 ), participation (𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑃 ) and selection away from the first tax and benefit 
kink ( 𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐾 ). Smith and Blundell (1986) also used this residual addition method, this 
computational approach gives identical results to grouping estimator, but the t statistics on the 
δ parameters directly provide tests of exogeneity.  
The four error terms are from the estimation of the reduced forms separately. For wage residual 
(𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑤), we regress the log after-tax wage on time dummies interacted with group dummies by 
OLS, over the sample of workers only and compute the residual from the regression. Similar 
procedure applies to nonlabour income residual (𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑌 ). And the participation residual (𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑃 ) is 
done by Probit, this is the inverse mills ratio. 𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐾 is the first order generalized residual from 
an ordered Probit regression with three groups for women: the working non-taxpayers, those 
close to the kink, and those above the kink; and four groups for men: the working non-taxpayers, 
those close to the kink, those pay at a basic rate and those pay at a higher rate. This is to account 
 
30 NVQs (National Vocational Qualifications) are not formally defined in terms of equivalence to conventional academic 
qualifications. In the paper, we follow the equivalences used by London School of Economics`s research lab, where there are 
five levels, NVQ5: degree level and above; NVQ4: higher education diploma below degree, teaching and nursing certificates; 
NVQ3: A levels or equivalent; NVQ2: O levels or GCSE equivalent: NVQ1: other qualifications. 
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for the selection away from Tax and NI kink31 . Ignoring this issue may cause the results 
uninterpretable from a preference point of view. Moreover, the wage effects would probably 
be downwardly biased, since for people bunch around the kinks, we would attribute their 
response to preference rather than the structure of the budget constraint.  
For sensitivity analysis, we estimate two versions of the model to compare and contrast the 
results in order to gain more insight about the variability of the coefficients with demographic 
characteristics. We firstly estimate the model without the interactions of log w and Y with 
demographic characteristics, and then with the interactions. The results are listed in table 9 to 
table 12. The discussions follow in the results section. 
3.3.2.1 Extensive margin theoretical framework: 
The analysis above is limited to the labour supply response at the intensive margin (for those 
who supply positive number of hours). In this section, we will model people`s decision on 
whether to work or not, the so-called extensive margin. In the extensive margin model, people 
choose between two points in the consumption-earnings space. Individuals can choose either a 
consumption level at zero earnings or a consumption level if he/she enters the labour market. 
The traditional framework is largely the hackman two step type of estimator, in our analysis, 
we adopted the estimator in Meghir and Phillips (2010), where they used the residual from a 
reduced form to act as an instrument to correct for the endogeneity problems in the wage 
equation.  
Following Meghir and Phillips (2010), we start by defining the utility functions for working 
and not working as below: 
                                                               𝑈𝑃 = 𝑎𝑃 + 𝑏𝑃𝑌𝑃 + 𝑐𝑃𝑋                                                             (6) 
                                                              𝑈𝑁𝑃 = 𝑎𝑁𝑃 + 𝑏𝑁𝑃𝑌𝑁𝑃 + 𝑐𝑁𝑃𝑋 + 𝑒                                          (7) 
Where 𝑌𝑃and 𝑌𝑁𝑃are the measures of total after tax income including any benefits when in 
work and out of work respectively. The X variables are taste-shifters which affect individual 
welfare differently when the individual works and when he does not. These include year 
dummies which reflects preferences over time, education and age, as well as region and 
ethnicity. Finally, e is the usual econometric error term. For simplicity, we assume that it is 
 
31 It is quite obvious that this tax and NI kink applies to the budget set of women in the UK, since the majority of women are 
either working non-taxpayers or taxpayers at the basic rate. However, we assume this kink also applies to men based on the 
findings in Emmanuel Saez (2010) and Richard Blundell and Hoynes (2004). Where Blundell et al., (2004) find clear evidence 
of benefit-eligible individuals bunching at exact 16 hours per week in the UK with FES data, and Saez (2010) used US tax 
return data find that there is clear evidence that people (especially self-employed) bunch around the first kink point of the 
income tax schedule, and no evidence of bunching at any other higher kink points. 
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normally distributed. Then the condition for working is when 𝑈𝑃 > 𝑈𝑁𝑃, or we can put it as 
below equation: 
 𝑒 < (𝑎𝑃 − 𝑎𝑁𝑃) + 𝑏𝑃𝑌𝑃 − 𝑏𝑁𝑃𝑌𝑁𝑃 + (𝑐𝑃 − 𝑐𝑁𝑃)𝑋                                    (8) 
Estimating the work probability and identifying the effects of income requires us to observe 
wages for the entire sample. Moreover, we wish to allow for the possibility that pre-tax wages 
are correlated with unobserved preferences or work (endogenous pre-tax wages). This is 
addressed by using predicted wages rather than actual wages for both workers and non-workers. 
We specify a wage equation of the following form; 
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛾𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝜗𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                      (9) 
Where 𝑑𝑡 is time dummy, region is region dummy and ethnicity is ethnicity dummy. The wage 
equation is specific to each education group (NVQ levels).  
3.3.2.2 Extensive margin empirical framework 
The main difficulty with estimating this equation is that wages are only observed for workers. 
To correct for such sample selection problem, we use Heckman sample selection model.  
The Heckman selection model is an estimation procedure which consists of two interdependent 
stages, with the first one being a binary probit model of participation choice (decision to work), 
and the second one analyzing a related continuous variable (wage rate) in the context of a set 
of regressors. The main advantage of this approach is that it corrects for potential selection bias 
of the second stage estimator by linking it to the first stage participation choice through a 
correction term called inverse Mills ratio.  
To avoid problems with multicollinearity, it is preferred to have the first stage of the Heckman 
selection model estimated with a genuine selection variable, which affects the participation 
decision, but not the censored indicator itself (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In the case of wage 
modelling, we have chosen three selection variables: the first two being the number and age of 
children in the family, which are frequently used instruments in the participation equation (see 
Blundell et al., 1992). The third instrument is defined as Z32, which is adopted from Meghir 
and Phillips (2010). 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌
𝑁𝑃 − 𝐺𝑖𝑡𝛾                                                                          (10) 
 
32
 The rationale behind the instrument Z is that since the key assumption we hold here is that the earnings for 
people when out of work can be taken as random after taking certain demographic characteristics as given, such 
as family composition, ethnicity, housing tenure and region.  
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Where E( 𝑌𝑁𝑃|𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ) =  𝐺𝑖𝑡𝛾 , 
with 𝐺𝑖𝑡 representing the variables in brackets. By taking the residual rather than the level of 
non-work income, we avoid the endogeneity problem arising from potential correlation of 
family composition, region and ethnicity with wages. Hence, estimated wage equation (9) by 
Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimator33, the results are represented in table 10 and table 
11.  
We then specify a model of probability that someone works as equation (11). This depends on 
the total income (𝐸𝑖𝑡) he would get if he/she enters the labour market.  
                       𝑃(𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘)𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                          (11) 
This total income is a combination of various means-tested welfare benefits, including WFTC, 
housing benefit, child benefit and child tax credit. In order to obtain this total income variable, 
we compute one probability of working evaluated at the expected in-work income. Specifically, 
we split the hours distribution for men and women into intervals respectively34 and assign a 
probability for each interval consistent with what is actually observed in our data. We then 
evaluate income at the average hours of each interval depending on pre-tax earnings at that 
point and taking into account all taxes and benefits for which the individual is eligible if he 
were to work that many hours. The measure of in-work income is then the weighted average 
of post-tax and benefit income at all these points. It should be noted that our in-work income 
measure also includes the spouse`s actual earnings, without considering the possibility that 
he/she might change his/her decision as a result of what their spouse does. 
3.3.3.1 Intertemporal Labour Supply Theoretical Framework 
Although the estimation of labour supply elasticity is often placed in a static framework, the 
labour supply decision can be understood better in a lifecycle context, where variations in 
health status, family composition and real wages provide incentives for people to smooth their 
income and to insure the unforeseeable shocks.  
To recover meaningful lifecycle parameter estimates, the estimation is often done with panel 
data. However, even with cross-sectional data, it is possible to obtain meaningful lifecycle 
parameter estimates. In the cross-section case, the inclusion of controls is crucial. The 
interpretation of the wage elasticities differs with different controls used in the specification. 
 
33 We also estimated the wage equation with Heckman two-step estimator, the results seem to be largely the same. 
34 Women 0, 1-15, 16-29, 30-44 45-54, 55-70, 71+; Men 0, 1-15, 16-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-60, 61-70, 71+. This is done based 
on the density of the distribution of their working hours, in order to get as good as possible a representative mean for each 
interval of hours. 
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In accordance with Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) handbook chapter, we specify the followings 
labour supply function for Frisch specification: 
𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑡 + 𝐹0 + 𝑏𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡                                                    (12) 
where ℎ𝑡 is weekly hours; 𝑤𝑡 is hourly wage rate; 𝐹0 + 𝑏𝑡 is the time path for ln𝜆𝑡, 𝜆𝑡 is 
the marginal utility of wealth for each period, 𝐹0  is the constant component across all 
individuals and time, 𝑏𝑡 is the time trend for ln𝜆𝑡, 𝑋𝑡 are demographic controls, 𝜖𝑡 includes 
sums of forecast error terms. 
If we have panel data, we could take first difference of equation (12). After cancelling out all 
the time invariant terms, an estimate of coefficient 𝛼 will be obtained. This 𝛼 corresponds 
to the Frisch wage elasticity, which measures the intertemporal substitution effect, it describes 
how changes in wages induced by movements along an individual`s wage profile influence 
hours of work. Since 𝐹0 is fixed, individuals fully anticipate these wage movements. 
We further assume that the ln𝜆0 can be approximated by sums of all expected future wages 
discounted to period 0, initial endowment, all time-invariant characteristics and an error term 
as in below equation: 
𝑙𝑛𝜆0 = 𝐷0𝜑0 +∑ 𝛾0𝑗𝐸0{𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗} + 𝜃0𝐴0 + 𝑎0
𝜏
𝑗=0                                           (13)  
Where 𝐷0 is a vector of demographic characteristics either observed at period 0 or anticipated 
in future periods, 𝐴0 is initial endowment, 𝑎0 is the error term. Then 𝐹0 in equation (12) 
can be substituted by 𝑙𝑛𝜆0, we will get: 
lnℎ𝑡 = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑡 +𝐷0𝜑0 +∑𝛾0𝐸0𝑗{𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗} + 𝜃0𝐴0 + 𝑎0
Τ
𝑗=0
+ 𝑏𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡                      (14) 
The 𝛼 estimates we get from fitting this equation will be composed of two effects: 𝛼𝐼 + 𝛾𝑜𝑡, 
𝛼𝐼 the Frisch wage elasticity and 𝛾𝑜𝑡 which determine the impact of a shift in the entire wage 
profile. and where the disturbance 𝜖𝑡 in equation (12) will now be 𝜖𝑡 = 𝑎0+𝑣𝑡 − 𝛾0𝑡(𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑡 −
𝐸0{𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑡}). All the 0 subscript terms in equation (14) includes all start-of-life controls to form 
𝜆0. 
In order to estimate equation (14), we need to assume that the lifetime wage path and the non-
labour income 𝑌𝑡 path anticipated at period 0 are: 
𝐸0{𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑡} = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑡 + ⋯+𝜋Τ𝑡
Τ−1 + 𝑢𝑡                                                  (15) 
𝐸0{𝑌𝑡} = 𝛿0 + 𝛿𝑡𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝛿Τ𝑡
Τ−1 + 𝑡                                                        (16) 
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By the fact that start of life nonlabour income is a fraction of the initial endowment   𝑌0 =
𝐴0
1+𝑟0




Combining equation (14), (15), (16), we could rewrite equation (14) as: 
lnℎ𝑡 = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑡 + 𝐷0𝜑0 + 𝜋0𝛾0̅̅̅𝑡 + 𝜋1𝛾1̅𝑡




+ 𝑏𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡       (17) 
This 𝜇𝑡 is a composite error term depending on the previous errors 𝑎0, 𝑢𝑡 and 𝑡. This equation 
relates individual effect to the parameters of his wage and income profile. If we assume that 𝐷0 contains 
only intercept and the coefficients on age and age squared for the lifetime wage and income path are constant 
across individuals35, we can then collect all the similar terms, equation (17) can be written as: 
lnℎ𝑡 = 𝑑1 + 𝑑2𝑡 + 𝑑3𝑡
2 + (𝛼𝐼+ 𝛾𝑜̅̅ ̅)𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑡 + ?̅?𝑌𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡                          (18) 
If we estimate equation (17) by using age squared as an instrument for log wage to account for 
its endogeneity, then the coefficient on wage rate will be the Frisch elasticity 𝛼𝐼. The intuition 
behind is that by controlling for individual characteristics across consumers and leaving higher-
order age variable to identify lifecycle wage variation. Hence, only evolutionary wage variation 
along the age-wage path is recovered. 
However, if we regress log hours worked on nonlabour income, age, age squared and log wage 
rate, the coefficient on wage will be the response of labour supply to a parametric wage shift, 
including both the intertemporal substitution effect 𝛼𝐼, as well as the reallocation of wealth 
across periods captured by a change in individual effect F. Since most tax and benefit reforms 
can be described as permanent unanticipated shifts in after-tax real wage today and in the future, 
therefore, the full lifecycle labour supply elasticity is the most appropriate one to capture such 
an effect.   
3.3.3.2 Intertemporal Labour Supply Empirical Framework 
Estimation of the simple parameterization of the full lifecycle model above relies on 
specifications for both within period utility and the individual marginal utility of wealth effect. 
However, controls are needed for all of the following: “start of life” characteristics which 
impact the initial setting of 𝐹𝑜, current-period characteristics which affect the within-period 
utility function, age, expected wages as of period zero and initial wealth. Expected wages are 
unobservable and initial wealth is generally not included in the dataset, therefore we replace 
 
35 knowing that the lifecycle hours and wage path are inversely “U” shaped, see figure 1, we therefore only included age to 
the quadratic order. 
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these with the parameters governing the time path of wages and nonlabour income (spouse 
income), which must be jointly estimated with the labour supply equation.  
It is worth noting that the elasticity derived from this static specification, can be placed in an 
intertemporal setting but is economically meaningful only under a strong assumption of either 
complete myopia or perfectly constrained capital markets. Otherwise, these elasticities confuse 
movements along wage profiles with shifts of these profiles and thus, yield response parameters 
which are a mixture of these effects. 
Therefore, under simplifying assumptions, formulation 17 allows to compute the intertemporal 
substitution elasticity using cross-sectional data alone. In contrast, formulation 18 allows one 
to estimate the response to a parametric wage shift, required controls here are property income 
in period t, age and age squared. The controls we included are education, ethnicity, gender, 
residential area. 
3.4 Data 
The data we use in this paper come from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), which is 
the largest regular household survey in the UK. It contains rich socioeconomic information on 
a country-wide random sample of almost 53,000 households for each quarter. Although it is 
not panel data, it provides consistent and accurate micro level information over a long period 
of time.  
3.4.1 Sample selection criteria 
In the analysis, Labour supply is estimated on married men and women between the age of 25 
and 59 who are not self-employed, not disabled (claiming disability benefits), not retired nor 
in full-time education. The sampling period are from 2002 to 2016. The reason for such 
selection is to construct the nonlabour income variable36 which is important in labour supply 
analysis (Blundell et al., (1998)). As mentioned before, we also excluded men and women at 
the top 1% of the income distribution, because their labour supply decisions are probably very 
different from normal wage workers. Such sample restrictions are made so that our analysis is 
not contaminated by factors such as self-employment, disability, retirement or full-time 
education where hours of work may not fully represent the level of efforts. The age range of 
25 to 59 is chosen in the same manner to exclude the fuzziness at the two ends due to education 
 
36 QLFS does not have any measure on nonlabour income. We circumvent this problem by matching up head of family with 
spouse of the family, hence using spousal income as own nonlabour income. 
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or retirement.  
For the intensive and extensive margin analysis, we use grouping method to circumvent the 
endogeneity issues of the regressors, where groups are based on cohort and education. we take 
four cohorts, consisting of individuals aged 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-59. And three education 
groups: NVQ1-3, NVQ4 and NVQ5. In total, this gives us twelve groups. Because the 
consistency of the grouping estimator is based in part on the number of observations per cell 
being large, we follow Blundell et al., (1998) and drop cohort-education cells with fewer than 
50 observations. 
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 and table 5 show the descriptive statistics of the main variables (hours, wage, non-
labour income) as well as some of the demographic characteristics (education, age of dependent 
children) separately on men and women across the years. Two more demographic variables are 
not included because their descriptive statistics do not mean much. One of them is URESMC 
the usual residential governmental area, that is consisted of twelve governmental regions37. The 
other is ETHNIC the ethnicity variable, that is consisted of six ethnic groups38. Table 4 suggests 
that in our sample, men are working 43 hours per week on average with a mean wage of £13 
to £18. The nonlabour income for men ranges from £270 to £450. This reflects the secular 
increase in women`s wages. The family types did not change much in time. Whereas, in table 
5, we can see that women`s mean working hours and wage are lower than that of men with a 
mean at around 33 hours and £13 respectively. The nonlabour income is high, simply because 
of their husband having a higher weekly income. However, the mean education value for 
women has increased much more than men, this is attributed to the large increase in female 
participation in higher education (Blau and Kahn, 2006). 
3.4.2.1 Basic characteristics of hours, participation and wage distribution 
In figure 3.2, we show the distribution of working hours by genders and by taxpayer status. 
This shows that there is indeed a great deal of variation existing between genders and between 
the taxpayer status to be explained. Women`s hours are scattered around 30 hours` mean, while 
men`s hours are rare before 35 hours, this shows that men mainly work full-time. The hours` 
distribution between taxpayer status indicates that non-taxpayers tend to work less hours than 
 
37 The 12 governmental areas are: London, Northwest, Yorkshire & Humber, West midlands, East midlands, East Anglia, 
Northeast, Southeast, Southwest, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. 
38 The 6 ethnic groups are: White, Mixed background, Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Chinese/other Asian background, Black 
Caribbean/African/other, and other ethnic groups. 
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their counterparts.  
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of log wage by gender, the distribution for men`s wage is 
asymptoticly normal, without the long tail. The distribution for women`s wage is a bit left 
skewed, showing that women`s wage are on average lower than men. 
In this paper, we are also interested in the participation decision. Therefore, the evolution trend 
for participation by genders are shown in figure three, the participation rate is fairly consistent 
across the years. Apart from the fact that there is slightly a dip right after 2008, this shows the 
hit of the great financial crisis. However, we do not see the same dip in women`s participation 
curve, this is because women`s participation in the labour market has been rising over the past 
several decades, therefore, even there is some hit, the increase has masked the effect. 
And the participation rate being so high has also something to do with our sample selection, 
where the age range is set from 25 to 59, the prime age for labour market. If we were to consider 
working age population (16-65), the level should be a bit lower. 
3.4.2.2 Lifecycle characteristics of hours, participation and wage distribution 
As far as the lifecycle characteristics of the relevant variables are concerned, we show the 
lifecycle profiles of hours, wage and education across figure four to seven. Figure four 
describes the lifecycle working hours` profile of men and women. The shapes are quite standard, 
men with an inverse U-shape hours profile: hours rise quickly for young workers, peak at 
middle age and decline when retirement approaches. Whilst women`s hours profile features a 
M-shape, hours increase quickly for young women, after family establishes and children arrives, 
the hours dip, and then rise again after children are old enough for school, before falling for 
retirement.  
Education is an important factor for decisions at both intensive (hours) and extensive 
(participation) margins. we show the lifecycle hours (left panel) and participation (right panel) 
by education levels in figure five. We can see that there is not much dispersion in men`s hours 
across life. However, the dispersion is huge in women`s lifecycle hours. There is a monotonic 
increase in hours worked as education levels increase. The effects are remarkably large 
amongst women, rather than men.  
Apart from hours, we also show the lifecycle wage profile by education in figure six. The first 
thing we notice is the similarity between the lifecycle wage profile and the lifecycle hours 
profile (if men and women are averaged, then the dip on the women`s hours profile could be 
averaged out, or at least flattened). With the quantiles, we can see that one principle applies for 
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both genders are that the higher the education levels are, the higher the wage profiles lie, the 
higher the quantiles are, the larger the variations across the lifecycle wage profile are.  
 
3.4.5 Institutional Background 
The personal tax and transfer system in the UK are consisted of a few simple taxes, mostly 
levied at the individual level, and many welfare benefits and tax credits, which usually are 
means tested at family level. Over the period of our data, extending from 2002 to 2016, there 
have been many reforms happened both in the tax and transfer systems. 
3.4.5.1 Tax system and reforms in the UK 
First, the tax system in the UK. All individuals irrespective of the total level of household 
income or consumption, have an income tax allowance. Income up to this amount in each tax 
year is free of tax. Income above this allowance is subject to tax. Starting from the allowance 
level, there are two or three different income tax rates applying to different levels of income 
across the years of my data (2002-2016). This aspect of the British tax system sort individuals 
into income groups, and the lowest income group can be referred to as non-taxpayers. All the 
other groups are taxpayers, only differ in the tax rates they pay.  
From April 2002 to April 2007, there were three tax rates: starting rate (10%), basic rate (22%) 
and top rate (40%). In April 2008, the 10% starting rate was removed, and the 22% basic rate 
dropped to 20%, leaving the top rate remains at 40% level. From 2008 onwards, although the 
basic rate and the top rate remained at 20% and 40%. There was a new rate introduced in April 
2013, called the additional rate, which aims at people who earns more than £150,000 a year. At 
the same time, the tax allowance decreases for people who earn above £100,000, for every £2 
they earn above £100,000, £1 of the personal allowance is lost, it can go down to 0. This 
basically means that the higher the income is, the higher the marginal and effective tax rates 
are. The taxes are collected at source through the Pay-As-You Earn system. Reforms were 
announced on the budget day and implemented immediately. Any changes to the tax system 
were widely publicized. 
In addition to income tax, individuals also pay national insurance contributions (NI). NI is paid 
on the entire income above a threshold, which is called the primary threshold (PT), up to an 
Upper Earnings Limit (UEL). Any individual who earns between the PT and UEL, pays the 
standard NI rate. For individuals, whose earnings is above the UEL, there is an additional 
contribution rate for the part of earnings above the UEL. Furthermore, there is also a Lower 
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Earnings Limit (LEL), people who earns between the LEL and PT, get NI credit, which means 
that they are entitled to NI benefits without paying any NI. However, if people earn below LEL, 
they will pay no NI and they will not be entitled to any NI benefits. 
To obtain a correct measure of the marginal tax rate, both the income tax and NI rates should 
be accounted. Table 1 presents the main changes to the UK tax system during the period 2002 
to 2016.  
Many women in our sample lies in the “basic rate group”39 (plus the NI rate). It seems that 
they would not be affected much by the reforms. However, the reforms have a greater effect on 
the incomes earned by men, especially on the middle and higher end of the income distribution. 
Since our sample is composed of couples, the income of man is the non-labour income for his 
wife. Therefore, the reforms are important in identifying the labour supply response from 
women as well. We decide to simplify the analysis by concentrating on men and women with 
employed partners only. This will help us to avoid the highly nonconvex budget set in the case 
where the partner is out of work and on benefit.  
In summary, the large number of tax reforms over this period, sometimes increasing taxes, 
other times decreasing taxes, have shifted the tax system and offered us opportunity to identify 
labour supply response to the changes. Some patterns of the changes can also be observed. For 
example, the structure of tax system across this period shows a shift away from lower income 
distribution to the higher end of the distribution. The reforms have been phasing out the NI 
kink discontinuity as seen in the UK tax system during the 1980s and 1990s. (see Blundell et 
al., 1998). From 2008, the standard NI rate and the basic tax rate start at the same income level. 
And the higher NI rate is also on the same income threshold as the top tax rate.       
A key variable in the intensive margin analysis is the marginal tax rate. To calculate the 
marginal tax rate, I exploited the information on segment limits and tax rates provided by the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) as well as the British Government Website40 through public 
access. For the extensive margin analysis, the working tax rates are applied to the estimated 
total in-work income.  
Figure 1 depicts the marginal tax rates and effective tax rates used in my analysis. Note that 
despite of the common trend going upwards, the shape of these two functions are a bit different: 
 
39 15 per cent of the working women in our sample do not pay tax. 
40 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rates-and-allowances-income-tax/income-tax-rates-and-
allowances-current-and-past, accessed on Nov. 1st 2016. 
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marginal tax rates are increasing in steps, while the effective tax rates are comparatively 
smoother.   
Due to the fact that the slope of an individual`s budget constraint is not only determined by the 
statutory income tax schedule, but also by the transfer systems in place. Therefore, it is essential 
to model income tax system together with the welfare system. In next section, we explain the 
welfare system in the UK as well as the reforms happened during the period of this study. 
3.4.5.2 Welfare system and reforms in the UK 
The current welfare system of in-work benefits in the UK is the working Tax Credit (WTC). It 
was introduced in April 2003 to replace the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) operated from 
April 1999 until March 2003. The WFTC was itself a transitional system from the earlier 
benefit for working families known as Family Credit (FC), which had been in operation since 
1986. 
Apart from in-work benefits, the UK welfare system contains other types of benefits as well 
covering people from all ages and economic activities; however, the focus of our paper is on 
people`s working behaviour, we therefore, are only interested in in-work benefits and tax 
credits. These include Income Support (IS), Child Benefit (CB), Child Tax Credit (CTC), 
Working Tax Credit (WTC) and Universal Credit (UC).  
CB is a benefit paid to parents or other people who are responsible for bringing up a child. It 
is non-means-tested. It has been a fixed amount uprating with inflation per week for each 
additional child in the family since its introduction in April 1977. From 2010 onwards, the 
government fixed the CB payment for every three-year period. From 2010 to 2013, the payment 
was £20.3 for the eldest child, and £13.4 for each subsequent child. And from 2014 to 2017 the 
payment was £20.7 for the eldest child, and £13.7 for each of the rest.  
CTC and WTC are the two types of tax credit. CTC is a payment to support families with 
children under 16 years old and dependent young persons aged from 16 but under 20 years old.  
WTC is for working people on a low income. Tax credit rates has been decreasing in time. In 
2011, the rate of withdrawal for WTC was increased from 39p to 41p for every pound earned 
above £6420. This means that households with slightly higher income will no longer be eligible 
for this support. In the same year, the proportion of childcare costs covered by the childcare 
element of WTC was reduced from 80% to 70%. In 2012, the number of hours a couple with 
children have to work to become eligible for WTC was increased from 16 to 24 hours a week. 




Income support (IS) is a benefit paid to people on low incomes, it is not available to the 
unemployed and those in full-time paid work. Claimants should be between 16 and the age at 
which they can get pension credit. The level of IS payable depends on the family`s needs (the 
‘applicable amount’) and its income. The applicable amount is the sum of basic personal 
allowances and premiums and housing costs for owner-occupiers (support for renters is 
provided through housing benefit). Therefore, the level of IS payable is just the applicable 
amount minus income. In 2014, IS is not payable if the claimant and the claimant`s partner 
together have more than £16000 of capital. Capital up to £6000 is ignored, between these two 
thresholds, IS entitlement is reduced by £1 for every £250 of capital exceeding the lower 
threshold.  
UC became law as part of the welfare act 2012. When implemented, the new benefit will 
amalgamate several existing means-tested benefits: IS, JSA, housing benefit (HB), CTC, WTC 
etc. it is hoped that bringing these diverse benefits together will remove much of the current 
complexity in the system. However, UC was only piloted in Manchester and Cheshire area in 
2013, hoping to roll out nationally in 2017. Given the period of my data, the proportion of UC 
claimant are very small.   
Our data only reports whether an individual receives welfare benefit or not, and which type of 
benefit he/she receives, the amount of benefit received is not reported. Therefore, we proceed 
by calculating benefit amount for different types of households. The rates applied are obtained 
from UK government website by public access41. 
 
3.5 Results and Discussions 
We present and discuss our results in this section. They are organized in such a manner that 
intensive margin elasticities are presented in tables six to eight with sensitivity checks in tables 
nine to twelve; extensive margin elasticities are presented in table fifteen and sixteen with 
estimated wage equations in table thirteen and fourteen; Finally, the intertemporal estimates 
are presented in table seventeen.  
 
41 The rates for the related benefits are obtained from Andrew Hood and Laura Oakley (2014) A survey of the GB Benefit 






3.5.1 Intensive margin: 
The intensive margin elasticities are estimated by equation (2). They measure the within period 
substitution effect between work and leisure. We find that all Marshallian elasticities are highly 
statistically significant; The consistently negative signs of the elasticities for men across 
different groups suggest a backward bending labour supply curve; The elasticities increase in 
magnitude by educational attainments suggest that male workers with lower educational 
attainments are more likely to respond than their higher educational counterparts to wage 
changes. If valued at the mean wage rate, the results show that every 10 percent (roughly one 
pound) increase in after tax and benefit real wage rate leads to an average of 0.83 hours (50 
mins) decrease in weekly hours of work for men with NVQ1-3, 0.61 hours (37 mins) decrease 
for men with NVQ4 and 0.35 hours (21 mins) decrease with NVQ5. On the contrary, women`s 
Marshallian elasticities are consistently positive, and the magnitude increases with educational 
attainments. Every 10 percent (roughly one pound) increase in the after tax and benefit real 
wage rate increases women`s weekly working hours on average by 0.36 hours (22 mins) at 
NVQ level 1-3, by 0.37 hours (22.2 mins) at NVQ level 4, and by 0.53 hours (32 mins) at NVQ 
level 5 respectively. 
It is commonly acknowledged that the presence of children affects the labour supply of both 
parents. Previous evidences explain that the presence of children (especially young children) 
pushes the father to work harder (Blundell & Walker, 1986; Meghir & Phillips, 2010), and the 
mother to spare more time for home production and childcare (Blundell, et al., 1998; Blundell, 
et al., 2000). However, our results point to a different picture, where both parents reduce their 
hours at similar magnitude when there are small children (less than two years old) present in 
the family. A major reason for this could be the new rules for paternity leave introduced in April 
2003, where male employees received paid statutory paternity leave for the first time. This new 
rule encourages fathers to have more “family time” when children arrive. However, it does not 
explain the consistency in the signs of male elasticities across all groups. Such consistency 
together with the fall in female elasticities as documented by Blau and Kahn (2006) reflects 
the changing dynamics of the labour supply decisions within a family: women takes some of 
the work pressure off men. The fall in female elasticities is also evidenced in our results, since 
they are generally smaller than the ones estimated in previous studies. The wage elasticity for 
women with children aged 0-2 remains to be lowest among all groups for reasons that pre-
kindergarten children demand much more time for childcare than children older. However, 
mothers start to recover their hours after the children hit the age of two. 
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Given the construction of our nonlabour income by the spouse weekly income, the income 
elasticities estimated in our analysis measure the wealth effect of spouse income on the other 
spouse` labour supply. While the effects are statistically insignificant for men in most groups, 
they are strongly significant for women. This suggests that wives` income does not explain 
much of the variations in husbands` labour supply, whereas the husbands` income does explain 
much of the variations in wives` labour supply. The income effects for men are positive implies 
assortative mating: the higher the wives` income, the more the husband works. The income 
effects for women are negative, and the size of the effects increase with educational attainments, 
implying that wives` labour supply does depend on their husbands` income, the higher the 
education of the husband, hence the income, the larger the effect is. As far as the children are 
concerned, the income effects are the largest when small children present, the size of the effects 
decrease as children age, but the effects return when children age ten and above. 
We further present results across three education groups by age of children present in the family 
to cross check the effects in table seven and eight. The Marshallian substitution effects in table 
seven are consistent with the patterns in table six. However, there are also some other 
interesting findings: Amongst families without children, the substitution effect for men with 
NVQ5 are not significantly different from zero, this means that the substitution effects are only 
with the lowly educated men. Amongst families with children aged 0-2, men with NVQ4 are 
the group who are most responsive to a change in wage (every one percent wage change for 
12.3 mins) compared the other two groups NVQ1-3 (3.72 mins) and NVQ5 (5.94 mins). This 
may suggest that male teachers, nurses and other similar professions are the ones who are most 
likely to use the new rules for paternity leaves, or to cut back hours for childcare. However, 
amongst women with children aged 0-2, women with degree and above are the ones least likely 
to reduce hours. In terms of the income effects, they are mostly significant only amongst 
women at degree levels. When small children present, the income effects are only observed 
amongst NVQ4 and NVQ5. 
From table nine to twelve, we present the sensitivity analysis for our results. They include 
parameter estimates from five different specifications of the model with/without interactions 
with demographic controls. All specifications include a full set of time dummies and group 
dummies. Indicatively we present a set of cohort education and time effects in the Appendix 
(table eighteen to twenty-three). The elasticities can be easily calculated from the parameter 
estimates by using group mean hours, wage and non-labour income. The parameter estimates 
are presented in three groups: the intercept estimates, wage effects and income effects. 
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From model I to IV, we have corrections for the endogeneity of wage, nonlabour income, 
participation and selection at tax kink. The parameter estimates between model I and III are 
very similar for men, but not for women. This is expected, since from model I, we know that 
participation bias only exists in women. And the estimates for model II and IV are very similar 
for men as well, for women the estimates have dropped noticeably, which implies that bias 
caused by participation and selection at tax kink both exist amongst women. In model V, we 
have dropped all the correction terms, therefore it is OLS. The parameter estimates are quite 
different from the previous four models, the estimated parameters are larger for men, and 
smaller for women when compared with results from other models. This indicates the 
importance of controlling for the endogeneity in wage and nonlabour income. 
As far as the tax kinks are concerned, we follow Blundell et al., (1998) by only considering the 
first tax kink, because distinction between non tax payer and tax payer are more significant 
than other higher tax kinks (Saez 2010). Though we did apply some treatments on the higher 
tax kinks by excluding the individuals around the higher kinks with a caliper of 50 pounds in 
income. 
3.5.2 Extensive margin 
Concerning participation, the most prominent problem is the lack of wage for non-participants. 
We therefore, firstly estimated the wage equations for men and women separately on equation 
(10) and (11). Where equation ten is the basic wage equation, and equation eleven is the wage 
equation after controlling for selection. Results for wage equation are presented in table eleven 
and twelve. We have omitted the estimates for dummies such as year, region and ethnicity, but 
the full results can be found in the Appendix. 
For both men and women, education matters in the participation decision as well as in the wage 
determination process. However, it is much more important for women in these aspects. Further 
into the results, we find that compared with women at NVQ level 1-3, women who have NVQ4 
qualifications earn 31.3 percent more, and women who have NVQ5 qualifications earn 57.3 
percent more. Moreover, compared to families with no children, men and women in families 
with dependent children are less likely to work, again the effects on women are much larger. 
And the wage growth for men and women are different as well; age increase by one year, wage 
increase by 5.9 percent to 7.2 percent for men, and only by 3.1 percent to 3.5 percent for women. 
Considering the fact that the average wage of men is larger than that of women, the growth 
difference in monetary terms can be even greater. 
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In table thirteen and fourteen, we present the marginal effects of increasing in the two estimated 
earning measures on the probability of participation by education and by family types. Each 
estimate represents the increase in the probability of work as a result of a percentage increase 
in the earnings. The results are sensible. First, earnings incentives matter most for lower 
educated individuals. The participation probability of highly educated individuals responds less 
to both earnings measures. The elasticities are larger for women than for men, indicating that 
welfare benefits have larger effects on the participation decision of women than for men, 
especially women with lower education levels.  
3.5.3 Intertemporal results 
In interpreting the effect of changes in wages on labour supply, it is important to separate the 
parametric change of the sort usually contemplated in comparative static exercises from 
evolutionary changes due to movement along a lifecycle wage path. A parametric wage change 
refers to shifts in a lifecycle wage profile, while an evolutionary wage change refers to 
movements along a given profile. It is apparent from the labour supply function given by 
equation (17) that the value of parameter 𝛼𝐼  determines the hours of work response to 
evolutionary wage changes, the intertemporal substitution effect, i.e. Frisch elasticity. The 
theoretical prediction for its sign is positive, since lifecycle hours profile synchronizes with 
evolutionary wage profile. 
The results for Frisch elasticities are presented on the left panel of table seventeen, where we 
control for all age invariant characteristics determining lifetime wages, preferences and initial 
permanent income, or we can simply call this the height of the age-wage profile, using age 
squared to capture the shape of the lifecycle wage path, then the coefficient we get measures 
the labour supply responses to anticipated changes in wage at any given age. Women have 
larger Frisch elasticities than men do, this is consistent with previous evidence (Blundell, 
Meghir & Neves, 1993). It implies that women respond to intertemporal consumption-wage 
substitutions more than men do. This can be explained by the fact that the labour supply of 
women, especially in the context of a family, are susceptible to family production and childcare.  
 𝛼𝐼 + 𝛾?̅? in equation (17) measures the labour supply response to parametric wage changes, 
correspond to the usual concepts of uncompensated substitution effects. Because 𝛾?̅? measures 
the wealth effect, it is unambiguously negative, therefore there is no sign prediction for the 
uncompensated substitution effects. The results are estimated by controlling for age and age 
squared, i.e., the width of the age-wage profile, then use individual characteristics which 
97 
 
determines lifecycle income, as instruments for wage. Therefore, the coefficients estimated is 
the response of labour supply to a parametric wage shift, including both the intertemporal 
substitution effect and the reallocation of wealth across periods. Estimates for full lifecycle 
elasticity i.e., the uncompensated substitution effects are presented on the right panel of table 
seventeen. The sizes of the elasticity estimates are still reasonably within the range of estimates 
of previous evidence listed in table one, though they are much bigger than our estimates in the 
static labour supply analysis. We attribute the reason to highly aggregate nature of the 
estimation method in the lifecycle analysis. However, the patterns do coincide with our finding 
previously. In addition to this, the difference between the full lifecycle elasticity and Frisch 
elasticity offers us the estimates for wealth effects. They suggest that amongst men, wealth 
effects are the highest for lowly educated men, while amongst women, the wealth effects are 
similar across education levels.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper offers renewed evidence for married couples` labour supply responsiveness in the 
UK using QLFS data 2002-2016. In our analysis, the variations induced by fundamental 
reforms to the UK tax and benefit systems during our data period are used to elicit the labour 
supply effects to wage and non-labour income changes. We also include an intertemporal 
component in our analysis to reflect the lifecycle dynamic perspective of labour supply 
decisions. The benefit for such an approach is that the estimates is not specifically tied to one 
particular reform, but an average of all the reforms happened therein.  
With such an approach, we show that the estimated Marshallian elasticities for men are negative 
across all groups, suggesting that despite the fact that men on average are working harder than 
women, in recent decades they are somehow on a backward bending labour supply curve where 
they substitute away labour supply for wage gains. This is also confirmed by the descriptive 
trends. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect is larger amongst men within families where 
small children are present shows the effects of family friendly policies that were introduced in 
recent decade on men`s labour supply decisions., such as paternity leave. On the contrary, the 
labour supply responses for women are positive and the effects decreases as education level 
increases. The positivity of the effects confirms previous evidence of increasing participation 
amongst women in recent decades (Blau and Kahn, 2006); The effect decrease in education 
may be somewhat an indicator for preference. Concerning participation, our findings indicate 
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that welfare benefits have larger effects on the participation decision of women than for men, 
especially women in lower education levels.  
And the lifecycle analysis shows that the intertemporal substitution effects are way smaller 
amongst men across education and family types in terms of the presence of children. This 
implies either that credit market constraint is very important for men, they just do not smooth 
their consumption, or that men discount their future heavily. But for women the effects are very 
large across education and family types.  
Our results are robust to checks across different specifications. However, for future research 
more work is required to investigate the inter-dependence of the labour supply decisions within 
a family. The use of desired hours in addition to observed hours may be another improvement 















Table 3.1: Labour Supply Elasticities literature in UK 




Intensive  Extensive   
Married women     
 
Arellano & Meghir (1992) 
FES & LFS (1983), Age 20-
59  
Semi-log labour supply with fixed costs  0.29-0.71 
 
(-0.13) to (-0.4)  
Blundell, Duncan & Meghir (1998) FES 1978-1992, Age 20-50 




(-0.06) to (-0.19) 
Blundell, Duncan, McCrae & Meghir 
(2000) FRS 1994-1996 
Discrete choice on hours and particpation 0.11-0.17 
 
 








      




Blundell, Duncan &  Meghir (1992) FES 1981-1986 Marginal rate of substitution function 0.16-0.34  
 
Brewer, Duncan, Shephard & Suarez 
(2005) FRS 1995-2002, age<60 
Discrete choice over 5 positive hours  
1.02 
 












      




Blundell & Walker (1986) FES 1980, Age 19-59 Gorman polar form and translog hours 0.024  (-0.287) 
Meghir & Phillips (2010) FRS 1994-2004, Age 22-59 Discrete choice of work and not work 
 
(-0.006) to 0.364 
 
      
Intertemporal studies   Frisch e.  
 
Blundell, Meghir & Neves (1993) 
FES 1970-1984, married 
women 
Flexible specification of preferences 0.58-1.22 
  
Blundell, Costas Dias, Meghir & Shaw 
(2016) 
BHPS 1991-2008 and 
simulation, married 
women/lone mother 




          
           
  
Note: FES stands for Family Expenditure Survey. LFS stands for Labour Force Survey. FRS stands for Family Resources Survey. BHPS stands for British  Household Panel Survey. GHS stands 












Table 3.2: Tax Reforms (2002-2016)            
 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Starting r. 10 10 10 10 10 10 - - - - - - - - - 
Basic r. 22 22 22 22 22 22 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Top r. 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Additional r. - - - - - - - - 50 50 50 45 45 45 45 
Allow. (%Δ) 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.12 -0.05 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.07 
NI (PT-UEL) 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 
NI (>UEL)  - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
     Note: “r.” denotes rate. “Allow. (%Δ)” denotes the real percentage change in the tax allowance. The starting rate, the basic rate, top rate as well as additional rate, NI (National Insurance) 














Table 3.3: Working Tax Credit and Income Support Reforms -- Married couples with Partner working full-time 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Income Support                               
Maximum award 84.7 85.8 87.3 88.2 90.1 92.8 95 101 102.8 106 111.5 112.6 113.7 114.9 114.9 
Withdrawal rate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
  
               
Working Tax Credits 
              
Basic credit 74.2 70.1 72.2 74.3 76.6 79.2 82.7 86.9 88.3 89.2 89.5 89.9 90.9 91.6 91.7 
Maximum amount (1 Child) 135 135 135 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 
Maximum amount (2 or more) 200 200 200 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
  
               
Child Tax Credit 
               
1st Income threshold 94.5 97.3 100.4 100.4 100.4 123.5 123.5 123.5 123.5 123.5 123.5 123.5 123.5 123.5 123.5 
1st Income threshold (CTC only)  / 254.4 259.2 267.5 272.2 278.8 299.5 308.5 311.3 305 305 306 307.9 309.7 309.7 
2nd Income threshold / 961.5 961.5 961.5 961.5 961.5 961.5 961.5 961.5 769.2 / / / / / 
Family element / 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.4 10.5 
Family element (under 12 months)  / 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.5 / / / / / / 
Child element 27.2 27.8 31.2 32.5 33.9 35.4 40.1 42.9 44.2 48.9 51.6 52.2 52.8 53.2 53.4 
1st Withdrawal rate 55% 37% 37% 37% 37% 37% 39% 39% 39% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 
2nd Withdrawal rate / 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 41% / / / / / 
  
               
Child Benefit 
               
Eldest/only Child 15.75 16.05 16.5 17 17.45 18.1 18.8 20 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.5 20.7 20.7 
Other children 10.55 10.75 11.05 11.4 11.7 12.1 12.55 13.2 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.55 13.7 13.7 
Notes: Tax and benefit systems as in April each year. Figures for mothers in couples assume partner works full-time. Work requirement is 30 hours per week for 1 














Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Workers (Men) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Hours 44.540 44.258 44.258 43.719 43.491 43.635 42.428 42.889 43.178 42.812 43.328 42.974 42.745 42.770 
Wage 13.082 13.257 13.715 14.093 14.605 14.994 15.306 15.843 16.062 16.560 17.287 16.946 17.162 17.396 
Spouse income 277.61 281.73 296.16 310.64 328.09 342.0 358.613 382.493 385.024 398.930 424.021 407.468 409.884 425.022 
Age 42.929 43.032 43.570 43.438 43.383 43.591 43.110 42.810 43.777 43.642 44.204 44.042 43.808 42.129 
NVQ5 25.22% 25.92% 26.65% 26.49% 27.57% 28.58% 29.32% 29.82% 33.34% 35.35% 37.09% 36.79% 36.39% 36.14% 
NVQ4 11.65% 12.36% 12.62% 12.55% 12.49% 12.43% 11.65% 11.66% 12.13% 12.77% 11.85% 11.13% 11.30% 10.59% 
NVQ1-3 63.13% 61.72% 60.73% 60.97% 59.93% 58.99% 59.03% 58.51% 54.53% 51.88% 51.07% 52.08% 52.30% 53.27% 
Child 0-2 0.083 0.082 0.088 0.092 0.100 0.094 0.101 0.110 0.115 0.115 0.107 0.112 0.128 0.121 
Child 3-4 0.140 0.133 0.125 0.131 0.131 0.134 0.135 0.134 0.163 0.172 0.159 0.170 0.186 0.160 
Child 5-9 0.234 0.233 0.235 0.227 0.208 0.225 0.210 0.202 0.217 0.233 0.220 0.240 0.267 0.257 
Child 10+ 0.297 0.288 0.296 0.288 0.288 0.282 0.265 0.250 0.254 0.249 0.241 0.242 0.277 0.273 
Obs. 10867 8493 5538 6807 5531 7664 7926 6166 5905 5912 5242 5528 6405 6535 






















Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Workers (Women) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Hours 34.063 33.804 33.349 33.320 33.692 33.674 33.177 33.681 32.956 33.009 33.584 33.147 32.874 33.306 
Wage 11.110 11.213 11.465 11.677 12.090 12.348 12.627 13.125 13.457 13.746 14.076 14.006 14.322 14.562 
Spouse income 525.20 541.74 555.431 578.961 595.287 609.146 626.092 638.139 648.338 679.276 695.849 657.533 651.836 674.581 
Age 41.139 41.356 41.672 41.922 42.051 42.165 41.939 41.551 42.637 42.508 43.130 42.957 42.878 42.650 
NVQ5 26.30% 28.03% 29.29% 28.82% 30.36% 32.08% 32.29% 33.61% 38.50% 40.67% 42.53% 42.95% 43.69% 44.31% 
NVQ4 19.34% 18.52% 17.98% 16.95% 16.43% 15.94% 16.11% 14.35% 14.73% 13.19% 13.23% 13.04% 12.82% 11.39% 
NVQ1-3 54.36% 53.45% 52.73% 54.23% 53.20% 51.99% 51.60% 52.04% 46.76% 46.14% 44.24% 44.01% 43.49% 44.30% 
Child 0-2 0.092 0.083 0.091 0.090 0.093 0.094 0.092 0.104 0.105 0.108 0.099 0.097 0.106 0.102 
Child 3-4 0.139 0.130 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.129 0.126 0.134 0.159 0.165 0.151 0.155 0.164 0.152 
Child 5-10 0.211 0.216 0.216 0.209 0.189 0.207 0.197 0.190 0.204 0.217 0.208 0.222 0.255 0.256 
Child 11- 0.260 0.258 0.270 0.268 0.267 0.263 0.251 0.241 0.242 0.238 0.229 0.247 0.286 0.281 
Obs. 8180 6462 4489 5735 4795 6896 7287 5813 5654 5739 5208 5706 6834 6746 








Table 3.6: Results on Static Labour Supply Elasticities (Instruments: Grouping by Cohort and Education) 
  
Marshallian Elasticity 
    
Income Elasticity 
  Means 
  
 
 Hours Wage Income 
  M   F     M   F   M F M F M F 
Overall -0.051 *** 0.048 *** 0.018  -0.133 *** 43.832 33.447 11.836 9.717 389.006 670.121 
 (0.724)  (0.789)  (0.003)  (0.003)        
NVQ1-3 -0.083 *** 0.036 *** 0.039 *** -0.062 *** 43.206 29.837 9.684 8.818 300.920 564.659 
 (0.236) 
 (0.636)  
 (0.001)  (0.002)        
NVQ4 -0.061 *** 0.037 *** 
 0.022  -0.220 *** 42.945 32.165 11.122 9.990 349.117 584.204 
 (0.968) 
 (0.829)   (0.004)  (0.003)        
NVQ5 -0.035 *** 0.053 *** 
 0.013  -0.286 *** 43.916 35.659 13.227 11.911 455.717 736.473 
 (0.614) 
 (0.791)   (0.001)  (0.004)        
No children -0.056  *** 0.066  *** 
 0.053   -0.038  * 42.862 36.465 10.658 9.583 391.227 605.589 
 (0.267) 
 (0.255)   (0.004)  (0.002)        
Children 0-2 -0.088  *** -0.081  *** 
 0.020   -0.367  *** 43.072 29.209 10.182 9.663 347.448 605.721 
 (0.540) 
 (0.446)   (0.002)  (0.005)        
Children 3-4 -0.090  *** 0.076  *** 
 0.005   -0.194  *** 43.080 26.563 10.121 9.679 319.303 602.945 
 (0.505) 
 (0.457)   (0.002)  (0.004)        
Children 5-9 -0.053  *** 0.092  *** 
 0.011   -0.105  *** 43.401 28.924 11.178 10.459 315.020 648.823 
 (0.242) 
 (0.325)   (0.002)  (0.003)        
Children 10+ -0.072  *** 0.092  *** 
 0.056  *** -0.366  *** 43.775 30.964 11.232 9.896 311.947 656.947 
  (0.328)   (0.321)     (0.002)   (0.004)               
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. These results are 







Table 3.7: Results on Static Labour Supply Elasticities (Instruments: Grouping by Cohort and Education)   
Mashallian E. 
NVQ1-3   NVQ4   NVQ5 
M   F   M   F   M   F   
No children 
-0.079 *** 0.055 *** -0.078 *** 0.058 *** -0.011 
  
0.066 *** 
(0.355)  (0.255)  (0.872)  (0.644)  (0.461)  (0.557) 
 
Children aged 0-2 
-0.062 *** -0.118 *** -0.205 *** -0.166 *** -0.099 *** -0.038 * 
(0.658)  (0.608)  (2.882)  (1.755)  (1.071)  (0.696) 
 
Children aged 2-4 




-0.041 * 0.113 *** 
(0.672)  (0.541)  (1.999)  (2.143)  (0.960)  (0.916) 
 
Children aged 4-9 
-0.065 *** 0.090 *** -0.032 * 0.031 
 
-0.031 *** 0.143 *** 
(0.470)  (0.385)  (0.784)  (1.161)  (0.406)  (0.663) 
 
Children aged 10+ 
-0.088 *** 0.053 *** -0.046 ** 0.152 *** -0.043 *** 0.186 *** 
(0.444)   (0.374)   (0.801)   (0.915)   (0.697)   (0.777)   
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. These 
results are from equation 2. The reported effects are calculated elasticities instead of the parameter estimates which can be 





Table 3.8: Income Elasticities (Instruments: Grouping by Cohort and Education)     
Income Elasticities 
NVQ1-3   NVQ4   NVQ5   
M   F   M   F   M   F   
No children 
-0.0004  0.004  0.125 
 0.003  0.025  -0.097 
** 
(0.009)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
 
Children aged 0-2 
-0.0034  -0.054  -0.040  -0.555 *** -0.063  -0.255 
*** 
(0.004)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.020)  (0.004)  (0.008) 
 
Children aged 2-4 
0.0257  -0.055  -0.030 
 -0.263 * -0.154 *** -0.181 ** 




Children aged 4-9 
0.0439  0.044  -0.095 
 -0.110  -0.092 
* 0.059 
 
(0.003)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.004)  (0.008) 
 
Children aged 10+ 
0.0442 * -0.056  0.033 
 -0.063  0.080  -0.339 
*** 
(0.003)   (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.015)   (0.004)   (0.010)   
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. These results are from equation 2. The reported effects are calculated elasticities instead of the parameter 




















Table 3.9: Sensitivity Analysis for Male Estimates: (with interactions)  
  I II III IV V 
Constant 52.579 *** 49.210 *** 52.439 *** 49.146 *** 52.167 *** 
 (0.829)  (0.519)  (0.820)  (0.499)  (0.280)  
Child0-2 0.350  0.516  0.353  0.526  0.569  
 (0.758)  (0.758)  (0.757)  (0.756)  (0.756)  
Child3-4 -1.310 ** -1.190 * -1.169 * -1.047 * -1.171 * 
 (0.612)  (0.611)  (0.610)  (0.610)  (0.607)  
Child5-9 -0.200  -0.010  -0.178  0.011  -0.132  
 (0.478)  (0.477)  (0.478)  (0.477)  (0.466)  
Child10+ 0.223  0.526  0.241  0.529  0.118  
 (0.379)  (0.374)  (0.378)  (0.374)  (0.359)  









Child0-2 -0.435  -0.465  -0.436  -0.468  -0.534  
 (0.350)  (0.350)  (0.350)  (0.349)  (0.350)  
Child3-4 0.596 ** 0.572 ** 0.536 * 0.511 * 0.445  
 (0.281)  (0.281)  (0.280)  (0.280)  (0.280)  
Child5-9 0.454 ** 0.433 ** 0.449 ** 0.428 ** 0.323  
 (0.211)  (0.211)  (0.210)  (0.210)  (0.210)  
Child10+ 0.510 *** 0.505 *** 0.505 *** 0.500 *** 0.500 *** 
 (0.163)  (0.163)  (0.163)  (0.163)  (0.163)  









Child0-2 0.001  0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 * 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Child3-4 -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  
Child5-9 -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 
 (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  
Child10+ -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 












Wage -0.092 *** -0.096 *** -0.091 *** -0.094 *** 
 
 
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
 
 
Nonlabour income -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** 
 
 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
 
 














Tax & NI kink 2.493 *** 
 





  (0.479)       (0.474)           
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. These results are from equation 2. The reported effects are parameter estimates and 









Table 3.10: Sensitivity Analysis for Female Estimates: (with interactions)  
  I II III IV V 
Constant 47.208 *** 42.603 *** 47.567 *** 42.676 *** 39.228 *** 
 (0.750)  (0.739)  (0.724)  (0.711)  (0.345)  
Child0-2 1.509 ** 0.479  1.284 * 0.254  -0.772  
 (0.738)  (0.741)  (0.729)  (0.732)  (0.733)  
Child3-4 -7.870 *** -10.295 *** -8.002 *** -10.405 *** -10.495 *** 
 (0.694)  (0.693)  (0.684)  (0.683)  (0.684)  
Child5-9 -9.619 *** -12.636 *** -9.808 *** -12.832 *** -13.281 *** 
 (0.528)  (0.522)  (0.522)  (0.515)  (0.515)  
Child10+ -3.252 *** -6.211 *** -3.471 *** -6.442 *** -7.290 *** 
 (0.429)  (0.420)  (0.424)  (0.415)  (0.413)  









Child0-2 -3.478 *** -3.466 *** -3.400 *** -3.393 *** -2.972 *** 
 (0.343)  (0.345)  (0.339)  (0.341)  (0.341)  
Child3-4 0.337  0.365  0.387  0.404  0.483  
 (0.325)  (0.327)  (0.321)  (0.323)  (0.324)  
Child5-9 1.537 *** 1.434 *** 1.631 *** 1.517 *** 1.611 *** 
 (0.244)  (0.245)  (0.241)  (0.242)  (0.242)  
Child10+ 0.630 *** 0.568 *** 0.750 *** 0.681 *** 0.793 *** 
 (0.203)  (0.204)  (0.200)  (0.201)  (0.202)  









Child0-2 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  
Child3-4 -0.001  -0.001 * -0.001  -0.001 * -0.001 ** 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  
Child5-9 -0.001 *** -0.0005 *** -0.001 *** -0.0005 *** -0.001 *** 
 (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  
Child10+ -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 












Wage -0.293 *** -0.268 *** -0.289 *** -0.266 *** 
 
 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
 
 
Nonlabour income 0.021 *** 0.020 *** 0.020 *** 0.019 *** 
 
 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
 
 














Tax & NI kink 8.149 *** 
 





  (0.260)       (0.256)           
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. These results are from equation 2. The reported effects are parameter estimates, the 












Table 3.11: Sensitivity Analysis for Male estimates: (without interactions) 
  I   II   III   VI   V   










































Child5-9 0.100   0.240 *  0.109   0.246 *  0.125  




















































































Wage -0.091 ***  -0.095 ***  -0.09 ***  -0.093 ***  
 
 





Nonlabour income -0.005 ***  -0.005 ***  -0.005 ***  -0.005 ***  
 
 



















Tax kink 2.455 ***  
 
  





  (0.479)           (0.474)               
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in brackets. These results are from equation 2, the reported effects are 
























Table 3.12: Sensitivity Analysis for Female Estimates: (without interactions) 
  I   II   III   VI   V 
Constant 47.105 ***   42.583 ***   47.329 ***   42.535 ***   38.843 *** 
 
(0.720) 






Child0-2 -4.661 ***  -5.68 ***  -4.709 ***  -5.741 ***  -5.973 *** 
 
(0.188) 






Child3-4 -7.499 ***  -9.908 ***  -7.528 ***  -9.938 ***  -9.996 *** 
 
(0.173) 






Child5-9 -6.725 ***  -9.907 ***  -6.727 ***  -9.940 ***  -10.209 *** 
 
(0.164) 






Child10+ -3.044 ***  -6.118 ***  -3.015 ***  -6.115 ***  -6.760 *** 
 
(0.146) 






Log Wage 1.961 ***  1.645 ***  1.901 ***  1.603 ***  -0.870 *** 
 
(0.156) 






Implied elasticity 0.060   0.050   0.060   0.050   -0.030  
 
 







Nonlabour Income -0.021 ***  -0.02 ***  -0.021 ***  -0.020 ***  -0.001 *** 
 
(0.001) 






Implied income effect -0.182   -0.174   -0.182   -0.174   -0.009  
 
 














Wage -0.286 ***  -0.262 ***  -0.282 ***  -0.260 ***  
 
 
 (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.013)   
 
 
Nonlabour income 0.02 ***  0.02 ***  0.020 ***  0.019 ***  
 
 
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
 
 



















  (0.261)           (0.256)               
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in brackets. These results are from equation 2, the reported effects are 











Table3.13: Wage Equation by Heckman MLE: (Instruments: Age and No. of Children) 
  Men     Women   
Variable Probit 
  Wage    Probit   Wage   
Constant 0.659 



























































































































































   
Year  √     √     √     √   
Region √ 
  √   √ 
  √  
Ethnicity √ 
  √   √ 
  √  
rho 0.082           -0.097         
sigma 0.464 
     0.457     
lambda 0.038 
 




 (0.008)      (0.009)     
Obs. 133816           155044         
LR test (rho=0): chi2(1) =19.95      Prob >chi2 =0.0000         
LR test (rho=0): chi2(1) =28.42      Prob >chi2 =0.0000 
These results are from equation 9, the reported effects are Parameter estimates, the controls such as year, 
















Table 3.14: Wage Equation by Heckman MLE: (Instruments: Age, Number of Children & Z) 
  Men     Women   
Variable Probit 
  Earning    Probit   Earning   


















































































































































   











   
Year  √     √    √     √   
Region √ 
  √   √ 
  √  
Ethnicity √ 
  √   √ 
  √  
rho -0.705           0.071         
sigma 0.433 
     0.381     
lambda -0.305 
 




 (0.004)      (0.003)     
Obs. 133693     153843   
LR test (rho=0): chi2(1) =866.87      Prob >chi2 =0.0000         
LR test (rho=0): chi2(1) =7.95     Prob >chi2 =0.0048  
These results are from equation 9, the reported effects are Parameter estimates, the controls such as year, region 









Table 3.15: Participation Elasticities          
  MLE Estimated Income TS Estimated Income   
  Men     Women       Men     Women   
Overall 0.091 
***  0.523 ***   0.121 
***  0.539 *** 
 (0.004)   (0.106)    (0.045) 
  (0.087)  
NVQ1-3 0.159 *** 
 
0.462  *** 
 
 0.172  
*** 
 








 (0.061)  
NVQ4 0.082 
  
0.600  *** 
 
 0.041  
 







 (0.147)  
NVQ5 0.067 *** 
 
-0.149  *** 
 
 0.100  







 (0.017)  
No Children 0.210 
*** 
 
1.753  *** 
 
 0.235  







 (0.298)  
Children0-2 0.261 *** 
 
0.010  *** 
 
 0.284  







 (0.025)  
Children3-4 0.214 *** 
 
1.843  *** 
 
 0.234  







 (0.267)  
Children5-9 0.036 
  
1.250  *** 
 
 0.074  
 













 0.098  
** 0.012  
 
  (0.004)     (0.238) 
      (0.046)     (0.017) 
  
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels respectively 
These results are from the estimation of equation 11. The reported effects are elasticities instead 
of parameter estimates,  





Table 3.16: Participation Elasticities by Education and Children： 
Elasticities 
NVQ1-3   NVQ4   NVQ5 
M   F   M   F   M   F   
No children 









(0.083)  (0.051) 
 
Children aged 0-2 







(0.137)  (0.037) 
 
Children aged 2-4 











Children aged 4-9 







Children aged 10+ 
0.247 *** 0.165 *** -0.473 *** -0.229 *** -0.144  -0.245 *** 
(0.063)   (0.021)   (0.147)   (0.051)   (0.097)   (0.034)   
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. These results are from the estimation of equation 11. The reported effects are elasticities instead of 









Table 3.17: Intertemporal Labour Supply Elasticities      
  Intertemporal Substitution   Uncompensated Substitution   Wealth Effect 
  Men   Women     Men   Women     Men   Women   
Overall 0.440 *** 1.206 ***  0.211 *** 0.598 ***  -0.229  -0.608  
 (0.055)  (0.239)   (0.017)  (0.015)       
NVQ1-3 0.545 *** 1.266 ***  0.129 *** 0.717 ***  -0.416  -0.549  
 (0.047) 
 (0.260)   (0.006)  (0.013)   
    
NVQ4 0.378 *** 1.136 ***  0.24 *** 0.604 ***  -0.138  -0.532  
 (0.076) 
 (0.280)   (0.020)  (0.022)   
    
NVQ5 0.338 *** 1.004 ***  0.294 *** 0.443 ***  -0.044  -0.561  
 (0.043) 
 (0.076)   (0.014)  (0.018)   
    
No Children 0.713 *** 0.898 ***  0.121 *** 0.545 ***  -0.592  -0.353  
 (0.067) 
 (0.018)   (0.007) 
 (0.010)   
    
Children aged 0-2 0.600 *** 1.155 ***  0.082 *** 0.688 ***  -0.518  -0.467  
 (0.215) 
 (0.010)   (0.013) 
 (0.030)   
    
Children aged 3-4 0.409 *** 1.257 ***  0.121 *** 0.689 ***  -0.288  -0.568  
 (0.118) 
 (0.008)   (0.011) 
 (0.021)   
    
Children aged 5-9 0.282 *** 1.132 ***  0.124 *** 0.652 ***  -0.158  -0.48  
 (0.090) 
 (0.007)   (0.009) 
 (0.014)   
    
Children aged 10+ 0.256 *** 1.146 ***  0.13 *** 0.642 ***  -0.126  -0.504  
  (0.071)   (0.006)     (0.008)   (0.013)           
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. These 
results are from the estimation of equation 11. The reported effects are elasticities instead of parameter estimates, Which can be 

























































Figure 3.3: Participation by gender 
 


























































Estimating trade union effects on hours of work 
—Evidence from the UK, QLFS 1996-2016 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Another phenomenon that is missing from the traditional discourse of hours of work, 
which says that it is everywhere and always a labour supply phenomenon, are 
institutional constraints. One of the most important institutional phenomena in the past 
several decades has been the diminishing influence of trade unions. Indeed, strangely, 
our knowledge of trade unions in labour economics continues to be harnessed to labour 
demand, and not to labour supply. Indeed, lifecycle labour supply even managed to 
become the dominant narrative to understand cyclical variations in the labour market 
in the past decades, virtually without reference to institutional driven constraints. We 
have few reasons to believe that institutional phenomena would leave supply 
considerations unaffected. Unions are a case in point, even though we think that what 
unions do is to raise wages, along the demand curve, by restricting supply. Thus, 
examining the relationship between unions, hours and participation seems well past 
time. Again, we try to restrict ourselves to exploring these relationships in reduced 
forms to first develop the stylized facts as a prelude to understanding them.  
Despite the decline in the membership and coverage of trade unions over the past five 
decades, collective bargaining and trade unions are still of crucial importance 
concerning the regulation of many issues in labour market (Andrews et al., 1998) such 




the extent to which trade unions and collective bargaining could drive differences 
between comparable union and non-union workers in terms of the above issues seems 
to be paramount for the understandings for policy purposes.  
Having reviewed the literature on trade unions, the picture revealed is that there is a 
voluminous amount of work trying to quantify the effect of unions on a range of topics, 
heavily on wage and employment42. but almost no work has been done to measure the 
effect of unionism on hours worked, none in the context of the UK. This chapter is 
motivated by the desire to fill this important gap in the literature and to shed some light 
on the magnitude of the effect of unions on hours worked. 
Bargaining between management and unions in practice, do not only focus on the level 
of wages, but working-hours is also often included in such packages. This may happen 
in different forms though, such as the length of the standard working week, the length 
of paid holidays, the number of public holidays and sick leave arrangement etc. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect some differences in the hours worked between 
workers in the union and non-union sectors (Booth 1995, p221).  
Moreover, several studies (see Freeman, 1981; Lewis, 1963 and Lewis, 1986) suggest 
that there are positive union-nonunion differentials for fringe benefits such as health 
insurance, pensions, supplementary unemployment insurance and the like. The 
presence of such fixed employment costs can reduce the relative flexibility of the 
unionized firm in managing workforce reductions. Thus, it is reasonable for the 
unionized firms to find ways of transferring these costs onto employment and hours to 
offset the effects on wage rates (Booth 1995, p221).  
Based on these arguments, there is reason to expect that there would be an impact of 
unionism on their employees` working hours. The focus of our paper is to estimate the 
size of such an impact. However, before we start, it is good to clarify what we are 
estimating. There have been two main dimension of trade union effects considered in 
the literature — union membership and union coverage. We need to distinguish between 
 
42 See surveys Lewis (1963, 1986), Pencavel (1991), Booth (1995) for reviews of the work done on these topics. 
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these two effects in our analysis, based on the UK LFS data. Because industrial relations 
in the UK is more complex than that of other countries such as the United States. In the 
US, membership and coverage are highly correlated – plants are often effectively 
“closed shops” – all workers are members of the union that cover the plant. But in the 
UK, many more non-members work in workplaces that are covered by union 
agreements and conversely, more union members are employed in workplaces where 
unions are not engaged in bargaining (Bryson 2002). In our study, we use the Quarterly 
Labour Force Survey data, ranging from1996 to 2016. The UNION variable askes 
people whether they are a member of trade unions or staff associations. The TUCOV 
variable askes people whether their pay or working conditions are affected by collective 
bargaining agreements. The data confirms the widely documented declining trend of 
the trade union presence in the working population over this period (see figure 4.1). 
Interestingly, the pattern of the trend for membership and coverage are quite different 
from each other. The percentage of the union membership decrease significantly across 
the period, from 31.3% in 1996 to 25.2% in 2016. While the percentage of covered 
workers are fairly consistent at around 10% to 12.3% therefore, there appear to be a 
good reason to differentiate these two effects.  
The literature exploring union effects on labour market outcomes is one of the oldest 
and most extensively studied topics in economics and industrial relations. The 
advancement in technology in recent decades has made large and good quality data 
available, encouraging good numbers of empirical research flourish. However, majority 
of them concentrates on wage differentials, employment, job satisfaction, fringe 
benefits, but very few studies the impact on hours of work. And they are very old, may 
not be relevant anymore in the light of the dramatic changes in trade unions in recent 
decades. Some of these studies look at the union effect on total hours of work, per week 
or per annual (Perloff and Sickles 1987; Earle and Pencavel 1990; DiNardo 1991), some 
look at the union effect on overtime hours (Ehrenberg 1971; Miller and Mulvey 1991; 
Trejo 1993). In this study, we investigate the unionism effect on three different 
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dimensions of work hours: total usual hours, standard hours43 and overtime hours. All 
measured in weekly terms.  
One of the major difficulties in the union differential estimation is the endogeneity of 
the union status determination, there has been a general agreement in literature 
regarding this (Robinson 1989; Card 1996; Raphael 2000 etc). while methods for 
dealing with endogenous selection are interesting conceptually, in practice existing 
studies in the current context are unconvincing as they are unable to find credible 
identifying instruments (Andrews et al 1998) and estimates produced from these studies 
tend to be large and unstable (Blanchflower and Bryson 2002). Thus, this remains a 
contentious issue, and so we prefer to concentrate on other methodological issues. In 
our analysis, we use several methods both parametric and non-parametric, as well as 
several model specifications to cross check the sensitivity of the results.  
However, an alternative approach is to use estimators that form estimates of 
counterfactuals, i.e., How many hours would union workers work if they were not 
unionized? This approach is known as the potential-outcomes framework, including 
methods such as matching and treatment effects (TE). Matching has been used widely 
in labour economics, and TE in health economics. Under the potential outcome 
framework, we consider our study as a social experiment, where union membership and 
union coverage are two separate treatments done to people in our sample `randomly`44. 
To obtain the effect of the treatments, we need to construct the counterfactuals for each 
individual, were they treated otherwise. We adopt a particular type of treatment effect 
method for our study, the inverse-probability weighting (IPW) method. The IPW 
method uses the inverse (reciprocal) of the probability of being in the observed 
treatment group as weights to eliminate the bias incurred in the estimation process. 
These probabilities are obtained by modelling the observed treatment as a function of 
 
43 The standard hours are derived by taking difference between total usual hours and overtime hours. 
44 The endogeneity of the union status remains a contentious issue. Through many attempts in the past decades 
(Farber, 1982; Abowd and Farber, 1982; Robinson 1989), some understandings have been made, such as individual 
characteristics, wage differential, industry characteristics (union coverage, capital labour ratio, firm size etc) do help 
explain some variations in the union status determination, but limited.  
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subject characteristics that determine the treatment group.  
The key findings are that as a whole, union workers work 1 to 1.7 hours more than their 
non-union/not-covered counterparts. And the effects are different between men and 
women, for men, union workers work roughly 1 hour less than the non-union/not-
covered men, and the effects diminishes over time, becoming not significant from 2010 
onwards. For women union workers, the effects are significant and large and consistent 
over time at around 3 to 4 hours per week. These are large effects relative to the standard 
deviation of hours: an estimate 1.7 for men is.  
If the effects are further decomposed into membership effects and coverage effects, we 
find that the membership effects are positive, and are larger among the covered workers 
(2 to 6 hours) than those among the not-covered workers (1 to 2.5 hours). The coverage 
effects are negative, and are larger in size among the non-union workers (-4 to -5 hours) 
than those among the union workers (-1 to -0.5 hours).  
We also analysed the effects of union on the prevalence of overtime hours. We find that 
union membership/coverage increase the prevalence of paid overtime by approximately 
13.9 percent, but decrease the prevalence of unpaid overtime by 2.3 percent. After 
controlling for individual characteristics such as industry and occupation and firm 
characteristics such as firm size, the effect decreases to 8.7 percent and 0.8 percent 
respectively, but still significant. 
Our results also suggest that unions reduce the chance of their members working unpaid 
overtime, and increases the chance of more paid overtime. Our results echo the story 
that unions use overtime hours to stabilize working hours and highlight the value of 
their membership.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature. Section III 
explains the empirical frameworks we use in our analysis. Section IV describes the data 
we use for this study as well as the basic patterns concerning hours of work that are 
evident in our dataset. Section V presents the results from our estimation and the 
discussions relevant. Finally, section VI summarizes and concludes.  
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4.2 Related literature 
In this section, we review the related past literature, where we first briefly allude to the 
theoretical developments and then explore the empirical findings. There are two strands 
of literature found relevant to the matter of hours determination in the context of 
unionized labour market: industrial relations and labour economics. 
4.2.1 Theoretical developments 
The industrial relations literature on unionism usually ascribes an important role on 
trade unions in the setting of work hours (Farber 1982; Abowd and Farber 1982; 
William K. 1987; Miller and Mulvey 1991; etc.), and most certainly unions have 
identified control over the hours worked by their members as an important goal of their 
activities. However, the traditional economic model of hours determination has been 
largely focused on the classic labour supply model where each individual employee 
selecting his or her hours of work to maximize a well-behaved utility function subject 
to a budget constraint. Although the contract curve model (Oswald and Walker 1993) 
does incorporate collective bargaining into the hours` determination process, there has 
hardly been any empirical evidence followed from this.  
The purpose of this section is to sketch some union-management bargaining models 
that help organize our thoughts with respect to the determination of hours of work in 
unionized labour markets. We adopt the bargaining framework from Earle and Pencavel 
(1990). First, we neglect issues presented by overtime hours and the overtime wage 
premium. Then we consider the complications raised by such issues. 
We start by specifying the objectives of the firm and the union. For the firm we posit 
profit maximization with profits defined as  
                                                     Π = 𝑅(𝐿, ℎ) − 𝑤ℎ𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿                                                   (1) 
Where R denotes gross revenues; L, the number of workers employed; h, hours worked 
per employee; w, the wage rate per hour per employee; and c, the per-worker fixed costs 
of employment, such as hiring and training costs and certain fringe expenditures. We 
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assume the union maximizes a well-behaved objective function Γ, which includes three 
arguments: e earnings; h hours of work; and L employment;   
                                                               Γ = 𝑔(𝑒, ℎ, 𝐿)                                                              (2) 






< 0, and 
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝐿
> 0.45 The objective function is the union 
leadership`s. The classical bargaining model for economists is to assume that wages, 
hours and employment take on the values that lie on the parties` contract curve, which 
means one party cannot improve its welfare without reducing the other party`s welfare. 
This model involves w, h and L being selected such that the function Ω1 is maximized, 
                                                            max
𝑤,ℎ,𝐿
Ω1 = Γ + 𝐵Π                                                      (3) 
Where B>0 represents management`s bargaining strength relative to the union. In other 
words, the value of B reflects the relative weight placed on the firm`s objectives in the 
bargaining problem.  
Given the objectives of the parties, consider the determination of wages, hours and 
employment. As in all bargaining situations, a crucial issue is whether the parties share 
some control over all the variables or whether one party possesses unilateral power to 
set one or more variables. The contract-curve model above assumes that all three 
decision variables w, h and L are negotiated jointly by the union and management. 
However, there are many other cases where one party has unilateral power over one or 
more of the variables. We now consider models where at least one of the parties is able 
to determine one or other of the variables unilaterally. Mathematically, there are 27 
possible permutations considering the determination of the three variables w, h and L. 
Each may well be an appropriate description in a particular labour market. The 
maximization problem can then be written as, 
                           max
𝑤,ℎ,𝐿,𝜆,𝜇
Ω2 = Γ + 𝐵Π + 𝜆(𝑅1 − 𝑤ℎ − 𝑐) + 𝜇(𝑅2 − 𝑤𝐿)                    (4) 
Where 𝜆>0 and 𝜇>0 are Lagrange multipliers, 𝑅1 = 𝜕𝑅/𝜕𝐿 and 𝑅2 = 𝜕𝑅/𝜕ℎ. This 
 
45 Trade unions objectives are for higher pay, shorter hours and more employment. 
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model nests other models: in the contract curve model, B>0 and 𝜆= 𝜇= 0, all three 
decision variables w, h and L are negotiated jointly by the union and management; if 
B>0, 𝜆>0 and 𝜇=0, then the management sets employment unilaterally; if B=0, 𝜆>0, 
and 𝜇>0, then wages are set by the union, then the management sets the hours of work 
and employment; if B= 𝜇=0 and 𝜆>0, then the union determines both wages and hours 
of work while management unilaterally sets employment; so on so forth. The first order 
conditions for a maximum are as follows: 
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+ 𝐵(𝑅2 − 𝑤𝐿) + 𝜆(𝑅12 − 𝑤) + 𝜇𝑅22 = 0
        
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝐿
+ 𝐵(𝑅1 − 𝑤ℎ − 𝑐) + 𝜆𝑅11 + 𝜇(𝑅12 − 𝑤) = 0
                                                              𝜆(𝑅1 − 𝑤ℎ − 𝑐) = 0
                                                                      𝜇(𝑅2 − 𝑤ℎ) = 0




 , 𝑅2 ≡
𝜕𝑅
𝜕ℎ
 , 𝑅11 ≡
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝐿2
 , 𝑅12 ≡
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝐿𝜕ℎ
 and 𝑅22 ≡
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕ℎ2
 . In the efficient 
contract model, where the three variables are jointly determined, the first order 
condition for hours can be derived from the first two conditions by setting 𝜆= 𝜇=0. 
Then we could find that an efficient contract requires hours to be set such that the 
marginal disutility of hours in the union`s objective function be proportional to the 
firm`s marginal revenue of hours, the factor of proportionality being the bargaining 
power parameter B, 






                                                   (6) 
In the models where management has exclusive control over hours of work, which is 
normal case seen at workplace, the first order condition for hours of work is  
                                                              
𝜕𝑅
𝜕ℎ
= 𝑤ℎ + 𝑐                                                             (7) 
The above models ignored the fact that one possible dimension of the union-
management bargaining, the overtime hours and overtime wage premium. To 
accommodate these, let`s define the parameter 𝛿 as either taking the value zero when 
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overtime hours are worked or one when no overtime is worked. and rewrite the firm`s 
profits as 
                    Π = 𝑅(𝐿, ℎ) − 𝛿(𝑤ℎ𝐿) − (1 − 𝛿)[𝑤ℎ̅𝐿 + 𝛾𝑤(ℎ − ℎ̅)𝐿] − 𝑐𝐿                 (8) 
Where ℎ̅ denotes normal hours of work and 𝛾 ≥ 1 is the premium rate applied to 
wages for each overtime hours worked. In the UK, the working time regulations 
stipulates that the maximum weekly hours are 48 hours a week on average. However, 
workers can choose to work more than this limit, and the overtime wage premium is 
not compulsory. Given the same objective function, equation (2) for the union, various 
bargaining models may be identified, although now the decision variables embrace ℎ̅ 
and 𝛾 in addition to w, h and L. And the maximization problem will become as follows, 
max
𝑤,ℎ,ℎ̅,𝐿,𝛾,𝜆,𝜇
Ω2 = Γ + 𝐵Π+ 𝜆{𝑅1 − 𝛿𝑤ℎ − (1 − 𝛿)[𝑤ℎ̅ + 𝛾𝑤(ℎ − ℎ̅)] − 𝑐} + 𝜇(𝑅2 −𝑤𝐿)       (9) 
In principle, it is straightforward to amend the models above to take account of many 
bargaining outcomes. The difficulty is discriminating among them in any given 
empirical situation, because the more variables are incorporated, the more possibilities 
of complications associated with corner solutions to the constrained maximization 
problems there will be. And these corner solutions appear to be highly relevant in view 
of the fact that many bargaining outcomes in the UK stipulate ℎ̅ = 35 or 40 and 𝛾 
ranges from 1 to 2 or even 3 in some cases. The above are the theoretical frameworks 
on how the determination of hours and other labour market outcomes happen in the 
negotiation process between unions and firms. In the next sections, we are going to 
brief the empirical evidence and the possible channels between unions and hours 
worked. 
4.2.2  Empirical evidence 
There are few existing studies suggest that unions may influence hours of work, none 
have real causal interpretations. The difficulty has been in finding meaningful 
exogenous variance in unionization. Union members may be highly selected, and the 
direction of selection is not clear: less motivated workers are more likely to queue for 
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union jobs because they gain more from union efforts to less hours and more job 
security, but because the supply of union jobs exceeds demand for those jobs, employers 
can pick the best workers from those queueing for the union jobs (Abowd and Farber, 
1982). Regardless of the direction of the selection, it has proven difficult to come up 
with a research design that convincingly deals with this problem. To my knowledge 
only DiNardo and Lee(2004) and the follow up studies by Lee and Mas(2012), 
Frandsen(2012), Sojourner and co-authors(2015) and Barth and co-authors(2017) have 
offered credible evidence on causal effects; with a quasi-experimental research design, 
regression discontinuity design related to union recognition in the US. While, Barth and 
co-authors(2017) innovatively exploit tax-induced exogenous variation in the price of 
union membership to identify the effects of changes in firm union density on firm 
productivity and wages using Norwegian firm level data(2001 to 2012). The empirical 
association of unionization and hours of work are generally found to be a negative 
correlation, though different dimensions of hours are measured. which is in line with 
the story that unionization protects the workers by depressing the hours of work as 
vigorously claims by most unions in their marketing pitch. Perloff and Sickles (1987) 
use three waves of CPS data (1973-1975) to estimate markups of wage, hours and 
earnings in the construction industry. They find that unionized construction workers 
have a slightly shorter workweek (-4%) than their non-union counterparts. Earle and 
Pencavel (1990) report both time-series and cross-section estimates which imply that 
unionization reduces annual full-time hours of work, but their cross-section estimates 
indicate that both the sign and magnitude of union hours effects vary across 
employment sectors. DiNardo (1991) finds that unionization depresses both annual 
weeks worked and average weekly hours. However, none of these studies distinguishes 
between standard hours and overtime hours, a distinction that is likely to be important 
because of union effects on overtime pay. Along these lines, Ehrenberg (1971) finds 
that unionized firms assign fewer overtime hours than do comparable non-union firms. 
Miller and Mulvey (1991), in contrast, report that union membership raises the 
incidence of overtime in their sample of young Australian workers. The evidence seems 
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to agree that in terms of total hours worked, union status depresses the hours of their 
members when compared with that of non-members. But when it comes to overtime 
hours, union members are more likely to work overtime than their counterpart. In next 
section, we explore the possible channels behind the empirical evidence. 
4.2.3  Possible channels of how union status influences hours of work 
Due to such a limited understanding on the determination of hours and the relationship 
between unionism and hours of work, the possible avenues through which unions may 
affect hours determination are yet to be fully explored. There may be multiple channels 
in this relationship, and they may cut in different directions. Unions may self-select the 
workers that wish to work different hours, for example, less total hours or more paid 
overtime hours. Booth (1995) has suggested two possible channels through which 
unions may influence workhours` determination.  
First, there are higher fixed cost associated with hiring and firing workers. The advent 
of unionisation is sometimes associated with a switch to bargaining over issues 
affecting employment adjustment costs, such as severance or redundancy payments and 
redeployment. Moreover, Freeman (1981), Lewis (1986) and Hart (1984) suggest that 
there are positive union/non-union differentials for fringe benefits such as health 
insurance, pensions, vacations, supplementary unemployment insurance and the like. 
These are costs that vary with the number of workers and not the number of hours 
worked, and are therefore fixed employment costs. Thus, unionized firms face greater 
fixed employment costs relative to variable employment costs than do non-union firms. 
The presence of these fixed employment costs can reduce the flexibility of the 
unionized firm in managing workforce reductions. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect 
to see firms are more prone to changing working workhours than changing employment. 
And it may also be reasonable to expect differences in hours fluctuations between the 
union and non-union sectors. 
Another way in which unions may affect hours as suggested by Booth (1995) is that in 
unionized firms, there is often bargaining between management and union over 
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working hours, this is rarely seen in non-unionized firms. Union bargaining occurs not 
only over the length of the standard working week, but also over issues affecting annual 
hours, such as overtime, length of paid holidays, the number of public holidays and sick 
leave etc. Such direct interference in hours determination is very likely to lead to a 
difference in hours worked in the union and non-union sectors.  
4.3  Data  
In this section we first present the source of data that we use, and some information on 
how the sample selection is done. We then go on to explain the variables we use and 
how some of them are constructed. And finally, we present the descriptive statistics 
from the data. 
4.3.1  Data source and variables selection 
The data used in this paper are drawn from a combination of seasonal data files and 
public release files of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey 1996 – 2016 (QLFS)46which 
are archived at the UK Data Service (UKDS). The QLFS is the largest regular 
household survey in the UK. It is based on a country-wide random sample of almost 53 
thousand households for each quarter. Although it is not panel data, it provides 
consistent and accurate micro level information over a long period of time.  
We restrict our sample to include workers between the ages 25 and 60 whose normal 
weekly hours worked are non-zero, exclude self-employed persons as well as those who 
did unpaid work for their family. Such restrictions make sure that our data contains 
workers only, whose hours are reasonably measured free from fuzziness induced by 
self-employment, full-time education and retirement. This will render our estimates to 
be as clean as possible. The QLFS questionnaire makes a distinction between those who 
are members of a union as well as those who are covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement. We therefore reconstructed the UNION variable into four groups: union 
 
46 The reason for two data sources is that the UNION variables are only present in the QLFS public release data files 
from 2009 onwards. We therefore requested seasonal data from UK Data Service, which contains UNION variables 
as early as 1993, discontinues from 2005 onwards. And the coverage variable TUCOV starts from 1996. Therefore, 
we consolidated all the data sources and formed our data which starts from 1996 to 2016, with 2006-2008 missing. 
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member and covered by a collective bargaining agreement (U-C); union member but 
not covered by a collective bargaining agreement (U-NC); Non-union member and not 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement (NU-NC); Non-union member but 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement (NU-C). The number of workers in the 
U-NC and NU-C groups are relatively small compared with the other two groups. The 
sample consists of 305,393 workers, half (157,984) of which are female workers. 55.8% 
(170,424) are NU-NC, 23.9% (72,892) are U-C, 11.7% (35,793) are NU-C, and 8.6% 
(26,284) are U-NC. 
The variables we include in this study are selected by drawing on previous literature 
studying the determination of union membership, union wage premium, and hours 
determination (eg, among others, Farber 1982; Abowd and Farber 1982; Lewis 1986; 
Abraham and Farber 1987; William K. 1987; Miller and Mulvey 1991; Bryson 2002 
etc.,) as well as theoretical considerations and include demographic characteristics, 
such as age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, educational attainment; job characteristics 
such as job permanency, industry, occupation; controls for firm size, sector, job tenure 
and region dummies. We also include regional and industrial union density from UK 
government public sources for union statistics47. The detailed variable definitions are 
reported in the first two columns in table 1. 
4.3.2  Descriptive statistics 
After filtering out all the non-complying individuals, our final sample consists of 
469,931 individuals. The characteristics are summarized by union and coverage status 
in table 4.1. In general, the data demonstrate differences in a range of characteristics 
between union and non-union as well as between covered and not-covered individuals. 
In the following paragraphs, we will explain the differences of these characteristics first, 
and then we will show the union/non-union, covered/not-covered time series as well as 
the distributions of hours in detail. 
The hours` statistics suggest in table 4.1 that unionized workers on average works 1.691 
 
47 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/trade-union-statistics accessed on 28th of May 2018. 
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hours more than their non-unionized counterparts in terms of weekly total usual hours, 
1.038 hours more in terms of weekly standard usual hours and 0.365 hours more in 
terms of weekly paid overtime hours. Whilst, covered workers and not-covered workers 
work more or less the same number of weekly total usual hours and paid overtime hours, 
but there is a positive 0.569 hours` difference in weekly standard hours by the not-
covered workers. 
As far as the educational attainment is concerned, there are more people with NVQ48 
level 5 and level 4 qualifications in the unionized workers and the covered workers than 
those in the non-unionized ones as well as in the not-covered ones. And the unionized 
workers and the covered workers are more likely to be younger, female, married and 
white than those of the non-unionized and the not-covered ones.  
The unionized workers and the covered workers are more likely to stay with their 
current employer longer in time than their non-unionized and their not-covered 
counterparts; also, the companies they are working for tend to be larger in size (number 
of employees) than the those of the non-unionized and the not-covered49. The unionized 
workers are more likely to have a permanent job and more likely to be in regions or 
industry where union presence and coverage are high. Moreover, the unionized and the 
covered workers seem more likely to be in public sector, the non-unionized and the not-
covered private sector. The unionized and the covered workers are also slightly likely 
to be in White collar occupations. 
The region variable is composed of 12 regions: Northeast, Northwest, Yorkshire and 
Humber, East midlands, west midlands, East of England, London, Southeast, Southwest, 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. And the industry variable is composed of 8 
 
48 NVQ (National Vocational Qualifications) levels are not formally defined in terms of equivalence to conventional 
academic qualifications. In the paper, we follow the equivalences used by London School of Economics`s research 
lab, where there are five levels, NVQ5: degree level and above; NVQ4: higher education diploma below degree, 
teaching and nursing certificates; NVQ3: A levels or equivalent; NVQ2: O levels or GCSE equivalent: NVQ1: other 
qualifications. In the descriptive analysis, we consolidate the lower three levels into one group NVQ1_3. 
49 Although `tenure` and `firmsize` are not dummy variables, and each of them has different categories. But their 
values are in a monotonic increasing manner, therefore, the interpretations are not affected. Variable `tenure` is 
defined as number of years working for the current employer, and it is composed of 6 categories: less than 1 year, 1-
2 years, 2-5 years, 5-10 years, 10-20 years and more than 20 years. And `firmsize` is defined as number of people at 
work place, and it is composed of 5 categories: under 10, 11-49, 50-249, 250-499 and over 500. 
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industries: Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, Energy and water, Manufacturing, 
Construction, Transport and communications, Logistics, retail and hotels etc., Business 
services and Other services. 
The decreasing trend of the union membership has been well documented in literature 
(Andrews et al., 1998 and Bryson 2002 etc.). Our dataset also confirms this trend does 
not only exist in the union membership trend but also exist for the union coverage, as 
shown in the Figure 4.1. The left panel is the trend for the whole sample, the right panel 
is decomposed by gender. In the left panel, we see that the decreasing trend of the union 
membership is fairly mild until 2009 where the drop is more pronounced. After 
decomposing the trend by gender, we see that women enjoy higher proportions in both 
membership and coverage through most of the years. And the falling trend are less 
pronounced in women than that in men, especially in membership. In 1996, there are 
roughly 27% of men and women works in the unionized firm. Up until 2016, the 
number drops to 20% and 25% for men and women respectively. The union coverage50 
percentages are much larger than that of union membership for both men and women. 
This may suggest the free rider problem as mentioned in Olson (1965). Throughout 
time, the falling trend are in line with the trend for membership. 
Figure 4.2 presents the union membership and coverage trend by sector (Private/public). 
The trend reflects the general real-life experience where public sector is more unionized 
than private sector. In private sector, a higher percentage of men are union members, 
although the difference is diminishing in time. The same trend applies to the coverage 
percentage. In public sector, the percentage of membership among women are fairly 
stable across time at around 60%, however, the percentage for men is on a similar falling 
trend as that in the private sector from roughly 65% to 50%. 
There has long been a speculation that older cohort are more likely to be unionized than 
the younger cohort. We therefore decomposed the union membership and coverage 
 
50 We have excluded the first three years of data (1996-1998) for the coverage trend due to a mis-classification 
problem which classified some not-covered individuals as dna, causing the proportion trend very misleading to 
interpret in those years. 
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trend according to birth cohort as presented in figure 4.3 & 4.4. Since our sample are 
restricted from 25 to 60 years old. Therefore, in the graphs, some of data are absent for 
some cohort in some years.  
Figure 4.3 shows the general trend for all seven cohorts, and figure 4.4 shows the trend 
decomposed by gender. They suggest that in terms of membership, the percentages are 
fairly similar across all cohorts at around 20%. However, a way higher proportion of 
older cohorts tend to work in union covered working condition than that of the younger 
cohorts. After decomposing by gender, there is a very consistent pattern of women 
having a slightly higher percentage than men across all cohorts in both membership and 
coverage. The distributions of hours by gender, union and coverage status are presented 
in figure 4.2. The hours` distributions by gender (1st row) are in frequency as shown on 
the Y axis.  
While the hours` distributions by union and coverage status (2nd and 3rd rows) are in 
measured in density. This is because the number of men and women in the sample are 
more or less the same, but the number of workers in unionized or covered firms are far 
less than those in the non-unionized or not-covered firms.  
while the hours` distributions by union and coverage status (2nd and 3rd rows) are in 
measured in density. This is because the number of men and women in the sample are 
more or less the same, but the number of workers in unionized or covered firms are far 
less than those in the non-unionized or not-covered firms.  
As we can see in the distributions of total usual hours and standard usual hours, 
women`s hours are flatter and more wide spread than those of men, there are significant 
number of women works less than 30 hours, comparatively very few men are this far 
down the left tail of the distribution. Women also work less overtime hours than men. 
The pattern in the hours` distribution by union and coverage status are not very obvious. 
Though, as far as the total usual hours and the standard usual hours are concerned, the 




We further explore the time series of hours by union status in figure 4.6 and 4.7. There 
are obvious gaps as suspected between members and non-members, as well as covered 
and not-covered; And the mean hours` gap attributed to membership is a lot larger. 
Decomposing by gender see that the hours difference amongst female workers are 
significantly more pronounced than those for male workers, implying that the union 
effects, if any, are greater amongst female workers. Pattern-wise, there is not much 
difference between total usual hours and standard hours (see appendix 1). Therefore, 
we decided to do regressions only with total usual hours. 
4.4 Empirical Frameworks 
Estimates of the union differential can be obtained using a number of alternative 
estimators. In this section we present those that have been used in the union wage 
differential literature, as well as those that can improve upon these approaches by using 
the Potential outcome model framework (POM), i.e. counterfactuals. 
4.4.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Union wage differential literature has heavily used this method 51  and generally 
estimated a model of the following form, we change the dependent variable to be hours 
worked, because it is the variable of interest in this paper. 
                 𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ + 𝛿𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡           (1) 
Where H denotes hours worked for individual i at time t; 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  is a vector of controls for 
demographic, socioeconomic and job characteristics; 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable 
for union membership status; 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable for union coverage; 
and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is a residual term. The coefficient estimates on the union status indicator 
variable 𝛿 and 𝜃 are interpreted as the union membership and coverage differential. 
However, this approximation is valid when 𝛿 and 𝜃 are small; when they are large it 
is more appropriate to consider 𝑒𝛿 − 1 and 𝑒𝜃 − 1as the union hours differential. 
As noted above, estimating equation (1) with OLS is the standard approach for 
 
51 Fixed effect estimators and quantile regression estimators have also been used in the union wage differential 
literature, but OLS is the predominant method that has been used in the previous literature. 
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obtaining estimates of the union differential. However, there are some limitations to 
using this empirical strategy.  
First, the OLS estimates of equation (1) assume a linear functional form, which can be 
strong in cases of non-linear relationship. There can be self-selection into union jobs 
and this can create biases in the OLS estimates of the union differential (Cahuc, Carcillo, 
and Zylberberg 2014). In contrast, potential outcome models (POM) estimators are 
based on a conditional independence assumption (CIA), so that conditioning on 
observed variables that can influence hours or union membership can lessen the impacts 
of self-selection on the estimates. If some of the variables in the conditioning set are 
correlated with unobservables, it can also reduce the impact of selection due to 
unobservables on the estimates. However, variables that are not included in the 
conditioning set but affect union status would undermine the CIA and create a bias in 
the estimates. Third, covariate imbalance, where the distributions of observable 
characteristics for union and non-union workers do not overlap, can also introduce 
biases in the estimates of the union hours differential produced by OLS. This imbalance 
arises because union members may not be a random sample of the population, it makes 
OLS much more sensitive to the model specification (Bryson 2002; Eren 2007). But 
the IPW estimator can eliminate this kind of bias because it imposes overlap in the data. 
In order to circumvent these issues, we take alternative methods to estimate the union 
hours differentials. 
4.4.2 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
PSM compares the hours outcomes for unionized workers with `matched` non-
unionized workers, and covered with `matched` not-covered. Let 𝐻𝑢 be the hours 
worked by a union worker and 𝐻𝑛𝑢 the hours worked by a non-union worker; and let 
𝐻𝑐 be the hours worked by a covered worker and 𝐻𝑛𝑐 the hours worked by a not-
covered worker. Note that 𝐻𝑢 = 𝐻𝑛𝑢 +𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ (𝐻𝑢 − 𝐻𝑛𝑢). Therefore, the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) can be expressed as: 
𝐸[𝐻𝑢 − 𝐻𝑛𝑢|𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1] = 𝐸[𝐻𝑢|𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1] − 𝐸[𝐻𝑛𝑢|𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1]      (6) 
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𝐸[𝐻𝑐 − 𝐻𝑛𝑐|𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 1]  = 𝐸[𝐻𝑐|𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 1]  − 𝐸[𝐻𝑛𝑐|𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 1]      (7) 
Where 𝐸[∗ |𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1]  and 𝐸[∗ |𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 1] denotes the expectation operator 
conditional on being unionized and being covered by collective bargaining agreements 
respectively. The treatment effect here which is the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) in both equations contain two terms. The first term is the mean hours 
worked by a union/covered worker, the second term is the mean hours that a union 
worker would work if he/she was placed in a non-union/not-covered job, i.e. the 
counterfactuals. The ATT thus provides an estimate of the union hours differential, 
which reflects the difference in hours between union/covered workers and the 
counterfactual hours for union/covered workers. In contrast, the OLS estimates of the 
union differential are not ATT because OLS estimates are bounded by the average 
treatment effect on the treated and the average treatment effect on the controls 
(Humphreys 2009)52. 
PSM shares the causal identification assumption of the OLS in that it yields unbiased 
estimates of the treatment effect where differences between individuals affecting the 
outcome of interest are captured in their observed attributes. However, matching has 
three distinct advantages relative to regressions in identifying an unbiased causal impact 
of union differential. First, it is semi-parametric, so it does not require the assumption 
of linearity in the outcome equation. Second, it leaves the individual causal effect 
completely unrestricted so that heterogeneous treatment effects are allowed for and no 
assumption of constant additive treatment effects for different individuals is required. 
Effects for sub-groups can be easily estimated by matching on sub-samples. Lastly, 
matching estimators highlight the problem of common support and thus the short-
comings of parametric techniques which involve extrapolating outside the common 
support. Matching eliminates two of the three sources of estimation bias identified by 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997); The bias due to difference in the supports of X 
in the treated and control groups and the bias due to the difference between the two 
 
52 The OLS estimate would reflect a treatment effect i.e. the average treatment effect (ATE) in a randomized 
experiment, but not in observational data, which is the case of this study. 
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groups in the distribution of X over its common support. The other source of bias is due 
to selection on unobservables, this highlights the importance of the CIA assumption.  
Estimating the ATT defined in equations (6) and (7) requires a few assumptions. First, 
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), conditional on a set of observed 
characteristics, X, the untreated outcome, 𝐻𝑛𝑢 and 𝐻𝑛𝑐 are independent of union and 
coverage status. The second assumption is that the propensity score, i.e. the conditional 
probability of receiving the treatment satisfies a common support condition, which 
means that the characteristics of the treated and untreated individuals have sufficient 
overlap to be able to find suitable matches in the sample. We assume that the common 
support condition holds in the sample, and check it through the matching quality graphs, 
this eliminates biases that arise from extrapolation in OLS estimates. see Appendix 3 
for an example, although in some cases, the scores for non-members/not-covered 
workers are bunched in the lower or upper quartile of the distribution, they nevertheless 
offer support for members/covered throughout the distribution. 
We follow the literature and assume a Probit functional form for the propensity score. 
The propensity score includes variable that influence both the probability of union 
membership/coverage and hours in the absence of union membership/coverage. If there 
are variables that are relevant and omitted from the propensity score then they would 
undermine the CIA and the selection on observed variables strategy. 53  We use a 
relatively large number of variables to control for observable characteristics and some 
of these variables are also likely correlated with some unobserved variables, which can 
lessen the biases arising from CIA violation.  
The variables we include in the propensity score are selected by drawing from the 
previous literature on union status determination and union differentials as well as 
theoretical considerations and demographics, all of which are dummies useless 
otherwise stated: Female, age (3 dummies, 25-34; 35-49; and 50-59), NVQ (3 dummies, 
NVQ5; NVQ4; NVQ1-3), White, Married, occupation (9 dummies), permanent, tenure 
 
53 For example, we have compared the estimates with and without the variable firmsize, we find that without it the 
estimates are larger than with it. 
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(5 dummies), region (12 dummies), firmsize (5 dummies), uniondensity (continuous). 
However, the functional form of the variables in the propensity score needs to be 
determined as well. The objective is to find a specification for the propensity score that 
induces balance. The conventional approach is trial and error. However, this can be very 
time consuming and tedious, and importantly, it might not necessarily reduce the 
amount of covariate imbalance since it is not guaranteed (Iacus, King and Porro 2012). 
We deal with this problem by including a large number of interaction terms between 
the variables and the union/coverage dummies. 
There are many ways to define the counterfactual using the propensity score. In this 
study we use nearest neighbour that involves taking each treated individual 
(member/covered) and identifying the untreated individual (non-member/not-treated) 
with the most similar propensity score. The matches were made with replacement so 
that in some cases, a non-treated individual provides the closest match for a number of 
treated individuals, whereupon they feature in the comparison group more than once54.  
4.5  Results and Discussion 
In this section, we present estimates of the union hours effects), the category of the 
effect (Membership/Coverage effects), the sub-samples used in the estimation 
(Union/non-union/covered/not-covered), as well as gender (All/Men/Women). Since 
there are so many tables, for the ease of reading, in our discussions, we only present the 
graphs, while attaching the detailed tables in Appendix 1. 
4.5.1 Union membership effects on weekly total usual hours. 
Figure 4.8 below, corresponding to the estimates in table 4.2 and 4.4 - 4.8. We plotted 
the estimates by year so that the changes in the effect over time can be shown. It reports 
the estimated union membership effects on the weekly total usual hours by OLS and 
PSM.  
 
54 Dehijia and Wahba (1999) find that allowing the untreated to be used more than once improves the performance 
of the match. 
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There are two types of membership effects reported, one is the membership effects 
among the not-covered subsample (U-NC/NU-NC), and the other the membership 
effects among the covered subsample (U-C/NU-C). These estimates suggest that union 
members on average work more than their non-union counterparts. (approximately 1 to 
2.5 hours per week among the not-covered, 2 to 6 hours among the covered). The results 
also suggest that the membership effects are declining overtime (see figure 4.8). This 
may reflect the declining coverage and influence of trade unions. Across methods, the 
estimates are more or less in line with one another, apart from the estimates by PSM, 
where the size of the estimates are smaller and the declining trend seems much flatter 
than those of other three methods, especially among the covered workers.  
If we go on to decompose the estimates by gender, we will see that among the not-
covered workers, the membership effects are around zero for men and the estimates are 
mostly not statistically significant (see table 4.3), however, for women the membership 
effects are strongly statistically significant and they fall in time from approximately 5 
hours to 2.5 hours. As for the covered workers, the membership effects for men are 
around 1.5 hours and fairly significant and consistent in time. For women, the 
membership effects are falling from approximately 5 hours to 1.5 hours.  
Table 4.5 and table 4.8 presents the PSM analysis. These are run on identical samples 
to those used in the parametric estimates in other tables. The sample sizes shown are 
smaller than those appearing in other tables, because in the process of matching 
members to their nearest neighbours, PSM leaves many non-members out of the 
estimation sample, i.e. off the common support. Fortunately, this group tends to be small 
ranging between 5% -7% in most cases. This means common support is not a problem. 
When comes to the difference between the PSM estimates, smaller in most cases, and 
those from other methods. People may argue that the difference in sample size and 
common support enforcement could be the reason, rather than that the parametric 
estimates are upwardly biased due to the linear functional form assumption. Of course, 
it is arguable that the parametric models are simply mis-specified and that results could 
be reconciled through the addition of appropriate interaction terms. In practice this may 
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require a great deal of trial and effort. 
4.5.2 Union coverage effects on total usual hours 
Similar with the membership effects, the coverage effects are also run over two 
subsamples – union workers and non-union workers. The coverage effects are largely 
negative as presented in figure 4.9 with the estimates reported in table 4.6 and 4.7, 
suggesting that covered workers work less on average than those that are not-covered. 
And the absolute values of the sizes of the effects are also decreasing in time. Among 
the non-union workers, the coverage effects fall from approximately 5 hours to half an 
hour. And for the union workers, the coverage effects rise from -1 to 1, indicating that 
before 2004, the covered workers on average were working less than the not-covered, 
but from 2005 onwards, the covered workers on average were working more than the 
not-covered, the size of the effects flat out at around one hour. Decomposing by gender, 
we see that the increase in the hours worked by union members were mainly because 
of female union workers. This echoes the documented increasing trend in female 
participation in the labour market.  
4.5.3 The compound effects  
The compound effects are estimated by comparing the hours of unionized, covered 
workers to the hours of non-unionized, not-covered workers. The estimates are 
presented in figure 4.10. Although we estimated the compound effects across both 
methods same as the previous analysis, but we only show the estimates by OLS as 
below due to the fact that the estimates vary very little across methods. We also compare 
the above estimates with those obtained from analysis include variable firm-size, which 
is considered very important in the wage differential literature. (see Andrews et al., 
1998) 
Two main interesting findings are that the compound effects are the balance of other 
effects. And firm size only matters in the effects against the non-union, not-covered 
workers. To be specific, the compound effects are significant and consistently falling 
between 1 and 2 hours. Amongst men, the compound effects are increasing from -1 
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hours to roughly 0 hours. As the estimates approach zero in time, they are becoming 
less significant, suggesting that the union effects are weakening among male workers. 
Amongst women, the union compound effects are fairly consistent and significant 
around 3 hours on average. After we control for firm size, the coverage effects among 
the non-union workers and the union effects among the not-covered workers both 
decreased by approximately 1 hour. Decomposing by gender, we see the decrease in 
effects only happens in women, this suggest that firm size is more important in 
explaining women`s hours in trade unions rather than men`s. 
4.5.5  Tobit results on overtime hours. 
In this section, we investigate the effects of union status on workers` probability of 
working overtime, and how many hours of overtime worked in the case of positive 
overtime. We report Tobit results on paid overtime hours as well as unpaid overtime 
hours, the estimates reported are the average marginal effects. 
The Probit estimates represent the probability of working paid overtime hours. All of 
the equations include union dummy, age, female, education, marital status, ethnicity, 
sector, job type, tenure (Years working for the employer), region and union density as 
independent variables. The estimates reported in the second and fourth columns include 
a vector of dummy variables identifying nine major industry and two major occupation 
classifications, the third and fourth column also included the variable firm size.  
Turning now to these results, there is strong evidence that union membership and 
coverage substantially increases the likelihood of working paid overtime. When 
evaluated against the non-union, not-covered workers, the union membership raises the 
probability of working paid overtime by 7.8 percentage points and union coverage 
raises the probability by 7.1 percent, which is higher when compared with the 
membership effects among covered workers (6.3 percent) and the coverage effects 
among union workers (4.4 percent). However, some of these effects are due to the fact 
that unions are disproportionately represented in industries and occupations, so that 
introducing the industry and occupation dummy variables in column 2 reduces the 
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positive effects, especially so among the covered/union workers (see 2nd columns in 
table 42-46). The estimates in columns 3 and 4 suggest that at least part of the effect of 
union membership/coverage on the probability of working paid overtime is due to firm 
size.  
Other characteristics have much to offer on the big picture. As people get older, union 
workers are less likely to work paid overtime. Female union workers are 6 to 12 percent 
less likely to work paid overtime than their male counterparts. People with a degree 
(NVQ5) are 13 to 19 percent less likely to work paid overtime than people with A level 
or below. Married union workers are less likely to work paid overtime. White collar 
workers are 12 percent less likely to work paid overtime than blue workers.  
However, the picture is not complete without the unpaid overtime, since these hours 
normally do not reflect willingness or preference. And it is reasonable to assume that 
people have an upper limit on their labour supply. Therefore, the more unpaid overtime, 
the less paid overtime will be chosen.  
Probit estimates of the probability of working unpaid overtime hours. The independent 
variables included are exactly the same as those for paid overtime. The results show 
that the union workers are 2 to 3 percent less likely to work unpaid overtime hours than 
their non-union/not-covered counterparts, despite some mixed effects in subsample 
results. People with higher education levels are more likely to work unpaid overtime 
hours, people with a degree or higher can be as high as 33 percent more likely to work 
unpaid overtime. People working with their employer longer are more likely to work 
unpaid overtime, with the group “staying more than 5 years” the most likely (10 percent 
more likely) to work unpaid overtime than people “work less than 1 year”. After 
controlling for firm size, the bigger the company is, the more likely the worker to work 
unpaid overtime. White-collar are 17 to 23 percent more likely to work unpaid overtime 
time hours than blue-collar. 
The Tobit results are presented table 4.9. The results suggest that union has a positive 
compound effect on the probability of working and actually working paid overtime 
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hours (3.5 to 5 hours), with membership effects ranging from 1.4 to 4.4 hours and 
coverage effects ranging from 1.2 to 2.9 hours depending on the subsamples. 
Decomposing by gender, the compound effects for men are at a range from 4.7 to 6.6 
hours, with membership effects (1.3 to 4.9 hours) and coverage effects (1.2 to 4.5 hours). 
As for women, the compound effects are at a range from 1 to 3.4 hours, with 
membership effects (1 to 3 hours) and coverage effects (1 to 2 hours). However, the 
coverage effects for women are largely insignificant. After controlling for firm size, the 
size of the effect’s decreases, especially for women, at a margin of half an hour. 
The estimates confirm the pattern in our data concerning overtime hours. Controlling 
for industry, occupation, firm size reduces but does not eliminate the effects of union 
membership/coverage on probability of working overtime hours. Union 
membership/coverage appears to increase the prevalence of paid overtime, but decrease 
that of unpaid overtime. The results seem to suggest that white collar/people with higher 
education levels are more susceptible to unpaid overtime, willingly or not, which 
making the finding that they are less likely to work paid overtime subject to different 
interpretations, income effect or fatigue.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper has analysed the effects of trade unions on working hours, at two dimensions: 
weekly total usual hours, and overtime hours. As a whole, union workers work 1 to 1.7 
hours more than their non-union/not-covered counterparts. And the effects are different 
between men and women, amongst men, union workers work roughly 1 hour less than 
the non-union/not-covered men, and the effects diminishes in time and becomes not 
significant from 2010 onwards. Amongst women union workers, the effects are 
significant and large and consistent in time at around 3 to 4 hours. If the effects are 
further decomposed into membership effects and coverage effects, we find that the 
membership effects generally positive, and are larger among the covered workers (2 to 
6 hours) than those among the not-covered workers (1 to 2.5 hours). The coverage 
effects are negative, and are larger in size among the non-union workers (-4 to -5 hours) 
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than those among the union workers (-1 to -0.5 hours). We also analysed the effects of 
union on the prevalence of overtime hours. We find that union membership/coverage 
increase the prevalence of paid overtime by approximately 13.9 percent, but decrease 
the prevalence of unpaid overtime by 2.3 percent. After controlling for individual 
characteristics such as industry and occupation, and firm characteristics such as firm 
size, the effect decreases to 8.7 percent and 0.8 percent respectively, but still significant. 
The results suggest that there is a positive correlation between union membership and 
hours of work. The possible reason that underline such relationship might be a queuing 
story (abowd & Farber 1982), where trade unions selects the “hard working” workers 
from the queue. Besides, the results also suggest a negative correlation between union 
coverage and hours of work. It is likely that this reflects the effects of free-riding 
(Bryson, 2008). Where non-union but covered workers free-rides the union`s voice on 
overtime hours.    
We also find that unions do use overtime hours to stabilize working hours and highlight 
the value of their membership. Our results also suggest that unions work in a way to 
reduce the chance of their members being taken advantage by their employers to work 
more unpaid overtime, and increase the chance of more paid overtime.  
The huge differences in our estimates between union members and union non-members, 
as well as covered and non-covered, suggest that the selection problem does exist in the 
process of unionization. Due to the lack of instruments, we used our model to estimate 
the union wage differential to gauge the level of bias in our results (table 4.3). Our 
estimates are closer to the lower bound when compared with literature (Andrews et al., 
1998; Bryson, 2002; 2011), which also suggest the contentious endogeneity problem 
with unionisation. Therefore, the future work is to find appropriate instruments to 











Table 4.1: Definition of variables used, sample means and standard deviations     
Variable Description 
Union/Coverage Status 
Union Non-union Covered Not-covered 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
ttushr Total usual hours worked in a week 39.396  11.173  37.705  12.874  38.317  11.344  38.336  12.940  
overtime Paid overtime hours worked in a week 7.068  6.007  6.703  5.770  6.907  5.911  6.836  5.856  
NVQ5 NVQ level 5 0.307  0.461  0.265  0.441  0.297  0.457  0.269  0.443  
NVQ4 NVQ level 4 0.165  0.371  0.106  0.308  0.150  0.357  0.112  0.315  
NVQ1-3 NVQ level 1-3 0.528  0.499  0.629  0.483  0.553  0.497  0.619  0.486  
age Age of the respondent 42.669  9.149  40.766  9.504  42.278  9.195  40.891  9.534  
female =1 if female 0.525  0.499  0.498  0.500  0.534  0.499  0.490  0.500  
married =1 if married 0.669  0.470  0.608  0.488  0.662  0.473  0.609  0.488  
white =1 if white 0.944  0.230  0.928  0.258  0.945  0.227  0.925  0.263  
tenure Number of years with current employer 4.312  1.409  3.406  1.508  4.168  1.456  3.435  1.519  
firmsize Number of employees at workplace 2.910  2.396  2.231  2.426  2.997  2.444  2.150  2.380  
permanent 1 if the job is permanent 0.966  0.182  0.948  0.221  0.955  0.206  0.954  0.209  
uresmc Usual residence region 6.369  3.356  6.488  2.998  6.433  3.333  6.452  2.987  
uniondensity % of regional labour force unionized 0.294  0.061  0.272  0.057  0.293  0.060  0.270  0.056  
uniondensityin % of industry`s labour force unionized 0.297  0.074  0.239  0.096  0.295  0.076  0.235  0.096  
observations Number of observations 173,086 296,845 195,205 274,726 






Table 4.2: Union effects on hours of work 
Outcome 
OLS 
All   M   F 







































































  (0.054) 
    (0.067)     (0.071)   
Note: U represents union, NU, non-union; C represents covered, NC, not covered. The 
results in this table are from the OLS estimation of hours. The * signifies the level of 
significance, * 90%, ** 95%, *** 99%. Standard errors are in the brackets. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Union effects on wage 
Outcome 
OLS 
All   M   F 







































































  (0.003) 
    (0.005)     (0.004)   
 Note: U represents union, NU, non-union; C represents covered, NC, not covered. The 
results in this table are from the OLS estimations of wages. The * signifies the level of 










Table 4.4: PSM Membership effects on total usual hrs (U-NC vs NU-NC) 
Year All Bootstrap Men Bootstrap Women Bootstrap 
1996 2.301  
1.24   3.36 
0.410 
-0.74   1.56 
2.499 
0.54   4.45 
Obs. 2830  1540  1288  
1997 2.908 
1.78   4.03 
0.108 
-1.25   1.47 
3.638 
2.16   5.10 
Obs. 2769  1430  1336  
1998 1.934 
0.78   3.08 
0.501 
-0.88   1.88 
1.344 
-0.20   2.88 
Obs. 2667  1424  1337  
1999 2.151 
1.44   2.86 
0.279 
-0.47   1.02 
2.380 
1.38   3.37 
Obs. 19144  10128  9016  
2000 1.358 
0.67   2.03 
-0.298 
-1.02   0.42 
2.555 
1.41   3.69 
Obs. 18330  9645  8685  
2001 2.361 
1.74   2.97 
0.020 
-0.90   0.94 
3.322 
2.31   4.32 
Obs. 18939  9816  9123  
2002 1.408 
0.72   2.08 
0.023 
-0.72   0.77 
2.052 
0.91   3.19 
Obs. 18284  9595  8689  
2003 1.787 
1.11   2.46 
0.416 
-0.42   1.26 
2.640 
1.60   3.67 
Obs. 17482  8998  8484  
2004 1.049 
0.45   1.64 
-0.115 
-0.85   0.62 
1.262 
0.35   2.17 
Obs. 17577  8981  8596  
2005 0.554 
-0.09   1.19 
-0.468 
-1.21   0.27 
1.318 
0.36   2.26 
Obs. 16686  8485  8201  
2009 1.945 
1.18   2.7 
1.080 
-0.05   2.21 
1.848 
0.90   2.79 
Obs. 14509  7246  7262  
2010 1.358 
0.67   2.03 
-0.298 
-1.28   0.69 
1.714 
0.43   2.99 
Obs. 18330  7021  7011  
2011 1.616 
0.87   2.35 
0.133 
-1.00   1.26 
2.069 
1.05   3.08 
Obs. 13871  6958  6913  
2012 1.417 
0.67   2.16 
0.767 
-0.32   1.86 
2.348 
1.06   3.63 
Obs. 13696  6775  6921  
2013 1.764 
1.02   2.5 
0.402 
-0.94   1.74 
1.861 
0.76   2.95 
Obs. 13904  6983  6920  
2014 2.220 
1.37   3.06 
0.989 
0.00   1.97 
2.454 
1.28   3.62 
Obs. 14242  7089  7152  
2015 1.565 
0.84   2.28 
0.231 
-0.83   1.30 
2.361 
1.28   3.44 
Obs. 13372  6678  6694  
2016 2.192 
1.91   2.46 
0.136 
-0.21   0.48 
2.682 
2.30   3.06 
Obs. 25811  12831  12980  
Note: Bootstrap shows the 95% confidence interval for the bootstrapped estimates. The support loss is generally 
between 5%-7% of the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes statistically significant at 1-percent 
level of significance, ** at 5-percent, * at 10-percent. Age is a continuous variable, in this study we only used 25-
50. Female is dummy, 1 for female, 0 for male. NVQ1_3 is the education group that is omitted. Married is marital 
status dummy, 1for married or cohabiting, 0 for otherwise. White is ethnicity dummy, 1 for white, 0 for otherwise. 
Private is the sector dummy, 1 for Private sector, 0 for Public sector. Permanent is the job permanency dummy, 1 for 
permanent, 0 for not. Tenure is the dummy for number of years the worker worked for the current employer, 
Tenure>5 more than 5 years is the group that is omitted. Uniondensitylo is the regional union density, Uniondensityin 
is the industry union density. Firmsize>500, more than 500 people at workplace is the omitted group. White collar 
is the occupation dummy, 1 for white collar, 0 for blue collar. All regressions have 12 regional dummies included, 
















Table 4.5: PSM Membership effects on total usual hrs (U-C vs NU-C) 
Year All Bootstrap Men Bootstrap Women Bootstrap 
1996 2.554 
2.06   3.04 
1.100 
0.39   1.80 
4.037 
3.23   4.83 
Obs. 12785  6392  6393  
1997 2.251 
1.78   2.71 
0.730 
0.07   1.39 
3.894 
3.20   4.57 
Obs. 13368  6605  6762  
1998 2.390 
1.85   2.92 
0.359 
-0.31   1.03 
4.458 
3.74   5.17 
Obs. 13165  6541  6623  
1999 2.199 
1.72   2.67 
0.772 
0.15   1.38 
3.683 
3.00   4.36 
Obs. 12871  6303  6569  
2000 2.314 
1.83   2.78 
0.655 
-0.04   1.35 
3.745 
3.06   4.42 
Obs. 12383  5977  6406  
2001 2.374 
1.89   2.84 
0.499 
-0.09   1.09 
3.815 
3.12   4.51 
Obs. 12432  5952  6480  
2002 1.993 
1.54   2.44 
0.939 
0.36   1.51 
3.099 
2.44   3.75 
Obs. 12157  5681  6476  
2003 1.971 
1.47   2.47 
0.619 
-0.03   1.27 
3.177 
2.49   3.86 
Obs. 11492  5374  6118  
2004 2.126 
1.64   2.6 
1.102 
0.47   1.72 
2.827 
2.15   3.50 
Obs. 11544  5278  6266  
2005 2.074 
1.58   2.55 
0.944 
0.34   1.54 
3.290 
2.51   4.06 
Obs. 10889  4999  5890  
2009 1.680 
1.16   2.2 
0.701 
-0.02   1.42 
2.313 
1.58   3.04 
Obs. 8468  3702  4767  
2010 1.797 
1.24   2.34 
0.401 
-0.35   1.15 
2.753 
1.94   3.56 
Obs. 7542  3347  4194  
2011 2.104 
1.53   2.67 
0.899 
0.21   1.57 
3.095 
2.30   3.88 
Obs. 7540  3243  4297  
2012 1.904 
1.3   2.5 
0.835 
0.08   1.58 
2.715 
1.91   3.51 
Obs. 6848  2985  3863  
2013 1.710 
1.11   2.3 
0.635 
-0.19   1.46 
2.407 
1.61   3.20 
Obs. 6943  3079  3864  
2014 2.408 
1.79   3.02 
0.949 
0.21   1.68 
3.142 
2.30   3.97 
Obs. 6337  2784  3552  
2015 2.016 
1.37   2.65 
0.682 
-0.19   1.56 
2.656 
1.77   3.53 
Obs. 6051  2646  3405  
2016 1.559 
1.22   1.89 
1.561 
1.11   2.01 
2.098 
1.60   2.59 
Obs. 10678  4704  5975  
Note: Bootstrap shows the 95% confidence interval for the bootstrapped estimates. The support loss is generally 
between 5%-7% of the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes statistically significant at 1-percent 
level of significance, ** at 5-percent, * at 10-percent. Age is a continuous variable, in this study we only used 25-
50. Female is dummy, 1 for female, 0 for male. NVQ1_3 is the education group that is omitted. Married is marital 
status dummy, 1for married or cohabiting, 0 for otherwise. White is ethnicity dummy, 1 for white, 0 for otherwise. 
Private is the sector dummy, 1 for Private sector, 0 for Public sector. Permanent is the job permanency dummy, 1 for 
permanent, 0 for not. Tenure is the dummy for number of years the worker worked for the current employer, 
Tenure>5 more than 5 years is the group that is omitted. Uniondensitylo is the regional union density, Uniondensityin 
is the industry union density. Firmsize>500, more than 500 people at workplace is the omitted group. White collar 
is the occupation dummy, 1 for white collar, 0 for blue collar. All regressions have 12 regional dummies included, 









Table 4.6: PSM Coverage effects on total usual hours (NU-C vs NU-NC) 
Year All Bootstrap   Men Bootstrap   Women Bootstrap 
1996 -2.296 
-3.02   -1.57 
 -2.947 
-3.77   -2.11 
 -1.553 
-2.74   -0.36 
Obs. 5109   2333   2776  
1997 -2.392 
-3.13   -1.65 
 -3.090 
-3.99   -2.18 
 -1.493 
-2.56   -0.42 
Obs. 5222   2277   2945  
1998 -2.295 
-3.09   -1.50 
 -2.644 
-3.59   -1.69 
 -2.014 
-3.21   -0.81 
Obs. 5154   2376   2778  
1999 -1.356 
-1.80   -0.90 
 -2.688 
-3.29   -2.08 
 -0.391 
-1.07   0.29 
Obs. 20595   10544   10051  
2000 -2.028 
-2.46   -1.58 
 -2.857 
-3.46   -2.24 
 -1.309 
-1.98   -0.63 
Obs. 19726   10095   9631  
2001 -1.371 
-1.81   -0.92 
 -2.427 
-2.97   -1.87 
 -0.619 
-1.24   0.00 
Obs. 20304   10293   10105  
2002 -1.357 
-1.79   -0.92 
 -1.892 
-2.47   -1.30 
 -1.139 
-1.74   -0.53 
Obs. 19745   10013   9732  
2003 -0.875 
-1.34   -0.40 
 -1.846 
-2.53   -1.16 
 -0.213 
-0.83   0.41 
Obs. 18714   9377   9338  
2004 -1.149 
-1.59   -0.70 
 -2.259 
-2.85   -1.65 
 -0.212 
-0.83   0.41 
Obs. 18896   9421   9475  
2005 -0.931 
-1.37   -0.48 
 -1.820 
-2.43   -1.20 
 -0.554 
-1.17   0.06 
Obs. 17908   8988   8920  
2009 -0.466 
-1.00   0.07 
 -1.545 
-2.25   -0.83 
 0.563 
-0.17   1.30 
Obs. 15344   7661   7683  
2010 -0.671 
-1.21   -0.12 
 -1.425 
-2.26   -0.58 
 -0.311 
-1.06   0.44 
Obs. 14578   7390   7187  
2011 -1.049 
-1.59   -0.50 
 -2.042 
-2.70   -1.37 
 -0.490 
-1.27   0.30 
Obs. 14672   7373   7299  
2012 -0.400 
-1.05   -0.25 
 -1.589 
-2.36   -0.81 
 -0.047 
-0.92   0.83 
Obs. 14098   7091   7007  
2013 -0.433 
-1.03   0.16 
 -1.107 
-1.84   -0.36 
 0.193 
-0.67   1.06 
Obs. 14366   7294   7072  
2014 -0.446 
-1.09   0.20 
 -1.909 
-2.70   -1.11 
 0.010 
-0.75   0.77 
Obs. 14551   7317   7234  
2015 -0.060 
-0.69   0.57 
 -1.781 
-2.51   -1.04 
 1.158 
0.35   1.95 
Obs. 13731   6975   6756  
2016 -0.575 
-0.82   -0.32 
 -2.070 
-2.36   -1.78 
 0.773 
0.41   1.13 
Obs. 26322    13222    13100  
Note: Bootstrap shows the 95% confidence interval for the bootstrapped estimates. The support loss is generally 
between 5%-7% of the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes statistically significant at 1-percent 
level of significance, ** at 5-percent, * at 10-percent. Age is a continuous variable, in this study we only used 25-
50. Female is dummy, 1 for female, 0 for male. NVQ1_3 is the education group that is omitted. Married is marital 
status dummy, 1for married or cohabiting, 0 for otherwise. White is ethnicity dummy, 1 for white, 0 for otherwise. 
Private is the sector dummy, 1 for Private sector, 0 for Public sector. Permanent is the job permanency dummy, 1 for 
permanent, 0 for not. Tenure is the dummy for number of years the worker worked for the current employer, 
Tenure>5 more than 5 years is the group that is omitted. Uniondensitylo is the regional union density, Uniondensityin 
is the industry union density. Firmsize>500, more than 500 people at workplace is the omitted group. White collar 
is the occupation dummy, 1 for white collar, 0 for blue collar. All regressions have 12 regional dummies included, 











Table 4.7: PSM Coverage effects on total usual hours (U-C vs U-NC) 
Year All Bootstrap Men Bootstrap Women Bootstrap 
1996 -1.163 
-2.04   -0.28 
-2.180 
-3.23   -1.12 
-0.438 
-1.74   0.86 
Obs. 10506  5598  4905  
1997 -1.598 
-2.44   -0.74 
-1.805 
-2.89   -0.72 
-0.623 
-1.72   0.47 
Obs. 10910  5758  5127  
1998 -1.023 
-1.9   -0.14 
-1.938 
-3.01   -0.86 
0.495 
-0.75   1.74 
Obs. 10771  5589  5182  
1999 -0.806 
-1.33   -0.27 
-1.623 
-2.30   -0.93 
-0.360 
-1.13   0.41 
Obs. 11420  5886  5534  
2000 -0.728 
-1.29   -0.16 
-1.376 
-2.08   -0.66 
-0.019 
-0.86   0.83 
Obs. 10987  5527  5460  
2001 -1.405 
-1.99   -0.82 
-1.867 
-2.60   -1.12 
-0.683 
-1.54   0.17 
Obs. 11068  5570  5498  
2002 -0.307 
-0.91   0.3 
-1.104 
-1.83   -0.37 
0.964 
0.04   1.88 
Obs. 10696  5263  5433  
2003 -0.921 
-1.51   -0.32 
-1.666 
-2.42   -0.90 
-0.287 
-1.13   0.55 
Obs. 10260  4995  5265  
2004 -0.188 
-0.81   0.43 
-0.918 
-1.63   -0.20 
1.037 
0.26   1.81 
Obs. 10225  4838  5387  
2005 -0.107 
-0.7   0.48 
-1.133 
-1.85   -0.41 
0.586 
-0.26   1.43 
Obs. 9667  4496  5171  
2009 -0.456 
-1.13   0.22 
-2.330 
-3.34   -1.31 
0.559 
-0.35   1.47 
Obs. 7634  3287  4347  
2010 0.077 
-0.59   0.75 
-1.281 
-2.13   -0.43 
0.833 
-0.05   1.72 
Obs. 6996  2978  4019  
2011 -0.162 
-0.83   0.5 
-0.970 
-1.91   -0.02 
0.834 
0.01   1.65 
Obs. 6738  2828  3910  
2012 0.705 
-0.03   1.44 
-0.990 
-2.03   0.05 
1.214 
0.32   2.10 
Obs. 6446  2668  3778  
2013 -0.094 
-0.84   0.65 
-1.109 
-2.18   -0.03 
0.890 
0.02   1.75 
Obs. 6480  2767  3713  
2014 0.070 
-0.63   0.77 
-1.883 
-2.85   -0.91 
0.852 
-0.00   1.70 
Obs. 6027  2557  3470  
2015 0.495 
-0.14   1.13 
-0.723 
-1.68   0.23 
1.587 
0.71   2.46 
Obs. 5692  2349  3343  
2016 -0.159 
-0.51   0.19 
-0.876 
-1.32   -0.43 
0.285 
-0.25   0.83 
Obs. 10167  4313  5854  
Note: Bootstrap shows the 95% confidence interval for the bootstrapped estimates. The support loss is generally 
between 5%-7% of the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes statistically significant at 1-percent 
level of significance, ** at 5-percent, * at 10-percent. Age is a continuous variable, in this study we only used 25-
50. Female is dummy, 1 for female, 0 for male. NVQ1_3 is the education group that is omitted. Married is marital 
status dummy, 1for married or cohabiting, 0 for otherwise. White is ethnicity dummy, 1 for white, 0 for otherwise. 
Private is the sector dummy, 1 for Private sector, 0 for Public sector. Permanent is the job permanency dummy, 1 for 
permanent, 0 for not. Tenure is the dummy for number of years the worker worked for the current employer, 
Tenure>5 more than 5 years is the group that is omitted. Uniondensitylo is the regional union density, Uniondensityin 
is the industry union density. Firmsize>500, more than 500 people at workplace is the omitted group. White collar 
is the occupation dummy, 1 for white collar, 0 for blue collar. All regressions have 12 regional dummies included, 












Table 4.8: PSM Compound effects on total usual hours (U-C vs NU-NC) 
Year All Bootstrap Men Bootstrap Women Bootstrap 
1996 0.059 
-0.78   0.89 
-1.732 
-2.41   -1.05 
2.010 
0.88   3.13 
Obs. 11406  6142  5264  
1997 -0.777 
-1.5   -0.04 
-2.727 
-3.48   -1.96 
0.952 -0.42   
2.32 Obs. 11709  6244  5464  
1998 0.218 
-0.63   1.06 
-2.113 
-2.90   -1.32 
2.322 
1.09   3.54 
Obs. 11568  6135  5432  
1999 0.561 
0.18   0.93 
-1.747 
-2.24   -1.24 
3.051 
2.41   3.68 
Obs. 25637  13545  12091  
2000 0.779 
0.39   1.16 
-1.344 
-1.80   -0.88 
2.670 
2.10   3.23 
Obs. 24607  12924  11683  
2001 0.821 
0.46   1.18 
-1.467 
-1.91   -1.02 
3.013 
2.41   3.60 
Obs. 25126  12993  12134  
2002 0.486 
0.09   0.87 
-1.281 
-1.71   -0.84 
2.272 
1.68   2.85 
Obs. 24194  12538  11656  
2003 1.179 
0.78   1.57 
-1.187 
-1.62   -0.74 
2.936 
2.37   3.49 
Obs. 23157  11808  11349  
2004 1.032 
0.66   1.39 
-1.245 
-1.67   -0.81 
2.998 
2.48   3.51 
Obs. 23196  11655  11541  
2005 0.962 
0.6   1.32 
-1.115 
-1.55   -0.67 
2.590 
1.98   3.19 
Obs. 21888  10990  10897  
2009 0.939 
0.51   1.36 
-0.998 
-1.52   -0.46 
2.615 
1.96   3.26 
Obs. 18230  9001  9229  
2010 1.138 
0.67   1.6 
-0.698 
-1.33   -0.05 
2.465 
1.80   3.12 
Obs. 17066  8450  8616  
2011 1.436 
0.95   1.91 
-0.364 
-0.95   0.23 
2.490 
1.69   3.28 
Obs. 17121  8370  8751  
2012 1.433 
0.94   1.92 
-0.441 
-1.12   0.24 
2.709 
2.00   3.41 
Obs. 16417  8027  8390  
2013 1.427 
0.89   1.95 
-0.387 
-1.05   0.28 
3.155 
2.43   3.87 
Obs. 16628  8249  8379  
2014 1.720 
1.18   2.25 
-0.373 
-1.10   0.36 
3.052 
2.27   3.83 
Obs. 16408  8135  8273  
2015 1.761 
1.22   2.29 
-0.623 
-1.30   0.05 
3.393 
2.62   4.15 
Obs. 15412  7628  7784  
2016 2.042 
1.8   2.28 
-0.263 
-0.56   0.03 
3.163 
2.81   3.51 
Obs. 29439  14613  14826  
Note: Bootstrap shows the 95% confidence interval for the bootstrapped estimates. The support loss is generally 
between 5%-7% of the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes statistically significant at 1-percent 
level of significance, ** at 5-percent, * at 10-percent. Age is a continuous variable, in this study we only used 25-
50. Female is dummy, 1 for female, 0 for male. NVQ1_3 is the education group that is omitted. Married is marital 
status dummy, 1for married or cohabiting, 0 for otherwise. White is ethnicity dummy, 1 for white, 0 for otherwise. 
Private is the sector dummy, 1 for Private sector, 0 for Public sector. Permanent is the job permanency dummy, 1 for 
permanent, 0 for not. Tenure is the dummy for number of years the worker worked for the current employer, 
Tenure>5 more than 5 years is the group that is omitted. Uniondensitylo is the regional union density, Uniondensityin 
is the industry union density. Firmsize>500, more than 500 people at workplace is the omitted group. White collar 
is the occupation dummy, 1 for white collar, 0 for blue collar. All regressions have 12 regional dummies included, 









Table 4.9: Tobit results on overtime 
Outcome 
Paid Overtime   Unpaid Overtime 
All   M   F   All M F 
























































































































-1.017 *** 0.781 *** -2.343 *** 
  (0.073)     (0.102)     (0.093)     (0.069)   (0.110)   (0.087)   
 Note: U represents union, NU, non-union; C represents covered, NC, not covered. The results in this table are from the Tobit estimations of both 






























































































































































































































































































NU-C vs  NU-NC U-NC vs  NU-NC
U-C   vs  NU-NC U-C vs  U-NC














With Firmsize (2002-2016) - all (OLS)
NU-C vs  NU-NC U-NC vs  NU-NC
U-C vs  NU-NC U-C vs  U-NC














ttushr - Men (OLS)
NU-C vs  NU-NC U-NC vs  NU-NC
U-C vs  NU-NC U-C vs  U-NC














With Firmsize (2002-2016) - Men (OLS)
NU-C vs  NU-NC U-NC vs  NU-NC
U-C vs  NU-NC U-C vs  U-NC















NU-C vs  NU-NC U-NC vs  NU-NC
U-C vs  NU-NC U-C vs  U-NC














With Firmsize (2002-2016) - Women (OLS)
NU-C vs  NU-NC U-NC vs  NU-NC
U-C vs  NU-NC U-C vs  U-NC



















Tobit on Overtime Hours - all
NU-C vs  NU-NC U-NC vs  NU-UC
U-C vs  NU-UC U-C vs  U-UC











With Firmsize (2002-2016) - all 
NU-C vs  NU-UC U-UC vs  NU-UC
U-C vs  NU-UC U-C vs  U-UC











Tobit on Overtime Hours - Men
NU-C vs  NU-UC U-UC vs  NU-UC
U-C vs  NU-UC U-C vs  U-UC











With Firmsize (2002-2016) - Men
NU-C vs  NU-UC U-UC vs  NU-UC
U-C vs  NU-UC U-C vs  U-UC











Tobit on Overtime Hours - Women
NU-C vs  NU-NC U-NC vs  NU-NC
U-C vs  NU-NC U-C vs  U-NC











With Firmsize (2002-2016) - Women
NU-C vs  NU-UC U-UC vs  NU-UC
U-C vs  NU-UC U-C vs  U-UC
























In this thesis, I have addressed three separate yet related topics on the economics of 
labour supply. Chapter 2 surveys the labour supply behaviour in the UK at three 
different aspects: static labour supply, life-cycle labour supply and labour supply in 
trade unions. With the insight in the labour supply trends, we therefore are interested to 
find out how large are the labour supply responsiveness to changes in income to 
understand the driving forces behind such variations in labour supply. Therefore in 
Chapter 3 we seek to estimate married couples` labour supply responsiveness to 
exogeneous wage changes; this has important policy implications, since if we know the 
magnitude of the labour supply responsiveness of a particular subgroup of the 
population, we could work out the distortion effects on labour supply of any potential 
tax or benefit policy to mitigate loss and maximize the gain in welfare. In this particular 
chapter, we use instruments such as discontinuities on the tax and benefit profile as well 
as the reform induced changes to generate exogenous variations to recover our 
parameters in the analysis. However, our understanding towards the hours of work 
determination may be short-sighted if we only consider the individual focused supply 
side of labour, the institutional factors should also be accounted. Over the past decades, 
one of the most important institutional changes in the labour market has been the 
dramatic decrease in the influences of trade unions. Despite the decrease in coverage 
and influence, unions still play an important role in setting labour market properties, 
such as wage, hours and many other benefits. We therefore have spotted a literature gap 
– the impact of unionization on workers` hours of work. Hence, in Chapter 4 We explore 
and attempt to gauge the direction and magnitude of such effects. 




labour supply does vary over all the demographic characteristics. We investigated at 
both margins, hours and participation. There is also strong evidence for lifecycle labour 
supply, especially for women, who are much more likely to smooth their consumption 
(working) across the lifecycle. Moreover, our results suggest that Education 
interestingly affects men and women`s working hours very differently the positive 
effect on women are fairly significant, especially amongst the highly educated. Whereas, 
men`s working hours are hardly different on average across all education levels; Despite 
the fact that men are much more likely to work full time than women, the proportion of 
part-timers amongst men has increased dramatically over time; The historically 
persistent hours gap between single and married workers has been closed in the recent 
decade due to the steady increase in married women`s working hours; The best 
remunerated workers are most likely to work a standard full-time working week, those 
working longer or shorter hours than standard are significantly less well paid. 
The effect of marital status on the lifecycle profiles can be understood by the division 
of labour within a family: it pushes up the lifecycle profiles of married men and lowers 
the lifecycle profiles of married women.  
Both union membership and union coverage rates have been falling over time, though 
the fall in the rates of male workers are more pronounced. The patterns are consistent 
by education, sector, industry and occupation; The union premiums (wage and hours) 
are consistent in patterns, with membership premium decreases and coverage premium 
increases over time. This chapter set out to paint the picture of labour supply behaviors 
in the UK, it is descriptive in nature, therefore findings should be pushed further so that 
more meaningful in-depth insights could be gained. 
My results in Chapter 3 indicate that women`s labour supply are more responsive than 
that of men at all margins, hours, participation and lifecycle. and wage changes have a 
larger effect on the decision to work, but a smaller effect on hours of work. Frisch 
elasticities suggest that women, rather than men, especially the ones with lower 
education are more prone to smooth their consumption across lifecycle due to child 
172 
 
bearing and rearing There are several limitations in our study, namely the lack of 
accurate measures for non-labour income/property income, without it, the parameter 
estimates are uninterpretable. Spouse income that we used as an equivalent measure, 
potentially downward biases our estimates. Furthermore, in our analysis, we treat the 
couples individually, such separability is too strong an assumption if we consider the 
collective decision making within families. Future work might consider other data 
sources which has available and well measured non-labour income, yet even better if 
they are panel data. And researchers can also consider to place the analysis within a 
family labour supply model, and compare and contrast the results. 
Chapter 4 is the first evidence we know of in the UK which estimates the union effects 
on hours of work. We show that the size of the effects is largely between -6 and 6 hours 
depending on characteristics, such as gender, type of effects and groups of people. And 
the size of the effects is falling overtime. We also show that unions do alleviate firms` 
greed on workers in terms of unpaid overtime hours. The limitations are that the 
analysis are only preliminary explorations, and yet to unveil much of the mechanism of 
the transmission in this relationship. Further, the analysis can be improved with 
potential of finding good instruments to overcome the endogeneity issue. Future work 
might consider to jointly model hours of work and wage, which could shine more light 
on the transmission mechanism from unionization to hours, wage and income. Future 
work might also consider to model the interactions between paid and unpaid overtime 
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